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Abstract  
 
The objective of this research is to contribute to knowledge and understanding by exploring: 
first, the professional identities of English General Practitioners (GPs) and other clinicians in 
the newly-formed Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) and second, their level of 
involvement in CCG ‘calculative practices’ (Miller, 1990, 2001). The institutional field 
studied is acute care, i.e. hospital, commissioning in contemporary England. To achieve its 
objective, this thesis asks four research questions: 1) ‘How appropriate is it for clinicians to 
be involved in CCG acute care commissioning?’ 2) What motivates clinicians to assume 
leadership roles in CCGs?’ 3) How involved are clinicians in CCG calculative practices?’ and 
4) To what extent do hybridity and calculative practices affect clinicians’ professional 
identities in CCGs?’ The theoretical framework used is based on the concept of ‘calculative 
practices’ and elements of the Institutional Logics Theory (ILT). This research employs three 
research methods – documents’ content analysis, semi-structured, in-person interviews, and 
non-participant observation of CCG meetings with the public and NHS conferences. The 
interview subjects are NHS managers and accountants, as well as clinicians. This thesis 
answers the four research questions and then proposes some additional, incidental to this 
research findings and contributions to policy/legislation and practice. In conclusion, this 
study deliberates on the viability of the purchaser-provider split of the early 1990s that 
established the foundations and raison d’être of CCG commissioning and dwells on the 
possibility that one day the general taxation-funded and free at the point of service National 
Health Service (NHS) in England may cede its way to a US-inspired model of full blown 
privatisation.    
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Prologue 
 
“Accounting affects the type of social reality we inhabit, the way we 
understand the choices open to individuals and business undertakings, and 
even how we assess ways of maintaining the nation’s health ... It is 
fundamental to the manner in which we administer the lives of others and 
ourselves. Yet, the calculative practices of accounting are largely invisible to 
the public eye…” (Miller, 2001, pp. 392-393). 
 
 
The English National Health Service (NHS) has been experiencing the effects of a 
momentous institutional re-organisation in the last two-three years. As one of the largest 
organisations in the world (Lapsley and Schofield, 2009), the NHS provides healthcare 
services to millions of people in England and the rest of the UK. Nowadays, this general 
taxation-funded institution is facing a number of serious challenges, most of which are also 
typical of other developed Western countries (Erler et al., 2011) – ever increasing demand for 
healthcare coupled with shrinking resources, high public expectations, and fast developments 
in medicine and technology. In today’s environment of financial austerity, healthcare 
institutions and the professionals therein need to provide their services much more effectively 
and efficiently than previously (Blumenthal and Dixon, 2012).   
 
Any large-scale reform of the socially important and cherished by the British people NHS 
would be worthwhile investigating in scholarly research, especially in the current context of 
financial constraints. This Ph.D. thesis focuses, therefore, on the most recent, far-reaching 
restructuring of the NHS in England and more particularly on the effects of changes to the 
commissioning of acute, i.e. hospital or secondary, healthcare. Commissioning involves 
2 
 
 
 
much more than simply buying something (Light and Connor, 2011). Acute commissioning, 
among other things, deals with the planning and purchasing of acute healthcare services from 
providers of such services (usually NHS hospitals) by commissioning bodies. The 2010-2015 
Coalition government’s plan to reform the commissioning of healthcare in England was first 
announced in July 2010 in the white paper, Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS (DH, 
2010a). After a consultation period with interested parties, the proposed reforms were slightly 
modified and then took effect on 1 April 2013, a result of the enactment of the Health and 
Social Care Act 2012 (from now on, ‘HSCA 2012’) one year earlier. Clinicians, most of 
whom family doctors or General Practitioners (GPs), were tasked with the new duty to lead 
commissioning in England. New commissioning bodies, known as Clinical Commissioning 
Groups (CCGs) were legislated all over the country. The reforms to commissioning are just 
one, but financially, politically, and socially significant, reform introduced by the HSCA 
2012.   
 
Despite the fact that healthcare commissioning plays a key role in how the NHS in England 
spends its money, most English people do not know what commissioning is and who handles 
it (HCHC, 2010a). As the opening quote of this thesis states, the “calculative practices of 
accounting are largely invisible to the public eye…” (Miller, 2001, pp. 392-393).  
 
1.2. Objective of this thesis 
 
The objective of this doctoral thesis is to contribute to knowledge and understanding by 
exploring the professional identities of GPs and other clinicians in the newly-formed CCGs 
and their level of involvement in CCG calculative practices. Both healthcare and CCGs are 
situated in the interplay of numerous institutional forces, be they political, economic or 
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social. A plethora of competing priorities exists in large public sector institutions, such as the 
NHS (Lapsley and Skærbæk, 2012), a fact which makes them intriguing to study.     
 
1.3. Why does this research matter?  
 
First, financial constraints in the public sector, such as the ones triggered by the 2008 credit 
crunch, are particularly apparent in healthcare. This sector has traditionally consumed a very 
large portion of Western countries’ tax resources.1 The agents studied in this research are 
clinicians (mostly GPs) in the newly established by the HSCA 2012 commissioning bodies, 
CCGs. There are 211 CCGs in England. Clinicians in CCGs are important to study from a 
financial constraints point of view since they allocate billions of pounds worth of healthcare 
budgets each year to various healthcare providers, i.e. they are purchasers of healthcare. By 
the end of 2013 for instance, CCGs handled £65 billion, or 68%, of the £95 billion NHS 
annual budget.
2
 The remaining 32% were spent by non-CCG bodies – for example by NHS 
England for primary care (general practice) and specialised commissioning (the 
commissioning of rare or expensive to treat diseases). The significance of these monetary 
amounts is tremendous. Various previous types of commissioning bodies have consumed a 
traditionally large portion of the NHS budget, as well.
3
  
 
                                                          
1
 To highlight the social and financial importance of the NHS in general, it is important to note for example that 
the NHS in the UK, including England, was allocated the biggest percentage of the overall UK public budget in 
2011-2012 (HM Treasury, 2012): of the total £322.5 billion for all public services, the NHS was allocated an 
estimated £101.1 billion, followed by the Department of Education (£51.2 billion) and the Department of 
Defence (£28.6 billion).  
 
2
 Available at: <http://www.england.nhs.uk/2013/03/27/gp-commissioning/> [Accessed 17 June 2013].  
 
3
 In 2011-2012 for example, the predecessor commissioners of the current CCGs, the Primary Care Trusts 
(PCTs), were allocated close to £93.9 billion, or about 90%, of the total £104 billion that the Department of 
Health (DH) spent on the NHS in that year (NAO, 2013a). In 2010-2011, this amount was £89.9 billion, or 
89.5%, of the total NHS budget of £100.4 billion (NAO, 2011, p. 10).  
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Second, non-financial constraints are also apparent in the healthcare field. One of the non-
financial constraints brought to the fore in this research is cross-occupational boundaries. 
Nowadays, in many international health systems, there has been a pronounced need for 
“getting doctors to be more engaged in management, leadership and service improvement,” 
that is, there is a need for clinical experts to also become good managers and leaders (Clark, 
2012, p. 437). The HSCA 2012 set in law the involvement of family doctors, i.e. GPs, in 
CCG commissioning. “As the custodians of the processes and micro-systems of health care, 
doctors are ideally placed to lead improvements,” (Ibid.) reasoned the government. Thus, GPs 
in England were given the new, legislated duty to engage in, among other things, 
‘participative budgeting’ (Bryer, 2014) and allocate millions of pounds each year to the CCG 
whose members they were. Multi-million pound budget allocations were also done by 
previous NHS commissioning bodies (Daniels et al., 2013). 
 
Given that financial management and accounting information play an ever more significant 
role in the management of healthcare, do the new commissioning roles of GPs conflict with 
their identities as healthcare professionals (Pettersen and Solstad, 2014)? Is it the case that 
medical doctors are people who possess a strong social identification with their occupational 
group or are they individuals who are easily malleable into new occupational identities? This 
research focuses on similar concerns with cross-occupational challenges and constraints in 
the context of CCGs.  
 
1.4. Definition of key terms 
 
First, what is a ‘clinician’? Laurant et al. (2010) distinguish between two types of clinicians: 
‘physicians’ (people with a degree in medicine who are fully licensed to practice medicine, 
5 
 
 
 
such as GPs and specialist consultants) and ‘non-physician clinicians’ (advanced Practice 
Nurses, such as Nurse Practitioners, specialist nurses, and clinical nurses; physician 
assistants; pharmacists; and allied health professionals, such as physical therapists, speech 
and language therapists, dieticians, and paramedics). Each country has its own specifications 
as to what a ‘physician’ and a ‘non-physician’ clinician means. In this research, the term 
‘clinician’ has a more narrow definition than just someone belonging to the medical 
profession. Here, the term designates these medical practitioners who can be involved, 
statutorily, according to the HSCA 2012, in CCG commissioning. These are “member[s] of a 
profession regulated by a body mentioned in section 25(3) of the National Health Service 
Reform and Health Care Professions Act 2002” (HSCA 2012, §28(1E)). These medical 
professionals are mostly GPs, but also specialist medical consultants, and nurses.  
 
Second, Professor Peter Miller from the London School of Economics defines ‘accounting’ 
as ‘an ensemble of devices and ideas formed at particular times and in particular locales, 
rather than an immutable and universal starting point” (Miller, 1998, p. 608). CCG 
commissioning may be seen as such an example of accounting; it is an ensemble of ‘devices 
and ideas’ formed in a particular ‘time’ (2010-2013) at a particular ‘locale’ (England). This 
Ph.D. thesis is in accounting and adopts this broad definition of the word ‘accounting.’ It 
does not assume that accounting is limited to just bookkeeping, financial reporting, 
managerial accounting, auditing, and taxation. Besides, Miller states that accounting is “an 
assemblage of calculative practices and rationales…” (p. 605). By extension, CCG 
commissioning is also a set of calculative practices. In another work, Miller writes that 
accounting is “a process of attributing financial values and rationales to a wide range of 
social practices, thereby according them a specific visibility…” (Miller, 1990, pp. 316-317). 
Thus, CCG commissioning gives ‘visibility’ to certain ‘financial values and rationales,’ too.  
6 
 
 
 
 
Third, what are ‘calculative practices’ (Miller, 1990, 2001)? These are “technologies of 
government (Rose and Miller, 1992: 183) … the mechanisms through which programs of 
government are articulated and made operable” (Miller, 2001, p. 379). CCG commissioning 
may be seen as such a ‘technology’ of the Coalition government that instituted it; it is a 
mechanism through which the ‘programme’ of government was ‘articulated’ and put into 
operation.  
 
Fourth, let us define another key term, besides ‘calculative practices,’ which appears in the 
title of this thesis, ‘Hybrid professional identities and ‘calculative practices:’ The case of GPs 
in the English National Health Service acute care commissioning.’ This term is ‘professional 
identity.’ Practices and identities are two inter-related concepts: the ‘What do we do?’ 
question refers to practices, while ‘Who are we?’ refers to identities (Glynn and Raffaelli, 
2013). In this research, ‘professional identity’ has social identity elements since medical 
professionals have traditionally been members of exclusive social and professional groups. 
 
Tajfel, cited in Ashforth, Harrison and Corley (2008, p. 327), defines ‘social identity’ as, 
“that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his 
membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance 
attached to that membership.” Clinicians in CCGs do possess a professional medical identity 
by virtue of their social membership in medical associations and circles. Perhaps, there is a 
certain level of ‘value and emotional significance’ that they attach to this membership. Unlike 
personal identity, social identity focuses not so much on individual attributes (demographic 
and personal characteristics, such as gender and race), but on ‘levels of self’ that distinguish 
among groups of individuals (Ashforth, Harrison and Corley, 2008).  
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Fifth, ‘hybrids’ have been defined as “composite phenomena produced by elements usually 
found separately. In biology, for example, hybrids are produced by crossing different species. 
In organisational terms, hybrids similarly represent a composite of two distinct modes of 
organising that achieve a degree of stability and longevity” (Fischer and Ferlie, 2013, p. 33). 
GP-commissioners may be seen as such hybrids – part medical professionals and part 
commissioners (administrators, businessmen and businesswomen, leaders, strategists, as it 
will be shown in another chapter). Their professional identity may also be seen as hybrid – a 
commissioning identity and a medical identity.  
 
1.5. Expected contributions, i.e. gaps to fill, and research questions 
 
This research seeks to contribute to current knowledge and understanding in accounting, 
management, and identity studies by identifying and filling a number of research gaps in the 
extant literature. Next, these research gaps will be presented one by one, together with the 
four research questions whose answers are expected to help fill these gaps.  
 
Gap 1 
 
Since the HSCA 2012 is a recent piece of legislation (it became effective on 1 April 2013), 
there have been relatively few academic studies that simply mention or examine in detail the 
CCG commissioning reforms (Asthana, 2011; Conrad and Guven-Uslu, 2012; Gray and 
Higgins, 2012; Hodgetts, 2012; Petsoulas et al., 2011; Robinson et al., 2012). These reforms 
have mostly been addressed by the practitioner literature (the British Medical Journal, the 
Health Service Journal, and the Lancet, to list just a few). This research tries to respond to 
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Guven-Uslu and Conrad’s (2011) call for further academic research on NHS clinicians and 
managers, many of whom are now CCG commissioners.  
 
Gap 2 
 
Some academics are skeptical about the commissioning leadership of the new clinician-
commissioners (Gridley et al., 2012; Richardson, 2013). While the changes to commissioning 
certainly mean that clinicians now have a leading role in, for example, population-based 
budgeting, Robinson et al. (2011) doubt that GPs will be able to meet their commissioning 
challenges on their own. They will have to engage with other stakeholders, such as the 
government, interest groups, and civic society in general. Petsoulas et al. (2011, p. 185) 
express the concern that GPs “generally lack experience and expertise in large-scale, 
secondary care contracting.” Devlin (2010, p. 1076) asks the vital question: 
“[A]re we sure that GP commissioners will be better agents for patients 
(individually and collectively) than PCTs [Primary Care Trusts, the old 
commissioners]? While GPs may be ‘closer’ to what individual patients want, 
it is not obvious why this would make them more expert at weighing up the 
relative benefits to patients, and the opportunity costs of budget allocation 
decisions. Indeed, it seems unlikely that many GPs will currently have either 
the expertise or interest in making these decisions.”   
 
To the author’s knowledge, no other study has asked directly of NHS managers and clinicians 
about whether this ‘lack of experience and expertise’ is just a perceived problem or whether it 
is actually causing problems in CCG commissioning. Besides, no other research has so far 
asked of NHS clinicians and managers about how they personally feel about clinicians’ 
involvement in commissioning, often a set of calculative practices. After all, commissioning 
involves a very different knowledge and skill set from medicine (what clinicians have been 
actually trained in). The knowledge and skill base most needed in commissioning is business, 
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management accounting, strategic, and calculative in nature – planning, budget preparation 
and allocations, contracting with providers, paying for services, de-commissioning of 
services, etc. (see section 4.5). 
 
Unlike the former practice-based commissioning (PBC) that placed the ultimate 
accountability for acute care commissioning on Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), the most recent 
commissioning reforms placed the ultimate accountability for it on GP-led CCGs. Cox (2011) 
sees some ethical dilemmas behind this shift since the new statutory duties of GP-
commissioners would place them in the impossible position where caring for patients might 
no longer be their primary concern. This research will try to find out whether the above 
concern with the fitness of clinicians to be involved in CCGs (calculative entities) is justified. 
 
Gap 3 
 
This research will incorporate Miller’s (1990, 2001) concept of ‘calculative practices’ in the 
context of CCGs, something that no other study has done, so far. Miller presents management 
accounting as a ‘technology of government’ that “link[s] together responsibility and 
calculation … to create the responsible and calculating individual” (Ibid.). A similar take on 
the CCG commissioning function (as a ‘technology of government’) has not been done 
before, although it seems to be highly appropriate. Regarding accounting practices, Miller 
states: 
“Rather than confront individuals daily over the allocation of resources, why 
not provide funds to an individual who will have both the responsibility and 
the freedom to spend the money as they see fit? Why not, in other words, seek 
to produce an individual who comes to act as a self-regulating calculating 
person, albeit one located within asymmetrical networks of influence and 
control?” (Miller, 2001, p. 381). 
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The NHS clinicians involved in CCGs may also be seen as such ‘responsible,’ yet ‘free’ 
persons who are being ‘produced’ by the system as ‘responsible and calculating individuals.’ 
As it was already noted in section 1.4, CCG commissioning may be viewed as a ‘technology 
of government.’ Thus, the first research question is: 
 
RQ 1: ‘How appropriate is it for clinicians to be involved in CCG acute care 
commissioning?’  
 
This research focuses only on acute care commissioning for capacity reasons. By all means, 
GPs are involved in several other sorts of commissioning, as well – prescribing, mental 
health, and others. Answering this first research question would help fill the first three gaps 
delineated above.  
 
Gap 4 
 
Empirically, this research extends the stream of accounting scholarly research by addressing 
the issue of commissioning within the English healthcare field. While some accounting 
research has concentrated on the commissioning for education, introduced in the UK by the 
Education Reform Act (ERA) 1988 (Edwards et al., 2000; Ezzamel, Robson and Stapleton, 
2012; Laughlin et al., 1994), healthcare commissioning in the new CCGs, entities collectively 
responsible for billions of pounds of healthcare budgets, has surprisingly not yet attracted the 
attention of the accounting community. Thus, this research contributes to the burgeoning 
academic literature in accounting on the recent NHS commissioning reforms.  
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Gap 5 
 
This thesis reviews the literature on relevant NHS structures (past and present NHS systems 
and institutions, various commissioning reforms that stem from the ‘purchaser-provider split,’ 
etc.) but, most importantly, it also looks at the agency (individual actors) side of CCG 
commissioning. This is done via the concept of professional identities. Kilfoyle and 
Richardson (2011) from the accounting literature have looked at both structure- and agency-
centred approaches to better understand the budgeting process in management accounting. 
Armstrong (2011), again from the accounting literature, has also explored the behavioural 
(agential) side of budgeting. Studies of the agency element behind budgeting and other 
calculative practices from a CCG perspective lack in the accounting literature.  
 
Gap 6 
 
To the author’s knowledge, no other study has so far examined why exactly some clinicians 
in England agree to undertake what seems to be difficult leadership roles in the new CCGs. 
To be a CCG leader – Accountable Officer, Chair of the board of governors, etc. – is a highly 
responsible undertaking. Membership in a CCG is mandatory for all English GPs, as 
mandated by the HSCA 2012, but undertaking a CCG leadership role is not. The following, 
second research question will help fill the fourth, fifth, and sixth, literate gaps:  
 
RQ 2: ‘What motivates clinicians to assume leadership roles in CCGs?’ 
 
Knowing the personal motivations of the clinicians involved in CCG leadership roles is an 
important issue to explore, given the enormity of the monetary responsibility bestowed onto 
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them. Motivation is important to study since it affects the way one does his or her job. It also 
casts some light on personal values and beliefs.    
 
Gap 7 
 
Calculative practices have penetrated the realm of medicine via CCG commissioning. Peter 
Miller writes:  
“Terms such as budgets, costs, return on investment, and so forth are no longer 
the preserve of the specialist. The calculative practices and language of 
accountancy have seeped into everyday life to an extent that would have 
seemed improbable to an observer of economic and social life half a century 
ago” (Miller, 2001, p. 391).  
 
This ‘seeping’ of calculative practices and the language of business and accountancy into 
clinicians’ everyday lives may or may not change their daily activities or practices – taking 
care of the sick, frail, and vulnerable. It would be interesting to see whether clinicians are 
very much or little involved in CCG calculative practices – another important gap in the 
literature. From here, the third research question is: 
 
RQ 3: ‘How involved are clinicians in CCG calculative practices?’ 
 
Gap 8 
 
This research also contributes to the literature on hybrid medical-managerial professional 
identities. A similar hybridity or ‘financialisation’ within knowledge-intensive organisations 
has been studied in Cushen (2013). So far, most of the research on medical hybrids has 
focused on the hybrid doctor-manager professional identity primarily from the provider’s 
perspective (i.e. in hospitals) (Ferlie and McGivern, 2014; Ferlie et al., 2011; Fitzgerald and 
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Ferlie, 2000; Fulop, 2012; Goodall, 2011; Hallier and Forbes, 2004; Kelly, Doyle and 
O’Donohoe, 2015; Llewelyn, 2001; Macinati, 2010; Noordegraaf, 2007; Waring and Currie, 
2009), not so much from the commissioner’s perspective (Pettersen and Solstad, 2014).  
 
Extant research has focused on professional restratification into medical surveillance roles in 
general practice (McDonald et al., 2009; O’Riordan and McDermott, 2012). For instance, 
McDermott et al. (2013, p. 4) find that, “GP managers have a high level of certainty of their 
identity as a GP rather than as a manager; and both GP managers and non-GP managers 
oscillate between multiple identities depending on the different situations they are in.” 
Moreover, research on the identity of NHS medical commissioning mangers has been done in 
previous types of commissioning organisations (McDermott et al., 2013), but not in CCGs, 
partly because CCGs are relatively new organisations. Looking at the hybrid professional 
identities of clinicians within CCGs is a gap that this research will try to fill, empirically.
4
 By 
exploring such new organisations, this thesis aims to be a current and relevant study of 
present-day socially important policy and practice.  
 
If CCG clinicians are involved in medical-commissioning hybrid roles thanks to their CCG 
calculative practices, will this affect deeply, just superficially, or not at all their professional 
identities? Therefore, the following, fourth research question is also asked: 
 
RQ 4: ‘To what extent do hybridity and calculative practices affect clinicians’ 
professional identities in CCGs?’ 
                                                          
4
 Professional identities, but among accountants, have recently been studied in the accounting literature, as well: 
Becker, Jagalla and Skærbæk (2014) explore the identities of accountants in the public sector, while the 
collective identities of management accountants have been studied by Morales and Lambert (2013). Also, the 
identities of managers within professional accounting firms have been the focus of Kornberg, Justesen and 
Mouritsen (2012). 
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This last research question will address the effect of hybridity and calculative practices on 
clinicians’ professional identities in CCGs. Now, let us turn toward the theoretical 
underpinning of this research.  
 
1.6. Theoretical framework  
 
The main contribution of this research is not theoretical, but empirical in nature. This 
research may be seen as an elaboration of existing theory or an empirical application of 
existing theory to increase understanding of the subjects studied – GPs in CCGs. The 
theoretical take of this research is based on Miller’s concept of ‘calculative practices’ 
described in section 1.4 and on some concepts from the Institutional Logics Theory (ILT) 
(Friedland and Alford, 1991; Scott et al., 2000; Thornton, 2004; Thornton, Jones and Kury, 
2005; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008; Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2012). The ILT 
concepts used here are: the business logic, the professional logic, the governance logic, the 
political logic, and the dynamic interplays among them. ). Institutional logics are defined as, 
“the socially constructed, historical pattern of material practices, assumptions, values, 
beliefs, and rules [my emphasis] by which individuals produce and reproduce their material 
subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality” (Thornton 
and Ocasio, 1999, p. 804). More on these institutional logics concepts will follow in Chapter 
5. The ILT is a relatively new theory and is a development of the neo-institutional theory 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). To the researcher’s knowledge, no 
other study on the CCG reform in England has so far used elements of the ILT. Reay and 
Hinings (2005, 2009) have discussed similar healthcare reforms from the ILT perspective but 
in the Canadian context.  
15 
 
 
 
 
  
As it will be shown in Chapter 4, CCG commissioners act as: philosophers, accountants, 
economists, strategists, and managers, to name just a few, i.e. they are involved in calculative 
and non-calculative practices. CCG commissioning is itself a calculative practice, as we saw 
earlier. Miller writes that governments have first, a “programmatic aspect” that can be called 
“political rationalities” of government (Miller, 1990, p. 317). These rationalities are 
“statements, claims and prescriptions” that set out “the objects and objectives of government” 
(Ibid.). The second aspect of governments, according to Miller, is ‘technologies of 
government, “The term technologies can be used to refer to this wide range of calculations, 
procedures and mechanisms of government. Technologies … complement the programmatic 
aspects, enabling them to be represented as operable in principle” (Ibid.).  
 
1.7. Research methodology and methods 
 
This research assumes the interpretivist ontology. It employs a qualitative research 
methodology and uses primary and secondary data. The data will be used as a basis for 
answering the four research questions. The primary data come from twenty-one semi-
structured, individual interviews with NHS clinicians (mostly practicing or retired GPs) and 
senior managers and accountants working for the NHS in England. The interviews were 
conducted in person between September 2012 and September 2014 at the interviewees’ 
places of work. The secondary data come from two government documents (DH, 2010a and 
the HSCA 2012) and from non-participant observation of four CCG meetings with the public 
and three national NHS conferences. More on the methodology and methods used will be 
discussed in Chapter 6.  
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1.8. Structure of this thesis 
 
This thesis is structured as follows. The next two chapters are contextual in nature – they 
situate CCG commissioning within its broader context (time and space). Chapter 2 is a 
review of the literature on reforms in the public sector in general and in the NHS in 
particular. Chapter 3 is a review of the literature on CCG acute care commissioning. Chapter 
4 reviews the literature on the work identities of clinicians and commissioners and their 
practices, i.e. work-related activities. Chapter 5 presents the theoretical vantage point of this 
study – concepts from the ILT and Miller’s (1990, 2001) ‘calculative practices.’ Chapter 6 is 
concerned with the research philosophy of this research, i.e. its methodology and methods. 
Chapter 7 presents and analyses selected excerpts from the research data. Chapter 8 is the 
discussion chapter. It seeks to answer the four research questions from Chapter 1. It also 
presents some additional, incidental to this research, contributions that came to the 
researcher’s attention after data collection. Chapter 9 provides a short conclusion, research 
limitations, and directions for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF PUBLIC SECTOR REFORMS AND IDEOLOGIES AND THE NHS 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a background overview of various public sector 
reforms and ideologies and the NHS. Public sector reforms and ideologies have impacted 
significantly on healthcare and other fields in the UK and abroad. More specifically, this 
chapter presents the historical and ideological concepts of public administration (PA), New 
Public Management (NPM), and New Public Governance (NPG); then, it introduces the 
ideology of the Coalition government (May 2010 – May 2015), the government that initiated 
and implemented the most recent NHS commissioning and other reforms; lastly, it provides 
an overview of the NHS as a large and cherished public sector institution. This contextual 
chapter is important for the understanding of CCG commissioning since it familiarises the 
reader with broader social, economic, and political forces that stand behind the creation of 
clinician-led CCG commissioning. 
 
2.2. Public sector reforms and ideologies 
 
The issue of ideology has attracted substantial attention in the public sector literature (Higgs, 
1993; Williams, 2005). According to Williams, ideology affects not just one’s objectives and 
aspirations, but also the ways in which one judges reality. While the former influence is 
obvious, the latter is not so clear, posits the author. Ideology, according to Williams, 
transpires through the questions one asks, through the way one formulates problems and 
issues, through the analytical methods one adopts and through the evidence one seeks. In 
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Williams’ view, even those who believe themselves to be ideologically neutral may in fact 
adhere to an implicit ideological stance by tackling an issue in a particular manner. Thus, any 
social science analysis is bound to a certain type of ideological conviction. Ideology may 
inspire reforms or the upholding of administrative systems.  
 
Administrative systems, such as the NHS, are certainly not a new phenomenon. They existed 
for example in ancient Egypt to help fortify irrigation channels from the annual flood of the 
Nile and build the Egyptian pyramids. The Chinese Han dynasty (206 BC-AD 220) and the 
Greek, Roman, and Spanish empires were also administrative empires (Hughes, 2003). 
Drawing upon the UK’s experience, Osborne and McLaughlin (2002) distinguish four stages 
of development in the public management of administrative systems.  
 
The first stage started from the late nineteenth century and may be called the period of the 
‘minimal state.’ The authors note that the former UK Prime Minister (PM) Margaret Thatcher 
used to refer frequently to this period of public management. Government provision in this 
period was seen as a “necessary evil” (p. 7). The second stage of public management started 
in the early twentieth century and was characterised by an “unequal partnership between 
government and the charitable and private sectors” (Ibid.). This period was influenced, the 
authors continue, by an ideological shift toward social reformism and Fabianism: the state 
provided a minimum of essential public services and the charitable and private sectors 
provided the rest.  
 
Institutional change is a characteristic of administrative systems and has been an issue within 
the public sector for a long time (Dopson, 1997; Ferlie, Hartley and Martin, 2003). The 
metaphysics of processional change and continual becoming take centre stage in Chia (1999) 
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and McMurray (2010) and may be applied to the NHS, as well. From a more recent 
perspective, ‘publicness’ (Anderson, 2012) is defined as the characteristic of an organisation 
that reflects the extent to which the organisation is affected by political authority. The NHS 
seems to have a lot of ‘publicness.’ The third and fourth stages of public management, which 
are discussed next, are particularly telling examples of the influence of political ideology on 
public institutions.  
 
2.2.1. Public administration (PA) 
 
The third stage of public management, the ‘welfare state,’ characterised the period from 1945 
to the 1980s (Osborne and McLaughlin, 2002). The term that is most often used to describe 
this third period is ‘public administration’ (PA). Osborne and McLaughlin refer to William 
Beveridge, the renowned welfare state reformer from the post-World War II period, to 
explain that underpinning the PA model was the belief that charitable and private 
organisations had failed in the provision of public services because of a fragmentation and 
duplication of services and because of these services’ inefficiency and ineffectiveness. 
Therefore, governments at the time were to meet all the needs of their citizens “from the 
cradle to the grave” (p. 8).  
 
PA was characterised by a hierarchical model of bureaucracy. The officials staffing pubic 
services in this period were permanent, presumably neutral, and motivated only by “the 
public interest” (Hughes, 2003, p. 17). Public services were supposed to be managed in an 
objective and professional way, note Osborne and McLaughlin (2002). Many scholars agree 
that the theoretical foundations of PA were derived from Woodrow Wilson and Frederick 
Taylor in the US and from the founder of sociology, Max Weber, in Germany.  
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2.2.2. New Public Management (NPM) 
 
The fourth stage in the development of public management is that of the ‘plural state’ (Ibid.). 
This is the stage of the so-called ‘New Public Management’ (NPM), also known as ‘neo-
liberalism’ or ‘managerialism.’ The NPM period started in the late 1970s and elements of it 
certainly continue to influence public services today. Neo-liberalism in the UK is usually 
ascribed as an ideology of the Conservative government (1979-1997). The New Labour 
(2010 – May 2010) and the Coalition (May 2010 – May 2015) governments have continued 
using elements of the neo-liberalist ideology although these governments have shared 
different philosophical stances.  
 
The NPM movement that started in the 1980s is an international trend. Mulgan (2003, p. 151) 
observes that in the 1980s, the public service bureaucracies in many countries, not just in the 
UK, underwent substantial re-structuring. This was part of an international movement 
towards a public sector reform. In Mulgan’s view, each country’s reformers followed 
different paths, according to their country’s particular constitutional traditions and ideological 
leanings. Nonetheless, the reforms shared sufficient common elements “to be counted as a 
single movement and not just a haphazard collection of isolated changes” (Ibid.). In short, 
there was a worldwide ideological shift from a bigger role of the state in the economy and 
society toward a greater role of markets and private sector organisations, remarks the author. 
NPM spread all over the world (for example, see Doolin (2002) for NPM in the New Zealand 
context). “Many have started speculating whether NPM is actually rooted in our everyday 
lives, if it has ever existed or if we are in a post-NPM world” (Liguori and Steccolini, 2014, 
p. 320). Despite these existentialist doubts, examples of NPM reforms may be found in: 
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financial de-regulation, the privatisation of publicly owned entities, reductions in welfare 
entitlements, and greater reliance on the private sector in many industries, including 
healthcare.   
 
The Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher used to criticise the welfare state which 
aimed to provide a minimum standard of public services to everyone, an example of the 
rationing mentality typical of the period following World War II (Osborne and McLaughlin, 
2002). This universal state provision was perceived by many as inefficient and ineffective 
compared to the market provision of social goods (Mulgan, 2003). Hughes (2003) provides a 
detailed account of the facets of public administration that NPM critiqued. Yet, the main 
reason for the change from bureaucracy to managerialism, according to him, was that the old 
model did not work: PA was perceived as tied up in poor service and in process and was out 
of touch with reality.  
 
Rose and Miller (1992) in their widely influential article observe that neo-liberalism suggests 
that big government is not just inefficient. It is also malign – political parties are forced to 
make unrealistic promises, while competing for votes. This fuels rising public expectations 
and an over-reliance on the government that can only be met by public borrowing on a large 
scale:  
“Because ‘the welfare state’ depends on bureaucracy, it is subject to constant 
pressure from bureaucrats to expand their own empires, again fuelling an 
expensive and inefficient extension of the governmental machine. Because it 
cultivates the view that it is the role of the state to provide for the individual, 
the welfare state has a morally damaging effect upon citizens, producing ‘a 
culture of dependency’ based on expectations that government will do what in 
reality only individuals can” (p. 198).  
 
There was a clear trend at the time away from collectivism and towards individualism: “By 
the late twentieth century, however, the perceived needs of citizens had moved on, away from 
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a concern with a basic level of service for all and towards services designed to meet 
individual needs” (Osborne and McLaughlin, 2002, p. 8). This period saw the Reagan 
revolution in the US and the Thatcher revolution in the UK and was accompanied by deep 
changes in public management, changes which Peters (1993) refers to as ‘the hollow state,’ or 
‘governing from a distance,’ away from central government. Rubin and Kelly (2005) note 
that if legislators have little or no role in setting performance goals, prioritising these goals or 
evaluating them, then they gain little or no power or influence. Central government may also 
shift some day-to-day decision making and performance evaluation power away from itself 
and closer to local governments. All this leads to ‘hollowing out’ of the central government’s 
power, i.e. to a disempowerment via devolution of power to local level.  
 
‘Governing from a distance’ is usually linked to the concept of decentralisation of central 
government’s power. Decentralisation has been a very popular concept in the last quarter of a 
century in the sense that almost everyone has supported it (Pollitt, 2005). Decentralisation, 
this cornerstone of NPM, involves the notion of authority being spread out from a small to a 
large number of actors and decision makers – usually, from a central authority to more 
numerous local authorities; thus, decentralisation puts authority closer to citizens (Ibid.). 
 
Besides decentralisation, NPM is characterised by other traits – a focus on outcomes and 
results, rather than processes, meeting specified objectives, public budgeting reforms, and so 
on. Mulgan (2003) writes that managing for results has led to results-oriented budgeting in 
which funds are allocated for specific programmes or purposes. Results-oriented budgeting is 
not an invention of neo-liberalism but is widely used by it: Mulgan observes that the earliest 
instance of results-based budgeting preceded the NPM reform movement by several decades. 
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‘Program budgeting’ for example was introduced in the US during World War II and became 
known in the 1960s as the planning, programming, budgeting system (PPBS). 
 
One challenge for NPM has been the difficulty of specifying objectives and measuring 
achievement in many aspects of governmental activity; for example, often objectives are 
unprecise because policy goals are complex and made up of shifting and conflicting values 
(Ibid.). Policy goals, notes the author, may be contested by various groups with competing 
interests. “Attempts to capture public policy goals in a simple formulation typically lead to 
vague and porous objectives sufficiently broad to cover all likely developments but without 
the rigour needed to provide clear direction or generate unambiguous measures of success or 
failure,” writes Mulgan (2003, p. 185). Besides, public budgeting reform has ranged from 
minor to dramatic (Rubin and Kelly, 2005). The more dramatic changes, in these authors’ 
view, have included a shift from simple line-item budgeting to programme and performance 
budgeting, performance contracts, contracting or leasing with the private sector, output and 
outcome measurement, and fiscal decentralisation. 
 
One of the main goals of NPM is to increase transparency and accountability. Programme 
administrators, for instance, are usually held accountable for delivering their contracted 
results (Ibid.). The incorporation of output and outcome performance information into the 
budgeting process is meant to help weed out ineffective programmes. Such programmes 
waste resources by not achieving their goals at all, or by not achieving them optimally (Ibid.). 
Mulgan (2003) observes that the NPM accountability reform agenda has tried to reorient 
public sector accountability away from inputs, processes, and political accountability for 
detailed decisions towards an accountability for results that is given directly to customers and 
through regulation. These accountability reforms have been met with mixed results. In fact, 
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an enhanced accountability has been difficult to achieve in the complex network of 
decentralised public bodies. 
 
Managerialism has been the object of criticism, just as PA has. It has been criticised for its 
economic basis, neo-Taylorism, politicisation, reduced accountability in practice, difficulties 
to achieve contracting out, ethical issues, implementation and morale problems, etc. (Hughes, 
2003). Needless to say, the NPM reforms discussed above apply also to the healthcare sector 
in the UK. Talbot-Smith and Pollock (2006) note that in the 1990s, the NPM measures aimed 
to increase efficiency and choice; however, the NHS hospitals and community services, 
already short of resources at the time, faced the additional cost of competing for funding, 
dealing with risk, and administering and monitoring hundreds of complex contracts. In the 
1990s, within a short period of time, more than a third of the newly-formed hospital trusts 
faced serious financial difficulties. Some were forced into mergers and service closures. 
NPM-based ideas contributed to the development of performance measurement and 
management systems that exposed in publicly available tables’ format the ‘poor’ healthcare 
providers (Ferlie et al., 2013). The early quasi-market experiment in health (1990-1997), a 
focus of discussion in Chapter 3, led to the disintegration of the old vertically-integrated NHS 
into purchasers and providers. These two were linked by contracts, rather than by 
administrative hierarchy, observes the same source.  
 
It is worth noting that NHS trusts (groups of hospitals) in the 1990s were no longer given free 
support from the Department of Health (DH)’s regional offices for their capital planning, 
estates’ management, and Information Technology (IT) (Talbot-Smith and Pollock, 2006). 
For the sake of efficiency, they now had to buy these services out of the revenue they earned 
from the health services they ‘sold.’ The authors observe that all NHS service providers now 
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had to pay an annual charge (originally 6%) on the value of their land and equipment. This 
money came out of the revenue trusts ‘earned.’ This is known as the capital charging system 
and is paid to HM Treasury, similarly to property tax. The NPM idea behind capital charging 
was that trusts needed to become more economical with the use of their capital assets. They 
were encouraged to sell off any assets they did not need or assets that were too valuable (for 
example, land in cities) by having to pay for their use, note the authors.  
 
Some commentators see severe consequences of the NPM philosophy on healthcare (Light 
and Connor, 2011; Pollock, 2004). For example, Light and Connor (2011) share the view that 
if healthcare is commercialised by being exposed to market pressures, hospitals will learn as 
sellers how to exploit buyers and customers in whatever ways this makes them money. Thus, 
depending on how incentives are structured, hospitals might overtreat or undertreat. The 
NPM reforms have attracted further criticism in the literature (Ferlie et al., 2013). The 
following externalities have been noted: an exaggerated focus on productivity and operational 
management (Dunleavy, 1995), a disengagement (or ‘democratic deficit’) between public 
services agencies, public services workforce, including clinicians, and society in general 
(Weir and Beetham, 1999), and excessively vertical and fragmenting effects (Sullivan and 
Skelcher, 2002).  
 
The NPM concept of privatisation has been seen as the reason behind the “dismantling” of 
the NHS by various governments over the past quarter century (Pollock, 2004, p. vii). This, in 
her opinion, is not unique to Britain since universal healthcare systems are being dismantled 
and privatised all over the world. Healthcare has become a commodity to be bought, rather 
than a right, she claims, and this has been the guiding philosophy of the Word Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the World Health 
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Organisation (WHO), and many more. NPM, according to some scholars, has transitioned to 
a particular type of governance. 
 
 2.2.3. New Public Governance (NPG)  
 
A potential successor of NPM is New Public Governance (NPG) (Osborne, 2006). Ferlie et 
al. (2013) see the idea of this chronological succession from NPM to NPG as too simplistic. 
Often however, NPG is considered to be the successor of NPM. NPG originated in the late 
1990s after NPM had already emerged. Both trends, NPM and NPG, are still clearly visible in 
the social and business worlds and practitioners shop freely between them (Ibid.).  
 
Before discussing NPG in greater detail, it is worthwhile to first discuss the concept of 
‘governance.’ There are various definitions of the word ‘governance,’ including such that 
include NPM (Klijn, 2012). In some of the literature, governance is equated to NPG. The 
term ‘governance’ has its roots in the Greek word kubernan, which means ‘to steer.’ It later 
developed through the Latin terms gubernare and guvernator and mostly meant ‘to steer’ or 
‘to pilot a ship’ (Storey and Grint, 2012). The French philosopher Michel Foucault (Foucault, 
1991) has used the word ‘governance’ in the same sense. To govern a ship, Foucault writes, 
one needs to take charge of the crew, the boat and its cargo, to deal with weather conditions 
and rocks, and to establish good working relations among the sailors. One governs a 
household in a way similar to governing a ship. Governing a family is not only about 
safeguarding the family’s property. It is about the wellbeing of the family members 
themselves, as well, continues Foucault. The same principle applies to the governance of the 
NHS. There are various eventualities that need to be considered if this large and complex 
institution is to be governed effectively.  
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Foucault’s work on the art of governing has been enlightening to the study of reforms within 
the NHS. Veitch (2010) for example builds on Foucault’s work on the art of governing to 
study New Labour’s proposed reforms to the NHS at the time. Veitch sees a similarity 
between these proposed reforms and the politics of 18
th
 century France: the French 
government wanted to distance itself from patients by transferring the task of patient care to 
patients’ families, the Church, and charities. This way, the government turned from “curer” to 
“advisor” and “supporter” (p. 323). In today’s context, a similar shift of responsibility is 
illustrated by the debate on the shift from the provision of care to the promotion of care by 
the Secretary of State for Health. 
 
As was already noted, the term ‘governance’ is sometimes used synonymously with NPG. 
While NPM is mostly based on organisational economics and principle-agent theory, NPG is 
primarily based on network theory (Ferlie et al., 2013). While NPM is linked to individual 
organisations, NPG has a multi-organisational focus (a network focus) and an interest in 
network concepts, such as ‘whole-of-government accounting’ and consolidation accounting 
issues (Almquist et al., 2013). These authors observe that while NPM is based on a vertical 
and hierarchical view, NPG has a horizontal focus: NPM is concerned with the outcomes of 
individual organisations, while NPG – with these of collaborative efforts among several 
organisations. Besides, NPM uses performance information in a ‘command and control’ way, 
while the function of performance information within NPG’s networks “is mainly to support 
processes of debate and dialogue among the partners with different competencies, who are 
dependent on each other but not in a hierarchical sense” (p. 4). NPG also helps enhance the 
quality and innovative capacity of information dispersed by various actors and enhances 
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democratic legitimacy by making possible the early involvement of stakeholders in policy 
dialogues (Klijn, 2012). 
 
According to Klijn, one may regard both NPM and NPG as reactions to the growing 
complexity of contemporary society and the difficulties of the traditional welfare state to 
cope with this complexity. The increased specialisation in today’s world, including the 
increased specialisation in healthcare (Scott et al., 2000), has led to enhanced 
interdependencies (Klijn, 2012). Klijn also notes that the growing individualisation has 
formed citizens who are more critical of their governments than in previous years; besides, 
traditional societal ties, such as family, religion, and neighbourhood, seem to have lost some 
of their strength in Western societies. “These arrangements must, on the one hand, satisfy 
demands for more integrated service delivery, with citizens participating ... Both NPM and 
governance recognize this growing complexity but have different attitudes toward coping 
with it” (p. 202).  
 
Rhodes (2012) sees three waves in the governance literature – network governance, meta-
governance, and interpretive governance – and points out that interpretive governance is the 
new way forward. The first wave, network governance, “evokes a world in which state power 
is dispersed among a vast array of spatially and functionally distinct networks composed of 
all kinds of public, voluntary, and private organizations with which the center now interacts” 
(p. 34). According to the author, the proponents of the first wave kind of governance are 
“self-confessed modernist-empiricists with a reified notion of structure rooted in an explicit 
social science theory of functional differentiation” (p. 39). 
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The second wave of governance, meta-governance, is a critique of the first wave. The 
proponents of meta-governance claim that the state is a material object, a structure, and a 
social form. They draw on the critical realist ontology by using such notions as “emergence” 
and “mechanism” (Ibid.). The second wave critiques argue that the state has been “hollowed 
out” of its centralised powers (p. 36). Another view is that the state has not been hollowed 
out, but that it governs indirectly: governance is more like indirect policy steering within 
complex multi-level systems than like direct policy imposition (Ferlie et al., 2013; Newman, 
2001). The state “has reasserted its capacity to govern by regulating the mix of governing 
structures such as markets and networks and deploying indirect instruments of control” 
(Rhodes, 2012, p. 39). Examples of indirect instruments of control are the use of negotiation, 
diplomacy, and other less direct modes of steering, writes Rhodes.  
 
Further on, Rhodes notes that there are three ways in which the state may steer the other 
actors involved in governance (Rhodes, 2012). The first way is that the state may set the rules 
for the other actors involved in governance to abide by and leave them to act within these 
rules. The second way is that the state may steer these actors by ‘storytelling.’ For the 
purposes, it may organise dialogues, create meanings, shape the beliefs and identities of the 
actors, as well as influence what they think and do. The third way is that the state may steer 
the actors by the way in which it distributes resources, such as money. Perhaps, the HSCA 
2012 is an example of the first way of steering – rule setting. An example of the second way 
of steering may be the House of Commons Health Committee reports (HCHC 2010a, b; 
HCHC 2011a, b, and c) on PCT commissioning where expert evidence was sought from a 
wide range of experts – storytelling. An example of the third way of steering may be the 
creation of clinician-led CCGs – distribution of financial resources.  
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Coming back to the three waves of governance, according to Rhodes, the third wave consists 
of ‘interpreting the changing state:’   
“An interpretive account of governance represents a shift of topos from 
institutions to meanings in action. It explains shifting patterns of governance 
by focusing on the actors’ own interpretations of their beliefs and practices. 
The everyday practices arise from agents whose beliefs and actions are 
informed by traditions and expressed in stories. It explores the diverse ways in 
which situated agents are changing the boundaries of state and civil society by 
constantly remaking practices as their beliefs change in response to dilemmas. 
It reveals the contingency and contestability of narratives” (Rhodes, 2012, p. 
39). 
 
Further, Rhodes (2012, p. 40) notes that this third wave of governance has an “actor-centred 
or bottom-up approach” to explaining patterns of rules since, in the case of failings in existing 
patterns of rules for instance, a system’s failings are not just given by one’s actual 
experience, but are also constructed from one’s interpretation of experiences infused with 
traditions. Thus, Rhodes brings up an interpretivist ontological element to the concept of 
governance. The concept of ontology, or worldview, will be introduced in more detail in 
Chapter 6.  
 
                2.2.4. The Coalition government’s ideology: May 2010 – May 2015 
 
The former Coalition government (Hickson, 2009; Painter, 2013) is the one that initiated and 
carried out the latest NHS reforms. This government consisted of the Conservative Party 
(right wing) and the Liberal Democratic Party (centre-right wing). As already noted in 
Chapter 2, prior to the Coalition government, the UK was ruled by the Conservative Party for 
18 years (1979-1997) and by the New Labour Party for 13 years (1997 – May 2010). The 
Coalition government needed to prove itself quickly, so it acted quickly, suggests Timmins 
(2013).   
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Over the five days in May 2010 when the Coalition was formed, something important 
happened – it was not just the case that the Coalition government agreed to eliminate the 
deficit over a Parliament (twice as fast as New Labour had planned it), but it also agreed to 
fixed-term parliaments (Ibid.). This plan gave the Coalition only five years in which to 
govern, but possibly only five years in case the economy did not pick up, posits Timmins. 
Besides, the Conservatives had perhaps over-absorbed Tony Blair’s statements in his 
autobiography that he had made the mistake of wasting his first term in office by not acting 
boldly enough on public service reform, observes the author. Thus, the Coalition became 
immensely bold in terms of public service reform and quickly, 
“launched the most ambitious programme for government since the Attlee 
administration of 1945. In three short years, the Attlee administration had 
introduced a national health service and a new social security system; 
nationalised the Bank of England and a clutch of utilities including coal and 
electricity … and built half a million new homes despite material shortages. 
The Coalition programme came close to matching that ambition. There was to 
be not just the NHS reform but a radical restructuring of tuition fees; the 
introduction of “free” schools … a major restructuring of the Financial 
Services Authority and the Bank of England; a merger of the Competition 
Commission and the Office of Fair Trading; elected police commissioners; 
more elected mayors; a big reform of public sector pensions; a new “localism” 
offering individuals new rights … and much else – all while eliminating the 
deficit, imposing by far the biggest cuts to government spending in living 
memory” (p. 46). 
 
Again, as noted in the above quote, the most recent NHS reforms were not the only reforms 
quickly introduced by the Coalition government. These reforms are just one example of the 
many reforms adopted by the Coalition in its hopes to act fast, achieve results, and gain the 
public’s trust. It seems like the 2008 world economic crisis, while creating ‘windows of 
opportunity for significant policy change to take place’ (Doetter and Götze, 2011), were not 
the only driving force behind the recent NHS reforms. Political drives and aspirations also lie 
at the heart of this important institutional change.   
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Before the NHS reforms, the Coalition Agreement of 2010 (HM Government, 2010) paid 
particular attention to the reduction of the deficit, European Union (EU) issues, civil liberties, 
pensions and welfare, and the environment. With regards to the environment, for instance, 
Timmins (2013) observes that the Coalition Agreement specified at least seventeen specific 
commitments, among which were the rollout of smart electricity meters and the creation of 
wildlife corridors that were meant to preserve the UK’s biodiversity. Yet, the NHS, the 
biggest public service in the UK that consumes about £100 billion a year, or about a third of 
all departmental spending, received little, if any, attention in this agreement. The NHS got a 
little more than half a sentence in this agreement, “The parties agree that funding for the NHS 
should increase in real terms in each year of the parliament, while recognising the impact this 
decision would have on other departments” (p. 45).   
 
The silence vis-à-vis any future reforms of the NHS during the pre-2010 elections campaign 
(Timmins, 2013), including the silence in the Conservative and Liberal Democratic parties’ 
manifestos, was surprising considering the fundamental reforms proposed in the July 2010 
white paper, Equity and excellence: Liberating the NHS (DH, 2010a). The Conservative party 
(the Tories) had even promised that if it were to win the elections, there would be no more 
disruptive and costly top-down reorganisations of the NHS (Timmins, 2013). Prior to the 
2010 elections, the Tories had promised not to cut the NHS budget and to keep the NHS 
away from continuous ‘re-disorganisations’ (Tallis, 2013). Within a few months of this 
promise, “the Coalition was boasting of the most radical shake-up of the service since 1948, 
the mother of all top-down reorganisations” (Tallis, 2013, Kindle p. 133). 
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The NHS reforms of 2010-2013 are mainly the workings of one man in particular – Andrew 
Lansley, a Conservative and the Coalition government’s first Secretary of State for Health.5 
He had previously held the post of Shadow Secretary of State for Health under the New 
Labour government for an unprecedented six and a half years (Timmins, 2013). Lansley, the 
son of a pathologist, comes from a family of public servants: his first wife was a GP, while 
his brothers were a teacher and a policeman, the source notes. The young Lansley was the 
principal private secretary of Norman Tebbit, the man who had privatised British Telecom 
(BT) at the time. Tebbit, Timmins notes, was one of Lansley’s personal heroes. Due to his 
experience with BT’s privatisation, which was based on the ideas of free competition and 
markets, Lansley developed a preference for market forces, such as the privatisation of the 
energy sector (Jupe, 2012), as a solution to the issues facing the NHS. Before entering 
politics in 1990 as head of the Conservatives’ research department, Lansley was a director of 
the British Chambers of Commerce (Timmins, 2013). At the Chambers of Commerce, he 
worked with the young David Cameron (the current UK Prime Minister (PM)) and George 
Osborne (the current Chancellor of the Exchequer and Second Lord of the Treasury), both of 
whom are also Conservatives. In the summer of 1992, Andrew Lansley suffered a minor 
stroke. His experience in the NHS at the time reinforced his genuine attachment to the NHS 
(Ibid.).  
 
2.3. Overview of the NHS  
 
The National Health Service (NHS) is the general taxation-funded, public healthcare service 
in the UK.
6
 It is the biggest integrated (Crisp, 2011) and the largest publicly-financed 
healthcare system in the world (Asthana, 2011). The NHS in England alone serves 52.23 
                                                          
5
 Andrew Lansley’s post was assumed by Jeremy Hunt in September 2012.  
6
 In 2001 for example, 86% of the NHS revenue came from general taxation, 12% from national insurance 
contributions, and 2% from user charges (Maynard, 2005). 
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million of the total of 62.24 million (or 83.8%) UK population (Davies, 2012). The Scottish, 
Welsh, and Northern Irish NHS systems are managed separately
7
 from the English NHS 
(Crisp, 2011). The annual budget of the English NHS exceeds £100 billion (Ibid.). All 
individuals living in England are entitled to NHS healthcare which is usually free at the point 
of access.  
 
The NHS services in England alone are provided by a 1.35 million staff and an additional 
159,000 staff work in local authority adult social services departments (NAO, 2013a). Just 
under a half of these 1.35 million staff is clinically qualified (Davies, 2012). According to the 
same source, the NHS deals with about one million patients every 36 hours and, in a typical 
year, the people in England visit GP practices 300 million times, make 19 million visits to 
Accident & Emergency (A&E), and make about five million calls to the NHS Direct 
telephone line (now called NHS 111). Besides, annually, there are about four million ordinary 
and day-case admissions to English hospitals and about 45 million outpatient appointments. 
Out of the total contacts per day, 51% (or 836,000) are GP or Practice Nurse consultations, 
24% (or 389,000) are community, non-hospital contacts, 94,000 (or 6%) are in-bed, 
emergency admissions to hospital stays, 7% (or 124,000) are outpatient attendances, and 
49,000 (or 3%) are A&E contacts (Ibid.). The UK spends less than the European average on 
healthcare as a percentage of its GDP, perhaps an indication of its efficiency. The 8.7% of 
GDP spent on healthcare in the UK in 2008 was less than what the French spent in that year 
(11.2%), what the Germans spent (10.5%) or what the Americans spent (16%). Nevertheless, 
this 8.7% of GDP was a significant part of national expenditure at the time (Crisp, 2011).  
 
                                                          
7
 The structure of the NHS is distinctive in the four constituent parts of the UK – England, Scotland, Wales, and 
Northern Ireland; yet, the NHS is based on common principles in all four nations (Davies, 2012).  
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Founded on 5 July 1948,
8
 the NHS is a treasured symbol of pride and national unity 
(Llewelyn and Northcott, 2005) that is revered around the world.  It is a national icon in the 
sense that it is by far the most popular of Britain’s public services, “a jewel in the crown of 
welfarism … and very much the envy of billions of people around the world whose health 
services are less developed, less accessible, more expensive and more exclusive” (Lister, 
2008, p. 1). Thus, the NHS was proudly featured during the opening ceremony of the 2012 
London Olympics. Besides the NHS, there is a small private healthcare sector in England that 
provides services for which there are usually long waiting lists in the NHS (Gaynor, 
Laudicella and Propper, 2012). The private sector does not cover all the healthcare services 
that the NHS does; the private healthcare sector is highly specialised, mostly dealing with 
elective surgery. For example, about 20% of all varicose vein repairs, hernia surgeries, and 
hip-joint replacements and about two-fifths of cosmetic operations are privately financed. 
The private sector, according to the same source, does not deal with medical emergencies, the 
kind of cases which fill NHS A&E departments (Klein, 2005).  
 
The NHS has its own constitution which establishes its principles and values and sets out 
patients,’ the public’s and staff’s rights. According to this constitution, the NHS belongs to 
the people and has lofty aspirations: 
[The NHS] is there to improve our health and wellbeing, supporting us to keep 
mentally and physically well, to get better when we are ill and, when we 
cannot fully recover, to stay as well as we can to the end of our lives. It works 
at the limits of science – bringing the highest levels of human knowledge and 
skill to save lives and improve health. It touches our lives at times of basic 
human need, when care and compassion are what matter most (DH, 2013b, p. 
2). 
 
                                                          
8
 More on the history of the NHS may be found in Doetter and Götze (2011), in Dr. Charles Webster’s The 
National Health Service: A political history (Webster, 2002) or in Timmins (1995).  
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The NHS Constitution also lays out the pledges that the NHS commits itself to achieve and 
the responsibilities of the public, patients, and staff. The Secretary of State for Health, all 
NHS bodies, private and voluntary sector providers, and local authorities are required by law 
to take into consideration the NHS Constitution while making decisions and taking actions 
(Ibid.). The NHS Constitution is renewed every ten years, while its accompanying handbook 
is renewed every three years. The NHS Constitution was last updated on 26 March 2013 
(Ibid.). 
 
The seven principles that guide the NHS in all that it does are: 1) that it provides a 
“comprehensive service, available to all,” 2) that “[a]ccess to NHS services is based on 
clinical need, not an individual’s ability to pay,” 3) that the “NHS aspires to the highest 
standards of excellence and professionalism,” 4) that it “aspires to put patients at the heart of 
everything it does,” 5) that it “works across organisational boundaries and in partnership with 
other organisations in the interest of patients, local communities and the wider population,” 
6) that it is “committed to providing best value for taxpayers’ money and the most effective, 
fair and sustainable use of finite resources,” and 7) that the “NHS is accountable to the 
public, communities and patients that it serves” (pp. 3-4). The Handbook to the NHS 
Constitution (DH, 2013a) clarifies each of these seven principles.  
 
The NHS is not a stand-alone organisation. It is closely linked to the DH and to Her Majesty 
(HM) Treasury. The DH is responsible for the overall performance of the NHS and has broad 
responsibilities: it “sets the direction on promoting and protecting the public’s health, taking 
the lead on issues such as environmental hazards to health, infectious diseases, health 
promotion and education, and the safety of medicines” (p. 5). The DH is also responsible for 
adult personal social services which are not part of the NHS. HM Treasury, on the other 
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hand, is the government’s economic and finance ministry. It controls public spending and sets 
the direction of the country’s economic policy, so that sustainable economic growth may be 
achieved.
9
 Among other things, HM Treasury is responsible for public spending, including 
capital investment, the delivery of infrastructure projects in the public sector (for example, 
the building of new hospitals), and facilitating private sector investment in UK infrastructure 
projects. 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
 
From the above literature review, it becomes clear that the CCG reforms are not an isolated 
event. Ever since its creation, the NHS has been in the midst of various forms of governance, 
ideologies, party and individual aspirations. It would be hard to gain a better understanding of 
the subjects studied (GPs in CCGs) without this contextual information. Now that some 
important features of public sector reforms and ideologies – PA, NPM, NPG, and the 
ideology of the former Coalition government – and the NHS have been addressed, this 
research will turn towards another contextual chapter, Chapter 3, which will elaborate on 
some important aspects of the literature on acute healthcare commissioning, past and present. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/hm-treasury/about> [Accessed 24 November 
2013].  
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CHAPTER 3 
REVIEW OF ACUTE HEALTHCARE COMMISSIONING IN THE ENGLISH NHS 
 
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
The aim of this chapter is to familiarise the reader with the specific institutional field studied 
in this research – acute healthcare commissioning in the contemporary NHS in England. This 
familiarity is important because in its absence, it would be difficult to understand the 
contributions to knowledge and understanding that this thesis proposes. The chapter starts 
with a definition of the terms ‘acute’ care and ‘commissioning.’ It then presents the ‘old’ 
(2005 – 1 April 2013) and ‘new’ (since 1 April 2013) commissioning systems in the English 
NHS. Afterwards, Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs), the particular healthcare 
commissioning organisations which this thesis focuses on, are presented in terms of 
governance, accountability, and support. Then, some key literature on the ‘new’ 
commissioning is reviewed, followed by a review of other key literature on prior forms of 
commissioning in the English NHS – GP fundholding and Practice-Based Commissioning 
(PBC).    
 
3.2. Commissioning of acute healthcare in the English NHS     
 
 3.2.1. Definitions of ‘acute’ healthcare and ‘commissioning’ 
 
This research examines the recent changes to the agency ultimately responsible for the 
allocation of significant financial resources from the DH, i.e. central government, to a local 
level within the ‘acute’ healthcare sector. This allocation is done, as it will be shown later, 
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through the process of ‘commissioning.’ ‘Acute’ healthcare, or simply acute care, according 
to the Health Foundation, is specialised medical care received in either an A&E hospital 
department or in a less urgent hospital setting following a GP referral to a specialist 
consultant (hospital physician or specialist). The referral may be for surgery, complex tests or 
other procedures that cannot be done in the community, i.e. outside of hospital.
 10
 The Health 
Foundation notes that the term ‘acute care’ is reminiscent of the acute or emergency phase of 
a patient’s condition in hospital before he or she moves on to community settings. Besides, 
the terms ‘acute,’ ‘secondary,’ and ‘hospital’ care are sometimes used synonymously for 
medical services carried out in a hospital by specialised staff (usually doctors and nurses) 
using specialised medical equipment.  
 
It is important to distinguish acute care from mental health, primary (GP care or family 
practice), social (for the elderly, frail or disabled), ambulance or end-of-life (hospice) care. 
Acute care, the Health Foundation clarifies, usually provides treatment for a short period of 
time, until the patient is well enough to be supported in the community. The source also notes 
that about half of all patients treated in acute hospitals are emergency cases (unplanned care), 
while the remaining half are planned admissions (admitted either as day cases or with 
overnight stays), an option that usually requires a letter of referral from a GP. It is important 
to mention here that GPs in England do not work in hospitals; they work in GP practices, 
sometimes called ‘GP surgeries,’ as independent contractors of the NHS.   
 
Acute care affects virtually everyone’s life – most of us are born in hospital, some of us are 
treated in hospital, many of us die in hospital. Storey, Bullivant and Corbett-Nolan (2011) 
rightly observe that healthcare’s governance is concerned with some of the most crucial 
                                                          
10
 Available at: <http://www.health.org.uk/areas-of-work/topics/acute-care/> [Accessed 10 July 2013].  
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questions in today’s societies: who exactly should make decisions about the allocation of 
scarce resources across the whole healthcare system, should more money be allocated for 
taking care of the terminally ill than for those in A&E, should more money be spent on 
mental health and less money on cancer treatments, should local A&Es be closed down 
because a superior service is provided further down the road? These are the kinds of 
questions that ‘commissioning’ is meant to give answers to.  
 
Before studying the recent changes to acute care commissioning, it would be necessary to 
first define the term ‘commissioning.’ The commissioning of healthcare services has been 
defined by the DH in the following way: 
“understanding the health needs [my emphasis] of a local population or a 
group of patients and of individual patients; working with patients and the full 
range of health and care professionals involved to decide what services [my 
emphasis] will best meet those needs and to design these services [my 
emphasis]; creating a clinical service specification [my emphasis] that forms 
the basis for contracts with providers; establishing and holding a range of 
contracts [my emphasis] that offer choice for patients wherever practicable; 
and monitoring [my emphasis] to ensure that services are delivered to the right 
standards of quality” (DH, 2010a, p. 2). 
 
Thus, the main elements of commissioning are the following. The first one is to assess the 
needs and develop a strategy for each health condition, group of conditions or client group 
within a local population of patients (HCHC, 2010a). This strategy, continues the above 
source, tries to determine what services are needed by the local population and the minimum 
standards these services should abide by. The strategy also tries to provide a framework for 
purchasing these services. The second element is to purchase the services via formal contracts 
between purchasers and providers. Public sector contracting and its challenges have been 
widely researched in the 1990s (Allen, 2002; Bartlett, 1991; Bennett and Ferlie, 1996; Rose 
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and Miller, 1992; Stewart, 1993) and also more recently (Petsoulas et al., 2011). The third 
element is to monitor and evaluate these services.  
 
Given the above definition, it is clear that commissioning is not simple. The commissioning 
process has been described as “complex and multi-stranded” (Jones and Lee, 2011, p. 92) and 
as involving strategic planning, procuring, monitoring, and evaluation (Quayle, Ashworth and 
Gillies, 2013), among others. According to HCHC (2010a), commissioners are to be 
advocates for their respective patients and communities by securing appropriate high-quality 
healthcare services; they should also be custodians of taxpayers’ money by securing best 
value in the use of resources.  
 
Healthcare commissioning requires extensive work with a variety of financial and non-
financial reports, including budgets, a central concept in management accounting. Budgets, as 
noted by Wildavsky (1979), are financial constructs concerned with the translation of 
resources into a variety of human purposes: a budget may be described as a series of goals 
with price tags attached to them. Commissioning authorities work with devolved from central 
government budgets (Hughes, 2003), i.e. their budgets are allocated for various purposes at 
commissioning, i.e. local, level, rather than at central, DH, level. One of commissioners’ 
main duties is to make sure that their expenditures do not exceed these in their allocated 
budgets (DH, 2010c).  
 
The issue of who should handle commissioning has been a topic of debate in public 
management for a long time. Should commissioning be done by civil servants, by clinicians, 
or by both? Harradine, Prowle and Lowth (2011) observe that the place of clinicians in the 
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management of hospitals
11
 has been an issue of concern since the birth of the NHS. 
According to these authors, different approaches have been tried to attract clinicians into 
management and budgetary processes in the past (for example, into specialty costing and 
clinical and management budgeting), but due to their role conflicts and the inadequacy of 
information systems, these attempts have often failed to progress or gain universal adoption 
until CCGs came to light.  
 
3.2.2. Overview of the ‘old’ commissioning of acute healthcare: PCTs and SHAs 
(2005 – 1 April 2013)  
 
The ‘old’ NHS system, i.e. the one preceding the recent NHS reforms, spanned from 2005 to 
1 April, 2013. It is depicted in Figure 1. In the old system, the DH devolved resources and 
responsibility for the delivery of NHS services to Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). PCTs were 
created in 2002 and were overseen by Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) (NAO, 2013a). In 
turn, PCTs devolved resources to providers, including NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts 
(FTs), many of which operated acute hospitals.
12
 PCTs and SHAs were the healthcare 
commissioners of acute and other care under the ‘old’ NHS system.  
 
The DH allocated resources to PCTs based on the PCT local populations’ estimated needs, 
while aiming to ensure equal access to healthcare and help reduce health inequalities (Ibid.). 
PCTs were “afforded a great deal of discretion” in the use of the funds allocated to them by 
the DH (Palmer, 2011, p. 69). Most of the entities in Figure 1 – the arms’ length bodies, also 
                                                          
11
 It is difficult to say exactly how many acute hospitals are included in the English NHS because since 1992 
hospitals have been administered by NHS trusts (and later also by NHS foundation trusts (FTs)). Each trust can 
encompass several acute hospitals (Pollock, 2004).  
 
12
 NHS FTs, which are self-governing institutions, do not have a statutory duty to make a surplus in any given 
year (NAO, 2012b). NHS trusts, however, should show a three consecutive years’ overall surplus. If not, under 
the ‘old’ NHS system, they used to receive financial support from their commissioners or directly from the DH.  
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called quangos, Monitor, the Care Quality Commission (CQC), and local authorities – are 
beyond the scope of this research and are included in Figure 1 for informational purposes 
only.  
 
Figure 1 
The Department of Health’s pre-1 April 2013 delivery network 
 
 
 
Adapted from: National Audit Office (2013a, p. 6) 
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clusters) 
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The ‘old’ commissioners – PCTs and SHAs – were considered by many people, including the 
Coalition government, to be expensive and bureaucratic organisations. The manifestos of all 
three major political parties (Conservative, Liberal Democrats, and Labour) before the 2010 
general elections focused heavily on cutting back on management costs and achieving 
efficiency gains (Timmins, 2013). This commentator sees in these cut backs an expression of 
one of most politicians’ ‘favourite pastimes’ – ‘bureaucrat bashing.’  The Conservatives, 
Timmins specifies, promised a 30% cut back in NHS administration costs, or a £4.5 billion 
cut. Labour, on the other hand, promised to cut the NHS red tape and make the £20 billion of 
efficiency savings required by the so-called ‘Nicholson challenge.’ Explaining how exactly 
administration costs would be cut was missing from the three manifestos, writes Timmins. 
The Liberal Democrats’ manifesto intended to cut by half the size of the DH, to scrap SHAs, 
and to replace PCTs with elected local health boards. 
 
The idea of cutting down on NHS administration costs is not new. The policy document, 
Creating a patient-led NHS: Delivering the NHS improvement plan (DH, 2005) intended to 
move funds away from management and towards ‘front line’ services by reducing the number 
of PCTs, SHAs, and other NHS bodies (HCHC, 2010a). It was decided in May 2006 to 
reduce the number of PCTs from 303 to 152, specifies the same source. In October 2006, new 
chairmen and chairwomen were appointed to these new, less numerous PCTs.  
 
Commissioners and providers (usually hospital trusts and their hospitals) in the ‘old’ NHS 
showed a variety of financial performance. In its report, Securing the future financial 
sustainability of the NHS (NAO, 2012b), the NAO points to the fact that in 2011-12 most 
commissioners (SHAs and PCTs) declared a surplus: all 10 SHAs declared a surplus, while 
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only three of the 151 PCTs declared a deficit. The combined deficit of these three PCTs was 
£49 million, while the combined surplus of the remaining 148 PCTs was £571 million. 
 
Another important point to note regarding the ‘old’ commissioners is that some of them 
would give financial support to their provider trusts and FTs in case these trusts experienced 
financial difficulties, such as deficits: “Any assessment of the underlying financial 
sustainability of the NHS, however, must also recognise that SHAs and PCTs agreed non-
recurrent funding to some trusts: direct financial support to increase income; and other non-
recurrent funding, including support for transitional costs or business changes” (p. 8).  
 
This NAO report (NAO, 2012b) concludes that without direct financial support from the DH 
or from commissioners, some NHS trusts, FTs, and even some PCTs would not have broken 
even, would have reported a larger deficit or would have had a smaller surplus in 2011-12. 
The report estimates that SHAs and PCTs provided £151 million in additional revenue to 
NHS trusts and £10 million to FTs in 2011-12. It shows that without a ‘one-off’ direct 
support, fifteen more NHS trusts might have posted a deficit in 2011-12. The report also 
identifies seven PCTs that might have reported a deficit for 2011-12 if they had not received 
additional resources from their SHAs or if they had not benefited from reallocations between 
PCTs within the same PCT cluster, reallocations totaling £89 million.  
 
One criticism that the ‘old’ commissioners used to receive was the ease with which they 
helped financially their troubled providers. Some PCTs had agreed to make advance 
payments of amounts due to trusts under contracts in 2011-12 (Ibid.). Some of these trusts 
had needed the advance payments to manage cash flows and to pay creditors, notes the NAO 
report. Besides, according to the report, some PCTs waived fines for providers who failed to 
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achieve infection targets: rather than levying penalties, these PCTs expected trusts to use the 
saved money to improve their performance in these areas. Commissioners also agreed 
payments to trusts to reflect increased work, i.e. activity, in cases where measures to reduce 
referrals from primary care or emergency admissions had not been in place.  
 
It is not just commissioners, but also the DH itself, that helped some provider trusts:  
“[T]he Department provided injections of cash to some trusts, in the form of 
public dividend capital, to strengthen the balance sheet, provide working 
capital or cover cash shortages resulting from deficits. All financial support is 
intended to help maintain services for patients, and is conditional on plans for 
recovery to a more sustainable position” (NAO, 2012b, p. 8).   
 
Some commentators note that commissioning had become “an end in itself, rather than a 
means to better patient care” (Light and Connor, 2011, p. 821). This perceived 
ineffectiveness of the ‘old’ commissioning system was probably caused by the numerous top-
down reorganisations of the NHS. Partly because of their central role in the NHS, PCTs were 
constantly subject to criticism; scarcely a week passed by without the uncovering of new PCT 
failings (HCHC, 2010a). For example, data inadequacies and disagreements about measuring 
quality (Bennett and Ferlie, 1996; Ranade, 1995) were among the factors that hindered 
effective contracting in the public sector in general and in PCTs in particular (Devlin, 2010). 
Besides poor data, skills deficit was another perceived reason for the failings of PCTs. 
According to Light and Connor (2011), policy leaders from Parliament, the King’s Fund, and 
the Nuffield Trust issued detailed reports on the ineffectiveness of what is now the ‘old’ 
commissioning. Most of these reports, observe the authors, note how PCTs lacked the skills 
and resources, purchasing power, and appropriate data to commission effectively. Devlin 
(2010, p. 1075) observes: 
“Primary Care Trusts … the main budget holders in the NHS, are viewed by 
some as having been unable to use their commissioning role to drive 
improvements in technical and allocative efficiency … A recent House of 
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Commons Health Committee report … concluded that many PCTs were 
passive; attributing weaknesses to a lack of skills and clinical knowledge ... 
Others … suggest that PCTs simply were not given a fighting chance, and 
could not match the power of hospitals and other NHS providers.” 
 
The idea that commissioners were not given a fair ‘fighting chance’ compared to hospitals, as 
mentioned above, is supported by Light and Connor (2011, p. 821): “[T]he government gave 
more power, higher salaries, and greater freedoms to the hospitals” than to commissioners in 
the early days of commissioning. In the later days of PCT commissioning, write Light and 
Connor, ministers still did not understand that “commissioning bodies need[ed] to attract top 
talent, have excellent data on how well providers perform, and have significant purchasing 
power in order to reward providers” (Ibid.). 
 
3.2.3. Overview of the ‘new’ acute healthcare commissioning: CCGs (since 1 
April 2013) 
 
Figure 2 summarises the structural changes introduced by the HSCA 2012,
13
 i.e. the ‘new’ 
NHS. It is important to note here that the recent changes to acute commissioning, as well as 
other changes introduced by this Act of Parliament, are not a matter of simple policy, but of 
legislation. Legislation is a law passed by Parliament which, according to Rose and Miller 
(1992, pp. 189-190), “translates aspects of a governmental programme into mechanisms that 
establish, constrain, or empower certain agents or entities and set some of the key terms of 
their deliberations.” Thus, the HSCA 2012 is both an obstacle (‘constraint’) and a vehicle of 
‘empowerment’ to the actors and entities involved in commissioning.  
 
                                                          
13
 For more on the HSCA 2012, please consult: <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/7/contents/enacted> 
[Accessed 2 September 2013].  
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On 1 April 2013, the ‘old’ system of commissioning healthcare, including acute care, 
changed fundamentally: the PCTs and SHAs ceased to exist, so that “layers of excessive 
bureaucracy” could be slashed and so that it might be “down to front-line medical 
professionals to structure services around what works best for patients” (Asthana, 2011, p. 
816). The abolition of SHAs and PCTs was meant to reduce NHS management costs by about 
45% (Asthana, 2011; DH, 2010a, b). The responsibility and resources for commissioning 
acute care, as well as most other types of care,
14
 except specialised and primary care which 
are commissioned at a national level by NHS England, passed from the 10 SHAs and 152 
PCTs to the 211 new CCGs, the ‘new’ acute care commissioners.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
14
 CCGs currently commission: community health services, maternity services, elective hospital care, urgent and 
emergency care, including ambulance and out-of-hours services, older people’s healthcare, children’s 
healthcare, rehabilitation, mental healthcare, healthcare services for people with learning disabilities, continuing 
healthcare, and infertility services (Davies, 2013). Acute care is just one, but very costly, service that CCGs 
commission (see also Naylor and Goodwin, 2011). 
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Figure 2 
The Department of Health’s post-1 April 2013 delivery framework 
 
 
 
Adapted from: National Audit Office (2013a, p. 8) 
 
The 211 CCGs comprise of GPs, nurses, allied health professionals, pharmacists, and other 
health professionals, but mostly of GPs.
15
 For 2013-14 alone, the DH had granted the NHS in 
                                                          
15
 When the recent reforms were first proposed, CCGs used to be called GP-led consortia (Holbeche, 2011). 
This name was later changed to CCGs, following advice from the NHS Future Forum 2011, to reflect the fact 
that professionals other than just GPs, such as nurses, are also part of these consortia (Storey and Grint, 2012). 
See also Davies (2013). 
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England £95.6 billion, 68% of which had been passed to CCGs (Davies, 2012; NAO, 2013b). 
The resulting £65 billion handed down to CCGs is a sum that is close to the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) of Morocco (Belfiend, 2012). Therefore, CCG commissioning is worth 
studying from an accounting point of view – these statutory entities are authorised to handle a 
very significant amount of money every year (billions, not just millions). Over 40% of the 
NHS expenditure (NAO, 2011), i.e. about £38 billion, is accounted for by acute care trusts. 
Thus, acute care commissioning is important to study in view of the material proportion of 
the NHS expenditure that it consumes, as already noted in Chapter 1.  
 
One of the other important changes to the ‘old’ NHS is that the NHS Commissioning Board 
(NHSCB) was established in October 2012. On 1 April 2013 however, this board was 
renamed to NHS England. NHS England provides leadership to the whole new NHS 
commissioning system, including the new CCGs (NAO, 2013a). It has four regional offices 
and 27 Local Area Teams (LATs). The CCGs are currently supported and held to account by 
NHS England and placed under the regional offices and the LATs (NAO, 2013b). Davies 
(2012) observes that NHS England, an independent arm’s length NHS body, is directly 
accountable to Parliament for the outcomes of the NHS. The HSCA 2012 designates the 
Chief Executive of NHS England as its Accounting Officer, a designation which contrasts 
with the practices of other arm’s length bodies’ – their Accounting Officers are appointed by 
the DH’s Accounting Officer (NAO, 2013b).  
 
According to the same source, the most recent NHS reorganisation has cost the NHS £1.1 
billion up to 31 March 2013, while 10,094 full-time equivalent members of staff have been 
made redundant due to the reforms. One hundred and seventy NHS organisations have closed 
down, while 240 new NHS organisations have opened up. The average redundancy payment 
51 
 
 
 
has been £43,095, while £95.6 billion have been granted to NHS England for 2013-14 alone. 
Moreover, £2.4 billion has been the DH’s estimate of savings in administration costs as a 
result of the reforms up to 31 March 2013. Sky News (2013) remarks that over the past three 
years, more than 32,000 NHS managers have received exit packages. Of these, 330 have 
received payoffs of more than £200,000 each and just under 2,000 have received payoffs 
between £100,000 and £200,000 each. These figures, notes the source, came in the same 
week that the NHS workforce statistics showed that the number of nursing jobs lost since the 
election in 2010 had been over 5,000.  
 
3.2.3.1. Governance of CCGs, including clinicians’ involvement 
 
When should we stop funding cancer care for those who are terminally ill but might treasure 
a few extra months with their families? Dilemmas like this are within the scope of healthcare 
governance (Storey, Bullivant and Corbett-Nolan, 2011) and commissioning in particular. 
Each option will attract advocates and opponents. So, ‘Who should decide and how?’ ask the 
authors. Should the timing of funding cancer care, for example, be decided by: the DH, civil 
servants, clinicians, patients, and/or the local community? 
 
More than 90% of patient contacts in the NHS are said to occur in primary care via GP 
consultations.
16
 Except in emergencies or with specialist referrals, patients in England usually 
see their GP first (Hausman and Le Grand, 1999). “Modern political rationalities and 
governmental technologies” are linked to “the powers of expertise,” remind Rose and Miller 
(1992, p. 173). Besides, GPs are seen as “general health experts with strong links to their 
local populations and a good degree of trust within their local communities” (Geyer, 2013, p. 
                                                          
16
 Available at: <http://www.bmj.com/content/348/bmj.g2408/rr/692631> [Accessed on 23 March 2015].  
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49). All these are reasons why GPs are considered by many to be ideally placed to understand 
the healthcare needs of their catchment areas. Clinicians are the conventional health experts, 
although patients also have undergone a certain ‘proto-professionalisation’ or 
‘medicalisation’ (De Swaan, 1988; Dent and Haslam, 2006), i.e. in today’s information age, 
patients have learned how to communicate to their doctors what problems they experience 
using medical vocabulary and knowledge found online. 
 
In the ‘new’ NHS, the governance arrangements within CCGs may be described in the 
following terms: 
“All CCGs will be required by law to have a governing body, the main 
function of which will be to ensure that the CCG has in place appropriate 
arrangements to exercise its functions effectively, efficiently and economically, 
and that it complies with such generally accepted principles of good 
governance as are relevant to it. The governing body will include at least one 
registered nurse, a specialist doctor and two lay members – one of whom will 
have a lead role in overseeing key elements of governance, such as audit, 
remuneration and managing conflicts of interest” (DH, 2012, p. 9).  
 
Geyer (2013, p. 49) purports that GPs have usually acted as patients’ advocates and that GP-
led commissioning would respond to “increasing demands for greater localism and autonomy 
within the English NHS.” Clinical commissioning would also “shift decision-making as close 
as possible to individual patients” (Asthana, 2011, p. 815). Harradine, Prowle and Lowth 
(2011, p. 55) find out in an empirical study that a clinical manager is able to “make savings 
within his clinical specialty of approximately £200,000 per annum. These savings were from 
adjustments to workload planning and additional payment rates.” While making savings may 
often seem to be a promising side of clinical involvement in management (and 
commissioning), based on the above study, Gridley et al. (2012) question the assumption that 
GPs are best placed to commission in ways that meet quality standards and lead to equitable 
outcomes. These commentators note that “[t]here is little evidence to suggest that GPs will 
53 
 
 
 
succeed where others have failed and a risk that, without top-down performance 
management, service improvement will be patchy, leading to greater, not reduced, inequity” 
(p. 87). 
 
Geyer (2013) is aware of the fact that there are both pros and cons to GP commissioning: it 
could align clinicians’ financial and clinical responsibilities, encourage decentralisation, 
promote local accountability, and enable GPs to shape the healthcare system to better serve 
patients. At the same time, Geyer writes that among the cons of GP commissioning could be: 
an increase in local variability of health outcomes (post code lottery), the growth of 
inappropriate relationships between commissioning GPs and large providers, such as 
pharmaceutical companies, who have a clear financial interest in influencing commissioners’ 
decisions, threats of lawsuits around complex commissioning contracts, a loss of the 
traditional GP culture, etc. Richardson (2013), among others, is also skeptical of GPs’ dual 
commissioner-provider role, i.e. of their conflict of interests in the new system. In other 
words, GPs have to provide primary care and at the same time commission (buy) secondary 
(hospital) care for their patients. Wouldn’t this dual role of purchaser and provider incline 
GPs toward adjusting their referral practices to secondary, including acute, care in such ways 
that would seem the most financially convenient to them?  
 
3.2.3.2. Accountability of the new acute healthcare commissioners 
 
The topic of accountability has received a lot of attention in the accounting, management, and 
sociology literatures (Almquist et al., 2013; Armstrong and Tomes, 1996; Butler, 2005; 
Cochrane, 1993; Dubnick, 2005; Goddard, 2005; Hodges, 2012; Hoskin, 1996; Jönsson, 
1996; Laughlin, 1996; McKernan and McPhail, 2012; Messner, 2009; Mulgan, 2003; 
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Sinclair, 1995; Smyth, 2013). Yet, this thesis does not address the topic of accountability in 
detail due to having a different focus. The new upward and downward accountability 
relationships within the English NHS, legislated by the HSCA 2012, are innovative and 
complex (Baker, 2013). In Department of Health: Accountable Officer system statement (DH, 
2012) for instance, the former Accounting Officer of the NHS, Sir David Nicholson, first 
describes his own accountability to Parliament, as Permanent Secretary and Principal 
Accounting Officer, and shares that he is accountable to Parliament for the appropriate 
stewardship of the resources allocated to the NHS. Under the ‘new’ NHS, the post of NHS 
Chief Executive no longer exists: Sir David Nicholson became the Chief Executive of NHS 
England instead. His current successor is Simon Stevens. The Chief Executive has sole 
Accounting Officer responsibility in the DH for the proper and effective use of resources 
voted by Parliament for the NHS. This top level accountability is described in the above DH 
document (p. 6): 
“Under the new system … most day-to-day operational management in the 
NHS will take place at arm’s length from the Department. [This distancing of 
the DH from the various NHS bodies] … is intended to empower front-line 
professionals … [and] will reduce the Department’s direct involvement in 
operational decision-making.”  
 
Both NHS England and CCGs are held to account under the ‘new’ system in the following 
manner: 
“The NHSCB will in turn appoint and hold to account the Accountable Officer 
of each CCG. Accountable Officers will be responsible for the stewardship of 
resources within each CCG, ensuring that the organisation complies with its 
duty to exercise its functions effectively, efficiently and economically … As the 
NHSCB Accounting Officer will be accountable for the entire NHS 
commissioning budget, he will prepare a set of annual accounts which 
consolidates the accounts of the NHSCB itself with the individual accounts of 
all CCGs … Both the accounts and the governance statement will be 
consolidated into the Department’s annual report and accounts … [T]he 
NHSCB will be audited by the National Audit Office, like the Department and 
other ALBs [arm’s length bodies]” (pp. 8-9). 
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There are strict accountability relationships between CCGs and NHS England. NHS England 
has a number of ways to satisfy itself (and the DH) on how CCGs discharge their 
responsibilities and ensure that they act with regularity and propriety, while providing value 
for money in the services they commission from providers (DH, 2012). Some of NHS 
England’s levers of accountability assurance include: 1) a Commissioning Outcomes 
Framework developed to provide transparency and accountability about the quality of 
services that CCGs commission; 2) the on-going assurance of CCGs which is done via an 
annual performance assessment that looks at how well CCGs have met their financial and 
other statutory duties; 3) a requirement for CCGs to publish an annual report with 
information about how they have discharged their functions; and 4) powers of intervention in 
case a CCG is unable to effectively fulfill its duties (Ibid.; Davies, 2013). While organisations 
are being held accountable for the actions taken in their name in all sectors, in the public 
sector collective accountability usually attaches itself to the executive government and 
sometimes to specific governmental agencies, especially if these agencies are independent 
statutory bodies (Mulgan, 2003), such as CCGs.  
 
3.2.3.3. Commissioning Support Units (CSUs) 
 
Commissioners, under the ‘new’ NHS are given the option to work with commissioning 
consultants. NHS England started by hosting 19 Commissioning Support Units (CSUs)
17
 
whose role was, and still is, to help CCGs by carrying out various functions, grouped into 
service lines,
18
 such as: service redesign, contract negotiations, management and monitoring, 
                                                          
17
 CSUs were previously called Commissioning Support Services (CSSs) (Davies, 2013). 
  
18
 CSUs could exercise functions that were categorised into seven service lines during the early stages of the 
CSU assurance process. These service lines are now thirty (Williams, 2012a): business intelligence (such as data 
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information analysis, and risk stratification (Davies, 2013). CSUs’ involvement in service 
redesign
19
 may be limited to an advisory or communications capacity, but it may also be 
extended to engagements in the redesign of healthcare services (Thiel, 2013). The redesign of 
healthcare services and care pathways is hoped to lead to significant cost savings in the long 
run since providers can make efficiency savings (achieve the same or better outcomes with 
the use of fewer resources) by reducing their costs or by redesigning care services (NAO, 
2012a).  
 
The idea of using commissioning consultancy is not new: the former commissioners, PCTs 
and SHAs, also had the option to hire the services of consultants. If a CCG hires the services 
of a CSU, the ultimate accountability for the quality of services received still rests with the 
CCG, not with the CSU. CCGs are under no obligation to use the services of CSUs: 
commissioning work may be retained in-house (within a CCG), shared with another CCG or 
delegated to a CSU (Williams, D., 2013). These three different options and the risks 
associated with each are explored in Williams, J. (2013). According to this author, the 
NHSCB’s ‘model constitution’ framework for CCGs, first published in April 2012 and 
superseded by the so-called ‘model constitution’ for CCGs in October 2012, explains further 
these three options.  
 
CCGs and CSUs are currently linked contractually by Service Level Agreements (SLAs). 
The Health Service Journal (HSJ) found that some CCGs opposed disclosing their SLAs for 
reasons of commercial confidentiality. Some commentators are of the opinion that while 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
management and integration), business support (such as legal services, HR, and finance), clinical procurement, 
and communications services, among others (Williams, 2012b). These services follow the NHSCB’s assurance 
process guidelines. 
 
19
 An example of a service redesign would be a change in the way health conditions (for example, diabetes) are 
treated. 
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confidentiality issues in the NHS are not new, resorting to closed doors appears to go against 
greater accountability and transparency in the commissioning function (Thiel, 2013). Besides, 
one should not forget that national and EU laws apply to commercial confidentiality. Another 
critique towards CSUs, besides the one on the danger of reduced accountability and 
transparency, is the high cost of commissioning consultancy. Light and Connor (2011, p. 
822) write,  
“With exceptions, expert commissioners and contractors will have to be hired 
from external consulting organisations that charge £400 an hour and shift 
control of the NHS into for-profit hands. Thus “commissioning” will be 
defined by corporate agents in diverse ways with much less accountability 
than national targets, tariffs, and guidelines imply.” 
 
It is still too early to tell what the future of CSUs will look like – whether they will continue 
to be hosted by NHS England or whether they will be opened up to privatisation, a process 
called ‘externalisation,’ which was recently pushed further in the future for practicality 
reasons. There have already been several cases of CSU mergers (Welikawa, 2014).  
 
3.3. The ‘new’ commissioning in the literature 
 
Over the past 20 years, the NHS has experienced many major reorganisations. Depending on 
one’s definition of the word ‘major,’ there has been at least one such reorganisation per year 
(Geyer, 2013). Every new Minister of Health, continues Geyer, announces how he will solve 
the NHS’s problems with a brand new reorganisation of some type. This tendency toward 
centralised reorganisation is amplified, according to the author, by critical and sensationalist 
UK mass media that revel “in exposing NHS incompetence, waste and mistakes (and the 
accompanying human tragedy) and … [demand] instant answers, responsibility, change and, 
if possible, retribution” (p. 50). Thus, the newest changes to commissioning are not a stand-
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alone reorganisation. Their roots go back more than 20 years, not just in the history of the 
New Labour government, but also in this of the Conservative government (Timmins, 2013).   
 
The commissioning function, including the commissioning of acute care, has attracted the 
attention of academics both during the old, and the new NHS. A short review of the literature 
on previous commissioning reforms will follow later. Commissioning in the new NHS has 
been examined in: Asthana (2011), Currie et al. (2012), Devlin (2010), Geyer (2013), Guven-
Uslu (2012), Petsoulas et al. (2011), Quayle, Ashworth and Gillies (2013), Robinson et al. 
(2011), and Whitehead, Hanratty and Popay (2010), among others. It was the American Alain 
Enthoven’s original idea to have all doctors share the responsibility for shared budgeting and 
for organising integrated care (combining acute and social services, for example), following 
the lead of the US healthcare company, Kaiser Permanente (Light and Connor, 2011). GPs 
and other clinicians, as the commissioning leaders of the reformed NHS, are the focus of 
several recent academic studies (Asthana, 2011; Devlin, 2010; Martin and Learmonth, 2012; 
Storey and Grint, 2012). Most of these studies do not belong to the accounting literature per 
se; therefore, a discussion of GP-led commissioning would fill a significant gap in this 
literature.  
 
It has been claimed that in today’s complex world, leadership is increasingly conferred not 
just to those who hold positions of formal power, but also to clinicians, patients, and even the 
public (Martin and Learmonth, 2012). The topics of leadership in GP-led commissioning are 
further elaborated in Storey and Grint (2012). Drawing on the distinctions they establish 
between leadership and governance, Storey and Grint conclude that in the reformed system, 
GPs will be expected to undertake certain elements of ‘leadership’ and certain elements of 
‘governance.’ Three functions of leadership are presented by the authors – vision/direction 
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setting, mobilisation, and scapegoating. With respect to the first function, vision and direction 
setting, GP leadership will doubtlessly be sought to help endorse the efficiency savings of 
£15-20 billion that were recently announced by central government (the ‘Nicholson 
challenge’), note the authors. In exercising this first function of leadership, GP-led CCGs will 
be aided by NHS England. GPs will exercise the second function of leadership by mobilising 
their peers. This way, the traditional, prevailing role of GPs as independent contractors of the 
NHS who exercise autonomous clinical judgement on a patient-by-patient basis will give way 
to a collective judgement about effective administrative/clinical practice and priorities within 
CCGs, write the authors. Vis-à-vis the third function of leadership, scapegoating, the authors 
predict that GPs will turn into scapegoats when things go wrong, given that patients and the 
public tend to complain intensely about dismantled or reduced services. Yet, GPs will 
exercise an enhanced leadership role by virtue of being responsible for spending the bulk of 
the NHS budget – more than £80 billion per annum – on acute and other services.  
“Holding the purse strings in this manner means there will be a strong 
expectation that they [GPs] must spend far more time than currently in helping 
to envision new and more effective care pathways ... They can no longer be 
mere service deliverers” (p. 270).  
 
 
Three functions of governance – 1) legitimation, 2) conformance and performance 
monitoring, and 3) regulation/accountability – are also presented by Storey and Grint (2012). 
Regarding the first function of governance (legitimation), GPs are expected to justify the new 
healthcare services redesign and priorities from a legitimation point of view. As to the second 
function of governance (monitoring), this function will be needed as GPs monitor new 
developments in commissioning, write the authors. The third function of governance 
(regulation/accountability) will continue to be present within GP-led CCGs due to the newly-
legislated regulation and accountability relationships presented earlier in Figure 2.   
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Besides through leadership and governance theories, CCG commissioning has been analysed 
in the literature through complexity theory. Geyer (2013) uses a modified Stacey diagram to 
compare the situation of GPs before and after CCG commissioning. He finds out that the 
position of GPs before the introduction of CCG commissioning was relatively stable and 
orderly, in the sense that much of GPs’ daily activity was well structured, stable, and 
repetitive: patient flows were relatively stable, salary rates were established through a 
structured bargaining process, and so on. Yet, due to CCG commissioning, GPs would move 
closer to the complexity zone of the modified Stacey diagram, finds Geyer. The reasons 
behind this shift are the increasingly political and judgemental role that CCG commissioning 
implies and the increased uncertainty of CCG-commissioned outcomes, posits the author.  
 
From a collaborative business relationships perspective, Quayle, Ashworth and Gillies (2013) 
use case studies from the criminal justice and IT outsourcing sectors to study the nature of 
commissioning relationships in the English NHS post-1 April 2013. The case studies look at 
how BS11000 (a collaborative business relationships framework) is meant to support 
business relationships. The research shows that business relationships are often too 
reductionist in nature and based on simple contractual relationships. The authors suggest that 
“a richer more collaborative business relationship is required for effective provision of 
services” (p. 18). Even if CCG business relationships are characterised by a spirit of 
collaboration, the switch to CCG commissioning may “undermine … one of the key 
mechanisms by which the NHS strives to ensure access to a full range of services wherever 
people live” (Whitehead, Hanratty and Popay, 2010, p. 1373).  This is sometimes referred to 
as ‘the post-code lottery.20’ While PCTs were responsible for whole populations living in 
                                                          
20
 This ‘post-code lottery’ clashes with the promise for a greater flexibility in what kinds of health services are 
available locally and with the national consistency in the access to the same quality taxpayer-funded services for 
all. The recent NHS reforms are not the first NHS reforms that “confront the trade-off between localism and 
centralism” (Devlin, 2010, p. 1076). 
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defined geographical areas, the authors note, CCGs are only responsible for patients 
registered with specific health services: 
“The White Paper abandons this population based principle – the basis for 
commissioning by the GP Consortia is for registered patients only, within 
amorphous and ill-defined boundaries. The ability to plan for the proper 
geographical distribution of services for communities and local populations 
will be lost. The incentive to invite practices with easier-to-serve catchment 
areas to be members (the so-called perverse incentive of “cream-skimming”), 
and avoid practices in unprofitable catchment areas and in areas with patients 
who are more sick, will increase with the introduction of commercial 
organisations to support commissioning, because their priority will be profit” 
(Whitehead, Hanratty and Popay, 2010, p. 1373).   
 
A commissioning expertise deficit and a lack of interest in commissioning among GPs are not 
the only risks confronting the new NHS. In line with Devlin (2010), Asthana (2011) sees a 
lack of appetite among the British public and GPs for such a radical market reform. She 
identifies a number of unintended risks (large transitional costs and organisational 
turbulence) resulting from a further NHS reorganisation and sees a potential financial risk in 
the proposed at the time NHS reforms. She shares the view that in order to reduce the 
potential for financial risk, CCGs would have to merge to the size of the former PCTs (an 
outcome which would raise the question about the whole purpose behind this reorganisation) 
or enter into complex and perhaps costly risk-sharing arrangements with other CCGs. This 
“reinventing the wheel” (Asthana, 2011, p. 818) would mean that democratic accountability 
would be compromised given the large resources spent on the reforms.  
 
Similarly to Asthana (2011) who questions the democratic accountability of the NHS 
reforms, Tallis (2013, Kindle p. 144) calls these reforms a “blatant deception … [and a] 
contempt for the electorate.” Tallis writes about the passage of the Health and Social Care 
Bill 2011 (HSCB, 2011) to the statute book in April 2012 and observes that it became law 
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because good men did nothing or, with a few exceptions, very little to oppose it. This 
delivery of the, 
 
“planned destruction of the NHS says something shocking – about the 
condition of the nation … the debased state of the national conversation about 
matters of supreme importance, and the marginalisation of professionals who, 
when faced with the greatest threat for generations to the institution and the 
values for which they claimed to stand, in most cases preferred appeasement 
to confrontation” (Tallis, 2013, Kindle pp. 149-150). 
 
 
The same source, on Kindle p. 125, calls the HSCB (2011) “a toxic bill that few had foreseen 
and no one other than its proponents saw as desirable … had got on to the statute book.” Now 
that the reforms have been legislated, they need to be abided by, like any other law. There are 
indeed some attendant risks in giving more decision-making power to frontline clinicians and 
patients (Devlin, 2010). Devlin states that, 
“encouraging patients to think of the NHS as having a duty to offer unlimited 
choices of where and how to be treated will, in a budget-constrained NHS, 
result in disappointment” because “[n]ot all effective treatments can be 
afforded: GPs have been passed the poisoned chalice of reconciling demand 
and supply, and the way they engage patients and the public in prioritising 
spending” (p. 1076).  
 
 
Healthcare reforms are hard to enact because the influence of institutionalised working 
practices often makes the envisaged changes elusive (Lockett et al., 2012). The creation of 
new roles as a result of healthcare reforms, for instance, tends to threaten the power and 
status of élite professionals, such as clinicians (Currie et al., 2012). This threat may be 
exercised, in the authors’ opinion, through a substitution of élite professionals’ labour. Currie 
and colleagues draw on eleven case sites from the English NHS where newly introduced 
nursing or medical roles have been found to threaten the power and status of specialist 
doctors. One of the key observations of their article is that élite professionals respond to 
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changes to their roles in such a way as to supplant threats of substitution with the opportunity 
to delegate routine job tasks to other actors. Besides, these professionals strive to maintain 
any existing resource and control arrangements in ways that enhance their status. It would be 
interesting to see whether clinicians feel that the recent commissioning reforms threaten their 
professional status or not. 
 
Devlin (2010) doubts whether, overall, the new commissioning system would be conducted 
in a more cost-effective way by the more numerous CCGs (211) than by the 152 former 
PCTs. He acknowledges that some GPs may welcome their new role in commissioning, but 
also thinks that it may be more likely that CCGs would delegate their commissioning tasks to 
CSUs, to discharge these tasks on their behalf. Devlin observes that shifting from NHS-
employed to CCG-employed commissioners does reduce NHS administration staff and costs 
but only by shifting these costs to CCGs. 
 
3.4. Prior forms of commissioning in the literature 
 
As noted earlier, the NHS in England has been experiencing quick and multiple structural 
changes (McMurray, 2007). On the average, there has been about one such change every two 
years, to the point that “organisation, re-organisation and re-disorganisation” could have 
become emblematic of the NHS (Timmins, 2013, p. 16). The commissioning function has 
mirrored this trend. There have been several attempts to devolve commissioning to the 
clinical level, prior to the CCG reforms (Naylor and Goodwin, 2011). Detailed accounts of 
the history of commissioning may be found in HCHC (2010a) and Timmins (2013).
21
  
                                                          
21
 Timmins’ study is a study in government, the Coalition government’s politics in particular. Although the 
reforms are widely known as ‘Lansley’s reforms,’ the actions of both governing parties, the Conservatives and 
the Liberal Democrats, have had a deep impact on the unfolding of events and the shape of the changes 
(Timmins, 2013). 
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                    3.4.1. The period 1948-1991 
 
In the early years of the NHS, an entirely nationalised healthcare system was established in 
which secondary care was provided by NHS-owned hospitals, while primary care was 
provided by independent GPs, independent contractors of the NHS (HCHC, 2010a). The 
period between 1948 and 1974 was a period of stability that experienced no material changes 
(Timmins, 2013). From the mid-1970s onwards, one could observe a pronounced need to 
limit the public expenditure growth within the NHS: how to make the NHS more efficient 
became a priority (HCHC, 2010a). Due to the absence of market mechanisms in the UK 
healthcare system, a system provided and financed mostly by the government, there was no 
natural pricing mechanism in the NHS through which the supply of healthcare could be 
efficiently matched to the demand thereof (Donaldson, Gerard and Mitton, 2005).  
 
In 1989, the absence of such pricing mechanisms led to the most important cultural shift since 
the birth of the NHS – the so-called ‘internal market’ established by the Conservative 
government (HCHC, 2010a). How the internal market would work was outlined in Kenneth 
Clarke’s22 January 1989 white paper, Working for patients (DH, 1989). One year later, in 
1990, this white paper was passed into law as the NHS and Community Care Act 1990. The 
changes took effect in 1991. In theory, claim Donaldson, Gerard and Mitton (2005), the lack 
of market mechanisms in healthcare may be overcome by ‘quasi-markets’23 or ‘internal 
                                                          
22
 Kenneth Clarke was the Secretary of State for Health at the time. 
23
 The word ‘quasi’ is used because it is hard to subjugate the healthcare field entirely to market logics, at least 
in a democratic society like the UK which takes care of its vulnerable groups. Hart (2010, p. 6) for instance 
notes that healthcare is a field “in which Adam Smith’s invisible hand cannot operate without introducing a 
potentially lethal infection, the profit motive. We may learn to cope with this from car salesmen, but from 
doctors and nurses it is surely intolerable, both for them and their patients.” At the same time, a hospital that 
does not take account of keeping its costs within reasonable limits would be considered unsustainable and might 
be forced to close down or become an undue drain on the rest of the healthcare system. 
 
65 
 
 
 
markets,’ created via rules and regulations. In this way, continue the authors, incentives may 
be set up to reward providers and consumers for being efficient. Williams, A. (2005) argues 
that the perception of an internal market as a value-neutral way of purchasing is an illusion 
because the ways in which ‘efficiency’ is measured is not value free. 
 
The internal market is seen by some academics as a type of ‘managed competition’ within the 
new ‘managerialist’ philosophy (Light, 2001) or NPM that is primarily based on ideas 
suggested by Prof. Alain Enthoven from the Stanford University Business School and Alan 
Maynard, Professor of Health Economics at the University of York (Kay, 2001). In the mid-
1980s, Prof. Enthoven visited the UK and argued that the NHS hospitals lacked incentives for 
improving the quality and efficiency of the services provided (Ibid.). Prof. Maynard argued, 
the source notes, that the NHS general practice did not provide incentives to GPs to control 
their costs and to use public resources efficiently; besides, he suggested that a budgetary 
system and associated incentives be introduced into the UK’s general practice for certain 
secondary care and pharmaceutical services. Prof. Maynard’s ideas were what influenced 
Kenneth Clarke’s decision to embrace quasi-markets in 1989. 
 
In the internal market legislation, hospitals were made to compete with one another for 
resources, just like in a competitive market environment, and to involve medical doctors in 
management decisions more effectively (HCHC, 2010a). According to Kay (2001), during 
the early 1990s, the publicly-funded healthcare systems in many Western countries, not just 
in the UK, experienced similar reforms: 
“Such reforms were designed to exert greater control over state spending on 
health care and to improve the efficiency with which these systems operated. 
To help meet these aims, attempts were often made to stimulate competition 
between hospitals that provided publicly funded services and to encourage 
doctors and other professionals to control public expenditure on health” (p. 
561). 
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This new system created a new set of key players and a new incentives structure for hospital 
policy making – now the most sought after employment position was not to be in charge of a 
Regional or District Health Authority (DHA), but to be the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or 
Director of Finance of a NHS hospital (Pollock, 2004). This, writes Pollock, could later be a 
stepping stone to even more powerful job positions in or outside the NHS. Derek Smith, for 
example, a former CEO of the King’s College Hospital in London, later became the CEO of 
the London Underground. The internal market is such a fundamental idea that Timmins 
(2013, p. 17) sees it as “the first building block” of Andrew Lansley’s reforms.  
 
                    3.4.2. Genesis of the purchaser-provider split: The 1991 reforms and GP 
fundholding   
 
Elkind (1998) applies several metaphors, in line with Morgan (1986), to her study of the 
NHS: the images of ‘machine,’ ‘organism,’ ‘religion,’ and ‘marketplace’ are found to be 
particularly relevant to the NHS as an organisation. The religious connotation focuses on the 
mission of the NHS as a universal and comprehensive service; likewise, the mission of many 
religions is to provide salvation to humanity. Besides, the NHS is machine like since it is 
based on technocratic rationality, just like a machine. Being like a living organism reminds of 
the NHS’ likeness to an open system – a living organism is participative and responsive to its 
environment, not closed to itself. Last but not least, the health service resembles a 
marketplace, according to Elkind, because of the presence of competition and the ‘internal 
market’ in the post-1991 period. The idea of internal market is closely linked to another 
innovative idea of the early 1990s – the ‘purchaser-provider split.’ The purchaser-provider 
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split, with its separation of commissioning from the provision function, was the cornerstone 
of the 1991 NHS reforms (Klein, 2005).  
 
This split characterises the period 1991 to the present and consists of changing the role of 
healthcare providers: whereas previously, providers (hospitals) had determined themselves 
what services to provide to their patients, under the reformed system of 1991, it became the 
newly-established commissioning bodies, not hospital doctors, who had to purchase the 
needed healthcare services from providers on behalf of patients (HCHC, 2010a). Thus, 
commissioning was born in 1991. In order to become providers in this internal market, the 
source continues, hospitals need to first become NHS ‘trusts,’ i.e. “separate organisations 
with their own management” (Ibid.).  
 
These changes within the NHS were in part inspired by political and ideological views. 
Timmins writes: 
“With Margaret Thatcher still at the height of her powers, the creation of “self-
governing” hospitals was seen by critics to be merely the first step towards 
their complete privatisation. GPs fell out bitterly over whether it was morally 
right to take budgets. There were widespread worries about what would 
happen if they ran out of money. Others feared an irretrievable breakdown in 
trust between doctors and patients once GPs were responsible for allocating 
resources between patients and staying on budget” (Timmins, 2013, p. 17). 
 
Ferlie et al. (2013) draw on the concept of ‘managerialism’ in healthcare when talking about 
the Thatcher years. The ‘professional dominance’ era of the pre-1979 period had now given 
way to the era of ‘neo-liberalism,’ a concept discussed in Chapter 2.   
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Under the very first commissioning model, there were two types of commissioners – 192 
District Health Authorities (DHA) and GP fundholders.
24
 According to Wilkinson (2011), GP 
fundholding was a voluntary commissioning model in which participating family 
practitioners were allocated a portion of the secondary care budget. With these funds, 
fundholders could buy healthcare services from NHS trusts and from the private and 
voluntary sectors on behalf of their patients (HCHC, 2010a). Initially, GP fundholders could 
buy just a limited range of care – the budgets covered, for instance, elective (waiting list) 
surgeries, physiotherapy, and the GPs’ own prescribing (Timmins, 2013). Although GPs 
could buy care from whoever they wanted, they were free to establish new services 
themselves, writes Timmins.  
“The idea was that at least for some treatments “money would follow the 
patient” so that hospitals that did more work would earn more. Hospitals that 
failed to attract patients would earn less – the hope being that they would up 
their performance in response to competitive pressure” (p.17). 
 
It was often the case that the patients of GP fundholders were able to obtain healthcare 
treatments more quickly than patients of non-fundholders (HCHC, 2010a). Because of this, 
there were some accusations that fundholding was violating the fair and equal access of all 
people to healthcare (Laudicella et al., 2009). By 1997, observe Donaldson, Gerard and 
Mitton (2005), half of the population was covered by fundholding practices that controlled 
over 10% of hospital and community health service spending. Besides, GP fundholders 
tended to enjoy better resources and were located in more affluent areas than non-
fundholders, remarks the same source. Despite fundholding’s shortcomings, its proponents, 
such as Croxson, Propper and Perkins (2001), argued that separating the roles of purchasers 
and providers helped improve the efficiency of the NHS in productive and allocative terms.  
 
                                                          
24
 Please consult HCHC (2010a) for a detailed table of the different commissioning models since 1991.  
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Some research has examined the issues of GP fundholding and incentives (Croxson, Propper 
and Perkins, 2001; Hausman and Le Grand, 1999; Propper, Croxson and Shearer, 2002). 
Other research has focused on the contracting side of commissioning (Petsoulas et al., 2011; 
Williams, Flynn and Pickard, 1997). It has been observed that the introduction of the internal 
market necessitated the use of contracts between purchasers and providers; yet, policy makers 
appeared to ignore the nature of these contracts by assuming the contracts conformed to the 
classical contracting model (Allen, 2002). Allen uses socio-legal and economic theories of 
contracting and examines the contracting between Health Authorities (former types of 
commissioners) and GP fundholders in a case study of district nursing services in Greater 
London. She concludes that classical contracting is an inappropriate model for the NHS. 
Relational contracting is not a very appropriate model, either, she claims. Laing and Cotton 
(1995) focus on the organisational purchasing behaviour of fundholding. To these 
commentators, GP fundholders emerged as new and inexperienced purchasers who had to 
begin developing a new body of expertise. The paper finds that the concerns about the high 
transaction costs of GP fundholding were justified, given the requirement for contracts to be 
renegotiated annually (Ibid.). 
 
According to Croxson, Propper and Perkins (2001), the 1991 reforms created incentives for 
GPs to increase their use of hospital services before entering the GP fundholding scheme. 
Non-financial motives, the authors argue, could curb this behaviour. The paper shows that 
fundholders-to-be did respond to the financial incentives offered by this early commissioning 
scheme. Hausman and Le Grand (1999), on the other hand, find that although GPs at the time 
were concerned with their incomes and responded to financial incentives, they were also 
influenced by other norms and concerns about their patients. In line with these findings, 
Spoor and Munro (2003) observe that for fundholding GPs, price was of secondary 
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consideration as to referral behaviour and conclude that healthcare markets are far more 
complex than regular markets. In sum, GP fundholding is the earliest predecessor of modern 
day CCG commissioning.  
 
                    3.4.3. Primary Care Groups (PCGs): 1997-2001  
 
In May 1997, the newly-elected New Labour government decided to put an end to the 
internal market (HCHC, 2010a). GP fundholding was abolished in the same year. In 
December 1997, the white paper, The new NHS – modern, dependable (DH, 1997) was 
published. It retained the purchaser-provider split but DHAs were renamed to Health 
Authorities (HAs) and became the new commissioners (HCHC, 2010a). The purchaser-
provider split, initiated by what tended to be a business-minded Conservative government, 
became increasingly important also under what tended to be a socially-minded New Labour 
government.
25
  Klein (2005, p. 55) notes a dramatic reversal in the usual anti-market 
inclinations of New Labour: 
“After initially cold-shouldering the private sector on coming into office in 
1997 (in line with traditional party ideology), the Government three years later 
enfolded it in a warm embrace. Having decided that extra billions of public 
funds would need to be poured into the NHS, the Government came up against 
the realisation that capacity, as much as money, was the main constraint on 
improving services in the short term (i.e. before the next General Election).” 
 
Thanks to short-term considerations like the ones evoked in the quote above, the New Labour 
government embraced the private sector’s cooperation in a much neo-liberal manner, just like 
the Conservatives had done up to 1997. Besides, growth in spending on healthcare increased 
significantly during the New Labour administration (Ham, 2004). Four hundred eighty-one 
                                                          
25
 A good summary of the post-1991 developments in the NHS is found in Petsoulas et al. (2011). 
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Primary Care Groups (PCGs) were established in 1999 in conjunction with the HAs (HCHC, 
2010a). 
 
                    3.4.4. The recently overthrown system: PCTs and SHAs (2002 - 1 April 
2013) 
 
 
Ferlie et al. (2013) divide the New Labour government’s era into three parts: the early phase 
of networks and lateral working (1997-2002), the middle period of choice and diversity 
(2002-2006), and the later period of ‘targets and terror’ (2006-2010) when some providers’ 
boards and senior management were dismissed for poor performance. During the early 
period, The NHS Plan: A plan for investment, a plan for reform (DH, 2000) announced that 
by April 2004, all PCGs were to become Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) but this date was later 
brought sooner – to April 2002 (HCHC, 2010a). The 100 HAs were abolished and turned into 
28 Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) that oversaw PCTs. In 2006, the SHAs were reduced 
to ten. The 2002 budget announced an increase in funding for the NHS and Alan Milburn, the 
then Secretary of State for Health, published Delivering the NHS Plan: Next steps for 
investment, next steps for reform (DH, 2002; HCHC, 2010a). 
 
Delivering the NHS Plan introduced yet another series of momentous reforms to the NHS – 
NHS foundation trusts (FTs) were established. FTs are hospitals or groups of hospitals 
established as public interest companies, outside of central government’s control (HCHC, 
2010a). These trusts enjoyed (and are still enjoying) more autonomy from central government 
(Anand et al., 2012) than simple NHS trusts. PCTs were free, according to the same source, 
to purchase care from the most appropriate provider, be it from the public (NHS entities), 
private (independent) or voluntary (also known as ‘third’) sector. This freedom of choice of 
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provider still exists and is called the ‘any qualified provider’ provision. The provision meant 
to increase competition and, arguably, improve performance, in the NHS.  
 
What had become of clinical engagement in commissioning in the mid-2000s? Timmins 
(2013, p. 23) provides the answer: it continued to exist, although it had never proved to be 
effective enough in the 1990s. By the mid-2000s, Timmins states, the New Labour ministers 
had come to the realisation that something had been lost with GP fundholding’s 
disappearance. In 2004, a new type of GP commissioning was announced as ‘practice-based 
commissioning’ (PBC) in the policy document, The NHS improvement plan – putting people 
at the heart of public services (DH, 2004). PBC was launched in 2005 and was meant to 
“reignite clinical enthusiasm and engagement” (HCHC, 2010a, p. 13). Adopting PBC was 
voluntary, just like GP fundholding had been. “Unlike with GP fundholding, which gave GPs 
the money, PBC … [gave] GPs only “indicative” budgets to commission services on behalf 
of their patients, while the PCT still … [did] the contracting” (Ibid.).  
 
In practice, few PCTs were keen on fostering PBC but there were some exceptions: in 
Cumbria, Cambridgeshire (the area of Andrew Lansley’s constituency) and Tower Hamlets in 
London, among other places, PCTs had taken steps towards a total devolution of the budget 
to family doctors (Timmins, 2013). In other places, PBC operated on a very limited scale. 
PBC is further elaborated in DH (2009). Its intention was that GPs and Practice Nurses would 
“reflect their patients’ preferences, leading to greater variety of services from a greater 
number of providers and for more conveniences for their patients, as well as a more efficient 
use of resources” (HCHC, 2010a, p. 17).  
 
73 
 
 
 
A highly critical of PCTs two-volume report (HCHC, 2010a, b) was published by the House 
of Commons Health Committee. Timmins observes: 
“The purchaser/provider split had increased transaction costs, the [House of 
Commons Select] [C]ommittee said, but PCTs were mainly passive buyers of 
care, not active shapers of services… If PCTs were to be retained, the 
committee said, they needed to be strengthened. But if PCT commissioning 
“does not begin to improve soon, after 20 years of costly failure, the 
purchaser/provider split may need to be abolished”” (Timmins, 2013, p. 24). 
 
Academic studies have been carried out on PBC. Checkland et al. (2009) for example 
conducted detailed case studies of five PBC consortia in three PCTs and found that their 
respondents articulated a number of ‘barriers’ preventing change within PCTs: lack of time, 
resources and personnel, and difficult relationships with the respective PCTs. The 
researchers’ observations suggest that these issues arose out of various kinds of 
organisational ‘sensemaking’ (Weick, 1995) and that the apparent ‘barriers’ had different 
meanings in different organisational contexts.  
 
CCG commissioning goes further than GP fundholding and PBC by giving GPs a “complete 
financial responsibility for commissioning a comprehensive range of services. Whereas 
fundholders and practice-based commissioners were supported by health authorities and 
PCTs respectively, under the new proposals commissioning will be fully devolved to 
consortia” (Naylor and Goodwin, 2011, p. 154). Besides, another important difference is that 
CCG membership is obligatory for all GPs, not voluntary like GP-fundholding used to be: 
“One of the many shocks contained in Liberating the NHS was that all GPs were going to 
have to be involved in commissioning from a set date – whether ready, willing or able; 
whether they liked it or not” (Timmins, 2013, p. 31). A recent report by the King’s Fund 
(Ham et al., 2015, p. 4) argues that even though the “squeeze on public finances may not 
have affected the NHS as much as most other public services” and even though “international 
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surveys showed the NHS to be performing well” (p. 11), the reforms were legislated and their 
“effects were both damaging and distracting.” These are just “tentative” (p. 7) conclusions 
that may need to be revised as more evidence is gathered in the future, the source admits.  
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
Chapter 3 introduced the reader to acute care commissioning in the context of the CCG 
reforms. It also summarised some prior NHS reforms of commissioning (GP fundholding and 
PBC), the first one of which became effective in 1991. It is important to keep in mind that the 
‘new’ acute commissioning system (the one since 1 April 2013) gave enhanced 
commissioning responsibilities and accountabilities statutorily to local family doctors, but 
also to some other clinicians, such as some nurses and other health professionals. The 211 
CCGs replaced the ‘old’ commissioners – PCTs and SHAs – and inherited the responsibility 
to handle multi-million pound budgets passed down to them by the DH. CCG commissioning 
has its deepest roots in the ‘internal market’ and purchaser-provider split of the early 1990s 
and was inspired by US competition and efficiency models.  
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CHAPTER 4 
PROFESSIONAL IDENTITIES OF CLINICIANS AND COMMISSIONERS AND 
THEIR DAILY PRACTICES 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Chapter 4 provides a review of the literature on the professional identities of clinicians and 
commissioners and their daily practices in the English NHS. This chapter is important 
because in the absence thereof, it would be hard to know what exactly CCG commissioners 
do on a day-to-day basis. First, a closer look at the concept of ‘identity’ is provided. Next, the 
topic of what makes a ‘profession’ and its identity is reviewed, followed by a discussion on 
‘hybrid’ clinical managers’ identities and practices from the provider’s and the 
commissioner’s side. Later, NHS commissioners’ work identities and day-to-day practices 
are examined in more detail.  
 
4.2. A closer look at identity 
 
 4.2.1. What is ‘identity’? 
 
The literature on identities is rich and diverse (see for example, Pullen, Beech and Sims, 
2007; Lieblich and Josselson, 1994). A multitude of studies has been published on cultural, 
ethnic, racial, gender, and work identities, just to name a few. The word ‘identity,’ on an 
individual level, has the following definition in the Collins Concise English Dictionary, “the 
state of having unique identifying characteristics held by no other person or thing [and] the 
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individual characteristics by which a person or thing is recognized.
26” Identity, on a group 
level, may characterise several individuals or groups of individuals unified by a “we-feeling” 
(Rao, Monin and Durand, 2003, p. 796). This social identification is seen by Ashforth and 
Mael (1989, p. 20) as “a perception of oneness with a group of persons” Identities are 
certainly not static; they are widely believed to be in a state of flux over time. Bauman (1996) 
implies for example that over the lifespan of an individual, he or she identifies with multiple 
identities. These identities are not necessarily cumulative, but are changeable and fluid over 
time – time “is no longer a river, but a collection of pools and ponds” (p. 25). To Halford and 
Leonard (1999, p. 117), this imagery suggests that there are “temporary stagnations over a 
lifetime, a spreading out into relatively stable identities for periods of time but inevitable 
movement on to new and only tenuously connected identities.” 
 
Identities are spatially mobile, in addition to being temporal (Nippert-Eng, 1996). The spatial 
contextuality of human identity, and therefore of human behaviour and practices, is illustrated 
by the ‘self’ one adopts while being at home with one’s family, as opposed to his or her ‘self’ 
while being at work with colleagues or elsewhere. In addition, Nippert-Eng finds out that 
some people are comfortable with integrating their home and work identities, while others try 
to keep these two identities separate. Keeping separate identities, a phenomenon labelled as a 
‘socially scripted personhood’ by Cohen (1994), is perhaps a misconception since this 
‘personhood’ “is not necessarily to say that … [people’s] sense of self undergoes an identical 
transformation [as their social roles]” (Halford and Leonard, 1999, p. 119). Thus, for some 
scholars, people’s behaviour and practices may change depending on the context they are in, 
but their true self and inner essence (the soul and spirit) remain the same, no matter the 
context. 
                                                          
26
 Available at: <http://www.wordreference.com/definition/identity> [Accessed on 9 January 2014].  
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4.2.2. History of identity studies 
 
Reviewing the history of identity research is useful to do in order to better understand the 
professional identities of clinical commissioners in CCGs. Identity is often thought as a 
meso- or micro-level issue. Group identities are typically linked to the organisational (meso) 
level of analysis and individual identities are typically linked to the micro level of analysis. 
However, work identities may be either a meso- or micro-level issue – how an individual 
understand himself or herself as a member of an occupational or professional group or how 
he or she understands himself or herself as an individual worker.  
 
Swann and Bosson (2010, p. 589) remind their readers of the origins of identity studies – the 
time when one of the founding fathers of psychology, James (1950),  saw the self as a 
“source of continuity” that gave a sense of “connectedness” and “unbrokenness.” As for work 
identity, symbolic interactionism (a theory from the early 20
th
 century, made popular by 
Charles Horton Cooley and George Herbert Mead (Cooley, 1983; Mead, 1934)) would have 
seen it as a superficial change (just a role identity), deprived of permanency and endurance. 
The so-called ‘dramaturgical movement,’ Swann and Bosson (2010) write, was 
‘[s]pearheaded’ by Goffman (1959). This movement assumed that people were like actors on 
a stage. ‘The world is a stage,’ claimed Shakespeare, and all we do is perform in front of 
various audiences. “As people take on various identities, the self is merely a consequence, 
rather than a cause, of the performance” (Swann and Bosson, 2010, p. 590). Further on the 
same page, Swann and Bosson write that if people could assume various identities, according 
to the demands of the situation, then they were “interchangeable” and ephemeral, something 
called the “situationalist approach” to identity studies. The theatrical metaphor assumes that 
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there is no such thing as an “enduring,” “underlying,” stable or “authentic sense of self” 
(Ibid.); identity is all about acting and meeting the audience’s expectations. 
 
In the 1970s, Snyder (1974) developed a personality measure called a “self-monitoring” scale 
that tried to distinguish people who were mere actors from those whose self-concept had a 
more “cross-situational consistency” (Swann and Bosson, 2010, p. 590). The idea of enduring 
identities then emerged. Markus (1977), again from the psychology field, introduced soon 
after Snyder the idea of enduring “self-schemas” which “systematically guided information 
processing about the self” (Swann and Bosson, 2010, p. 590). In the 1980s, social 
psychologists continued abandoning the symbolic interactionist views on identity and started 
embracing the idea of a more permanent schema, an identity deeply encoded in memory.  
 
4.3. What makes a profession and its identity? 
 
According to the Collins Concise English Dictionary, a profession is “an occupation 
requiring special training in the liberal arts or sciences, esp[ecially] one of the three learned 
professions, law, theology, or medicine.
27” This is not the only possible definition of the word 
‘profession,’ however. According to its popular usage, the term may have a wider variety of 
meanings – a highly skilled occupation or any work from which one derives his or her 
income (Abbott, 1988; Freidson, 1986, 1994; Saks, 1995). Occupations, such as architecture, 
accounting, engineering, and nursing, have also obtained the status of professions in some 
countries, i.e. they have endured a process of ‘professionalisation’ (Millerson, 1964).  
 
                                                          
27
 Available at: <http://www.wordreference.com/definition/profession> [Accessed on 9 January 2014]. 
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Larson (2013) and Walby et al. (1994) observe that professions are occupations that enjoy 
special powers and prestige and note that society bestows these rewards on the professions 
because professionals have acquired special bodies of isoteric knowledge and techniques. 
These knowledge and techniques have a special ‘cognitive’ dimension (Larson, 2013). They 
are linked to the central needs and values of society – legal justice, health, and financial 
accountability, just to name a few. Professions are expected to be altruistic and devoted to 
servicing the public (a ‘normative’ dimension). Whether professionals tend to act 
altruistically is another question: the main issue with professional groups, according to Saks 
(1995, p. 3), is whether they indeed “subordinate their own interests to the wider public 
interest in carrying out their work.” The claim to altruistic ideals, continues Saks, is typical of 
most professions, especially those in the Anglo-American context. Besides, most codes of 
professional associations require the maintenance of high standards of practice and the 
delivery of impartial service.  
 
The medical profession, as one directly dealing with individuals’ health, is an example of a 
profession with exceptionally high societal expectations of altruism and selflessness on the 
part of its members. Saks (1995) remarks that the medical profession in the UK has been 
strongly inspired by the Geneva Code of Medical Ethics, a code adopted by the World 
Medical Association in 1949. This code calls on medical professionals to make a pledge to 
consecrate their lives to serving humanity.  
 
Another distinctive trait of the professions, as opposed to the rest of the occupations, is 
professions’ autonomy,28 self-monitoring, and self-regulation (an ‘evaluative’ dimension). 
                                                          
28 Flynn (1999, pp. 22-23) notes that professional, “‘[a]utonomy’ can be conceptualized at different levels of 
analysis – for example institutional autonomy refers to the jurisdiction claimed by a professional occupation and 
the extent to which it can secure legitimacy and state approval, whereas technical or work autonomy refers to 
efforts to determine terms, conditions and working practices, as well as the division of labour vis-à-vis other 
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Usually, the professions have their own methods of training and assessment. In recent years, 
financial scandals, such as the accounting scandals in the Western world that have transpired 
since the early 2000s (Enron, HealthSouth, WorldCom, etc.), have put into doubt the 
altruistic nature of certain professions, including the accounting profession (Sikka, 2008, 
2009; Suddaby, Gendron, and Lam, 2009). The demise of the Big Five accounting firm 
Arthur Andersen was caused by its involvement in the Enron scandal. Subsequently, the first 
US accounting profession regulator was established – the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB). These are telling examples of the shaken status of the US 
accounting profession (Anantharaman, 2012).  
 
Due to such professional and ethical failures, the claims about the professions’ altruistic 
service to the public “have been regarded as a form of self-serving mystification, more 
rhetoric than reality” (Walby et al., 1994, p. 60). The medical profession, both in the UK and 
abroad, has also been affected by negative publicity, especially in the case of medical 
malpractice lawsuits (Schön, 1991). The cognitive, normative, and evaluative dimensions of 
the professions create cohesion among their members and help shape professional groups’ 
identities.  
 
During their intensive professional training years, future professionals ‘internalise’ certain 
professional values and norms (for instance, responsibility, competence, and altruism). Later, 
when professional training has been completed and professional practice commences, 
professionals reinforce these same values and norms via their involvement with colleagues in 
professional associations (Kitchener and Exworthy, 2008). It may be argued that professional 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
groups. Professional autonomy is thus contested, variable and contingent on many factors.” Besides, according 
to Kitchener and Exworthy (2008, pp. 210-211), professional autonomy exists to the extent to which the state, 
“delegates, to an occupational group, responsibility for defining and implementing the goals of work, setting 
performance standards, and ensuring the maintenance of standards.”  
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identities, i.e. the feeling of belonging to a recognised professional body, are no different 
from personal or group identities in the sense that they are changeable and malleable across 
time and space. Some scholars go as far as to argue that since identities change with time and 
space anyway, professional identities are not attributive to public policy reforms. For 
instance, Halford and Leonard (1999, p. 118) contend, “The recognition that identity is highly 
fluid … and changeable across time and space … presents a challenge to the idea that new 
managerialist discourses have a transformative effect on identity.” Some other scholars take a 
social constructivist stance as far as professional identities are concerned and think of 
identities as ‘relational,’ ‘conditional,’ and continuously being ‘constructed’ due to various 
changes in circumstances (Halford and Leonard, 1999).  
 
On a more negative note, it has been argued in the literature that being a member of a 
professional body does not preclude a member from pursuing personal self-interests – usually 
income, power, and status (Freidson, 1986; Larson, 1977; Wizz, 1992). Regarding the social 
position of professionals, the Chicago School of Sociology, represented by Everett Hughes 
and his followers, tries to evaluate the actual status of professions and asks “what professions 
actually [my emphasis] do in everyday life to negotiate and maintain their social position. 
The salient characteristics of the professional phenomenon emerge, here, from the 
observation of actual practices” (Larson, 2013, p. xii).  
 
Professional power and status are seen by others as maintained by a ‘closure’ to the 
professions, i.e. by high barriers to entry. These barriers evoke the image of a cartel or an 
exclusive clique. Parkin (1979) analyses different strategies of closure by an occupational 
group from a Marxist standpoint. Thus, ‘exclusionary’ closure by an occupational group may 
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be an expression of power by the have’s over the have not’s, while ‘usurpatory’ strategies 
may be attempts by the less powerful to attain the status of the more powerful.  
 
The first school of thought that has emerged around the debate on the changing nature of 
professionalism is the one claiming that a de-professionalisation is taking place, i.e. that 
“professionals are losing their cultural authority in terms of prestige and trust” (Exworthy and 
Halford, 1999b, p. 15, summarising Freidson’s understanding of professionalism). This loss 
is due, the authors explain, to the presence of consumerism and increased levels of education, 
i.e. the gap in knowledge between professionals and lay people is diminishing. De-
professionalisation also occurs because of the public’s concern with certain excessive 
privileges accorded to professionals – high pay and status being the most common ones. The 
second school of thought espouses the ‘proletarisation’ thesis, that is the claim that 
professionals are losing their “independence and becoming subject to the rule of mangers like 
any other occupational group.” The third school is that of ‘internal combustion.’ This internal 
combustion, according to Freidson, is due to the “increased bureaucratization of professional 
associations” and to the “greater specialization within individual professions” (Ibid.).  
 
Besides ‘de-professionalisation,’ ‘proletarisation,’ and ‘internal combustion,’ agency 
(Broadbent, Dietrich and Laughlin, 1996; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973; 
Sappington, 1991) and marketing theories (Mitra, Reiss and Capella, 1999) have also 
provided important insights into professional identities. For example, professionals, including 
these affiliated with CCGs, figure in the literature as one of three basic types of customer 
agents, the other two being retailers and personal representatives (Stinchcombe, 1984). 
Professionals usually provide ‘credence,’ or trust-based, goods and services to their clients 
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(Mitra, Reiss and Capella, 1999).
29
 The demand for medical services is a demand for 
credence goods (Watt, 2012). Professional identity from an agency theory perspective is seen 
as agential – the principal being the patient and the agent – the medical practitioner 
(Broadbent, Dietrich and Laughlin, 1996). These authors theorise an accountability model of 
the ‘caring professions’ (Gorz, 1989) based on the potential for value conflict (low or high), 
as combined with the level of trust (also low or high) in communal and contractual inter-
relationships between agents and principals.   
 
CCG commissioners (agents) purchase from providers (NHS trusts) complex healthcare 
services that local populations (principals) do not completely understand. Commissioning is 
highly complex; yet, the changes to commissioning “have not always been accompanied by 
the development of a sufficient infrastructure to give commissioners the confidence, skills 
and support they need to live up to the very rigorous demands of policy” (Glasby, 2012a, p. 
245). Thus, CCG commissioners may lack a proper support structure if this insufficient 
infrastructure is still present.  
 
 4.3.1. We are ‘what we do’ or we do ‘what we are’? 
 
Two conceptions of work or occupational identities have dominated the literature on work, 
including professional work, and self-concept (Halford and Leonard, 1999). With respect to 
the first conception, the type of work performed is believed to determine the worker’s 
identity, i.e. ‘who we are’ is contingent upon ‘what we do.’ For instance, we treat patients; 
therefore, we are health workers. We commission NHS services; therefore, we are NHS 
                                                          
29 Marketers categorise goods and services into three categories: search, experience, and credence (Mitra, Reiss 
and Capella, 1999).  
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commissioners. This concept of work identity, the authors write, is based on an ‘external’ 
imposition of identities. The authors posit further that employing organisations ‘bend’ 
individuals’ aspirations, personal values, and identities towards these organisations’ own 
aims and aspirations. “While personal choice may play some initial role in the choice of 
occupation, from that point onwards individuals develop distinctive identities as a 
consequence of their structural location” (p. 103). Thus, according to the ‘we are what we 
do’ school of thought, work identity is a function of ‘structural’ location. This first approach 
has been particularly popular in industrial and economic sociology, note the authors.  
 
With respect to the second conception, the relationship is reverse – ‘what we do’ is 
contingent upon ‘who we are.’ Witman and colleagues find that when medical colleagues 
consider their clinical leaders to be ‘wise’ men and women, only then are these leaders able 
to influence the clinical activities of their work groups. These wise leaders utilise collegial 
manners and a so-called medical ‘habitus,’ a term used by Pierre Bourdieu (Witman et al., 
2011). In other words, one is a member of an occupation because one already possesses a 
priori certain personal characteristics that are desirable in the respective occupation – good 
communication skills, genuine care for others, trustworthiness, intelligence, and so on. Based 
on this school of thought, a certain line of work may be done (or should be done) by people 
possessing some desirable individual characteristics or, as the authors put it, “individual, 
innate, preformed identities are seen to determine the way in which work is carried out” 
(Halford and Leonard, 1999, p. 102). This is an ‘internal’ processes or an ‘agentic’ approach 
to work identities, according to the authors, as opposed to the first approach which was 
‘structural’ in nature.  
 
85 
 
 
 
Following the assumptions of the ‘we do what we are’ approach, Gergen (1992) and Morgan 
(1993) for instance view the working man or woman as a unique individual, with a unique 
personality, soul, and spirit. If a professional or another worker expresses his or her unique 
self (soul or spirit), the organisation he or she belongs to would ultimately benefit from this 
expression. The approach of this second school of thought, in Halford and Leonard’s (1999) 
view, has dominated much of the organisational and management literatures. The authors 
conclude that depending on which one of the two schools of thought is being followed, one 
might argue that workers’ identities “will change dramatically following public sector 
restructuring, or that they will change very little, as individuals’ stable, inner core resists 
situational change.”  
 
4.3.2. Professional stratification and power 
 
The concept of ‘power’ has long been an issue concerning the professions. Halmos (1970) 
sees the political power of the professions grow with time. From a post-Marxist, post-
industrialist perspective, Bell (1974, p. 129) sees “the clash between the professional and the 
populace … [as] the hallmark of conflict in the post-industrial society.” The issue of 
professional stratification relates to the internal hierarchies and other divisions of labour in 
the professions (Freidson, 1994). Although all professionals within a given profession belong 
to the same, or similar, professional bodies, these professionals may exercise different work 
roles. Causer and Exworthy (1999) elaborate on this issue. First in their typology is the 
‘practicing (or rank-and-file)’ professional who engages in the profession’s core day-to-day 
activities. This would be for example the professional accountant who files tax returns on 
behalf of his or her clients or who conducts audits of client financial statements. Practicing 
professionals may be divided into two sub-groups: those without supervisory/managerial or 
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resource allocation duties (the ‘pure practitioners’) and those with substantial 
supervisory/managerial or resource allocation duties who are not formally called ‘managers’ 
(the ‘quasi-managerial practitioner’). 
 
The second group that Causer and Exworthy delineate is composed of those practicing 
professionals whose primary duty is to manage the day-to-day work of other professional 
peers and the resources utilised. These are the ‘managing professionals.’ If the managing 
professional continues to directly engage in professional practice, while also acting as a 
manager, he or she is labeled as ‘practicing managing professional’ and if not – as ‘non-
practicing managing professional.’  
 
The third and final group presented by Causer and Exworthy is the group of those who have 
managerial responsibilities over the activities of professional employees, but who are not 
concerned with the direct management of day-to-day professional operations. This group is 
called ‘general managers’ and “may but need not … be drawn from among those with a 
background in the practice of the profession itself. We can accordingly differentiate within 
this group between the professionally grounded general manager on the one hand … and the 
non-professional general manager on the other” (p. 84).   
 
What becomes clear from Causer and Exworthy’s (1999) professional internal stratification 
exercise is that five of the six sub-groups (all except the ‘non-professional general manager’) 
are characterised by a past or present involvement in professional practice, a fact that may re-
inforce these sub-groups’ members’ identity with their corresponding profession. Besides, 
there is a trend toward what one may call a ‘managerialisation’ of the professions: “[E]ven 
among practicing professionals there will be those whose roles are not those of the pure 
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practitioner, but rather entail undertaking activities of at least a quasi-managerial nature (p. 
85).” 
 
Who enjoys more power, status, and prestige – the ‘professionally grounded general 
manager’ or the ‘pure practitioner’? Although some authors (Exworthy and Halford, 1999a, 
b) have affirmed that taking up managerial tasks has been accompanied by career progression 
for many professionals, the answer to this question is perhaps not so clear cut. Since the topic 
of managers and professionals is reviewed in more detail later in this research, here it suffices 
to introduce the topic of positional power in professional hierarchies.  
 
Sheaff (2008), based on Blau (1864), Dahl (1986), Parsons and Shils (1951), Tawney (1952), 
and Weber (1947), reminds the reader that power is usually thought to be the probability that 
an actor will be able to carry out his or her own will despite resistance by others. Sheaff 
(2008, p. 1) writes, “Weberian organizational sociology asserts that a group’s power in an 
organization depends largely on its positional power, i.e. on the topology of the hierarchies 
which usually comprise an organizational structure and what place the group occupies within 
it.” He further explains that individuals or groups that occupy ‘high’ positions within an 
organisation exercise ‘positional power’ over their subordinates. These Weberian power 
relationships apply to a variety of organisations, including professional organisations – the 
UK’s Royal College of Nursing, the Royal College of General Practitioners, the British 
Medical Association (BMA), the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales, 
etc. Weberian theory postulates that a superior’s power is a function of the control he or she 
has over people at inferior levels of the organisation and is also a function of the resources 
and discretion that are delegated to him or her by those at higher levels in the hierarchy 
(Ibid.). Sheaff sees the exercise of power as a, 
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“zero-sum game whose prizes are the allocation of activities, technologies, 
economic rewards, formal position, status and other perquisites, and of the 
means of exercising power in future. Usually the main source of power given 
by a high ‘vertical’ position in an hierarchy arises from capacity to allocate the 
use of physical resources and budgets owned by the organization, which above 
all enables the superiors to appoint, promote or dismiss subordinates” (pp. 1-
2). 
 
In the early literature on the professions, professional power was discussed by Johnson 
(1972). To a certain extent, the power of medical professionals comes from the indeterminacy 
of clinicians’ medical expertise. Larson (2013) calls this power the ‘monopoly’ of expertise. 
Walby et al. (1994) clarify that medical doctors’ knowledge can “never be fully written 
down, because of the nature of the judgement involved ... Each situation to which a doctor 
applies his or her professional expertise is different and involves judgement as well as rules.” 
For Flynn (1999), based on Freidson, this indeterminacy of expertise is what constrains 
external inspection and supervision over a profession. However, Flynn also acknowledges 
that this discretion or indeterminacy is ultimately governed by resource constraints, “Freidson 
correctly points out that professional technical autonomy can only be exercised if resources 
are available, so the crucial issue is whether professionals can determine resource allocation 
and control resource use or whether distinctive managerial groups have encroached and 
consolidated control in this domain” (p. 23). In the case of CCGs, medical professionals do 
have discretion over resource allocation to providers. 
 
The balance of organisational power has to be continuously negotiated and renegotiated via a 
process of ‘negotiated order’ (Sheaff, 2008; Strauss et al., 1963). The professional is seen in 
the literature not just as a controlling agent, but also as a ‘reflective’ agent (Schön, 1991). In 
Schön’s view, the ‘reflective’ practitioner is not only an expert; he or she also empowers 
patients through the use of a ‘reflective’ contract, a contract that is more flexible and 
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empowering than the traditional patient-medical professional contract. As can be inferred 
from the above, the concept of ‘power’ is not foreign to managerial and professional work in 
the NHS. McNulty and Ferlie (2002) and Harrison (2002) contribute to another debate – the 
reengineering and modernisation of UK healthcare from a managerial perspective, i.e. the 
debate on whether the tendency is towards an increase or decrease of non-medical managers’ 
power over medical professionals and their clinical practices.  
 
In a more recent study, Sheaff (2008) explores the ways in which the balance of power 
between NHS managers and medical doctors has shifted since 1991 and asks to what extent 
these changes are attributable to changes in organisational structures or other factors. 
Ultimately, this commentator tries to determine the implications of these changes to theories 
of managerial and professional power. Although it may well be the case that GPs in England 
are paid well according to European standards, Sheaff notes a trend towards “a net 
strengthening of NHS managerial control and a reduction in GPs’ professional autonomy, 
both individual and collective. Gradually power has been draining from medicine to 
management in NHS primary care” (p. 14). Sheaff refers to an earlier work with colleagues 
from 2004 to clarify that the above mentioned managerial-professional power tensions are 
mostly a function of environmental factors (laws, regulations, and labour market forces), 
structural factors that are typical of all healthcare organisations, and organisation-specific 
processes factors (medical resistance to management, professional discipline, etc.).  
 
4.4. The ‘hybrid’ clinical manager: Identities and daily practices  
 
The social sciences have played an important role in informing arguments about the 
relationship between managers and professionals in the public sector (Flynn, 1999). 
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According to this source, even though there are no clear-cut boundaries between managers 
and professionals, these two groups are characterised by different objectives, values, and 
practices, some of which may even escalate to conflicts between the two groups. Many of the 
differences between these groups are cultural and based on competing agendas (Sorensen et 
al., 2013, p. 698). While studying these differences, numerous authors have focused on the 
role of managers and professionals in the English NHS (Macfarlane, Exworthy and Willmott, 
2012; Sheaff, 2008; Smith, 2007).  
 
Management is a vital function for the viability of any business, be it private or public. Thus, 
Charles Webster, the official historian of the NHS, “has been quoted as saying that 
management is now the most powerful occupation” (Harrison, 1999, p. 56). General 
management was introduced at all levels of the NHS in 1983 by the so-called Griffiths 
Inquiry Report (DHSS, 1983; Macfarlane, Exworthy and Willmott, 2012) which was 
commissioned by the then-Secretary of State for Health and chaired by Sir Roy Griffiths, the 
Managing Director of the Sainsbury supermarkets at the time. According to Sherman, Black 
and Halpern (1983), the objectives of the report were to review the incentives facing NHS 
management and examine the ways in which the NHS resources were being used and 
managed. A major recommendation of this report was that the operating since 1974 
‘consensus’ management in the NHS had to be replaced by ‘general’ management, so that the 
NHS systems of control could improve (Macfarlane, Exworthy and Willmott, 2012; Pollitt et 
al., 1991). The Griffiths report “provides a baseline against which subsequent public 
management reforms (especially those in the NHS) can be gauged” (Macfarlane, Exworthy 
and Willmott, 2012, p. 135), such as a bigger involvement of clinicians in the management of 
the health service. Similarly to the most recent NHS reforms, the Griffiths Report “advocated 
that daily decision making should happen at a local level” and called for a strong general 
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management team “to ensure the devolution of power with clear lines of accountability” 
(Rivet, 1998, p. 354). Thus, ‘professionalism’ and ‘managerialism’ imbued the Griffiths 
Report as early as in 1983. These two ideologies paved the way for clinicians’ involvement in 
commissioning: first, in GP fundholding, then in PBC, and now in CCGs.  
 
The clinical and managerial governance within the NHS have been studied for a long time, 
especially after the Griffiths Inquiry Report. Smith (2007, p. 45) posits that clinical 
governance “became particularly important for the National Health Service in 1997 when the 
Department of Health said that quality measures had to be introduced [via The new NHS – 
modern, dependable (DH, 1997)].”  Further, Smith (p. 46) observes that in the 1990s, the 
tension between managers and clinicians in the NHS intensified since managers “tried to 
streamline for efficiency and clinicians perceived that quality of care was being reduced.” It 
is clear, based on these sources, that professional (quality of healthcare) and managerial 
(streamlining for efficiency and setting quantifiable targets) mindsets in the NHS collided on 
numerous occasions.  
 
‘Janus-faced,’ clinicians have been seen as working in two worlds that are guided by two 
different worldviews or logics (Witman et al., 2011). That is, clinicians’ work is becoming 
‘hybridised’ (Kurunmäki, 2004) between management and medicine. Hayne and Free (2014) 
evoke ‘hybradised professional groups,’ i.e. hybrids within the professions, such as medicine. 
Physicians involved in managerial positions in hospitals have also been referred to as ‘two-
way windows’ that occupy ‘boundary roles’ (Llewelyn, 2001). Kurunmäki (2004) suggests 
that medical doctors in Finland for example are more willing to adopt accounting practices 
and technologies than their UK counterparts because of the presence of more powerful 
professional accounting associations in the UK than in Finland. In another study, Jacobs 
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(2005) finds out that there is no evidence from the three countries studied – Germany, Italy, 
and the UK – that accounting education (a manifestation of a management and accounting 
worldview) has been incorporated into clinicians’ formal education. Jacobs’ findings show 
that in the period studied, there were management and accounting modules offered to medical 
doctors who were considering clinico-managerial posts in these three countries. These 
findings, according to Jacobs, do not support the position that medicine has become a 
hybridised profession; it has become instead ‘polarised.’ Moreover, clinicians may easily 
become ‘managerialised’ in their attempt to ward off managerial encroachment on their 
autonomy (Waring and Currie, 2009). These authors suggest that rather than viewing 
professionals as attracted to management roles per se, one should view managerial techniques 
and jurisdictions as strategically drawn into professionals’ work practices and identities.  
 
Even though most clinicians in the UK have remained practitioners, rather than managers, 
throughout their careers and have thus secured high social status and material rewards 
(Causer and Exworthy, 1999, p. 98), the role of many professionals in the public sector, and 
in the NHS in particular, is shifting towards managerialism. The introduction of NPM (Hood 
1991; 1995 a, b) and NPG discussed in Chapter 2 has a lot to do with this shift. The 
professional-manager schism is not always clear and straightforward but ‘blurred,’ as already 
noted. According to some academics, public sector managers and professionals “derive their 
legitimacy and purpose from legislation and government policy … and are accountable 
bureaucratically to higher level officials and politicians. However, in the new … system … it 
is unclear whose goals and interests will shape the behaviour of local managers” (Flynn, 
1999, p. 24). This is to say that the professional-manager schism does not always shape 
practices in the same way.  
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In a study on medicine, schools, and social work, Causer and Exworthy (1999) delineate the 
changing roles of the professionals holding management positions in these three public sector 
fields. The authors note that there is a general tendency for the managerial component of 
work to become increasingly important for most professional groups. An example of this 
trend from a NHS provider perspective is that each NHS trust or FTs has been required to 
have a medical director, who is a medical doctor, on its trust’s board (Causer and Exworthy, 
1999; Harrison and Pollitt, 1994). It is clear that medical directors’ work is both 
“professionally defined” and “managerially defined” (Flynn, 1999, p. 33) in the sense that 
medical directors are considered to be professional authorities sitting on managerially- and 
strategically-oriented boards. As Hoggett puts it, rather than managers controlling directly 
professionals, professionals are converted into managers – they are given budgets and 
become responsible for semi-autonomous business units. These managerial-professional 
hybrids combine both ‘technical expertise’ and ‘managerial competence’ (Hoggett, 1991, 
cited in Causer and Exworthy, 1999). It is not surprising to the two authors (p. 100) that 
despite the inter-professional and inter-sectorial variations in the three institutional fields 
examined – medicine, schools, and social work – the boundaries between professionalism and 
managerialism in the public sector are becoming more and more ‘blurred.’ 
 
This ‘blurring’ of professional and managerial work practices and identities is evident within 
CCG commissioning, as well. As it was mentioned in the previous chapters, CCG 
commissioning has to do with the rationing of multi-million pound budgets to purchase 
healthcare from hospitals. Flynn (1999, p. 18) notes that “the ultimate source of tension in the 
public sector” is seen by many people to be the control over decisions on resource allocation. 
Surprisingly though, clinicians did not struggle to obtain control over resource allocation 
decisions (actually, quite the opposite) while the 2011 bill was being discussed in Parliament. 
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It was the Coalition government which enforced on them this control, via legislation 
(Timmins, 2013).  
 
The ‘blurring’ of professional and managerial elements characterises not only work identities 
and practices, but also the prospect of career advancement. Causer and Exworthy (1999, p. 
101) for example bring up the term ‘managerial assets:’  
“[M]anagerial assets are becoming of increasing importance for career 
advancement within the professions. To some extent, such assets have always 
been important in most professions, but their significance is intensifying. For 
many people engaged in professional activity it may become increasingly 
inappropriate to ask whether they are a professional or a manager, for the 
essential nature of their work will lie in the combination of both elements.” 
 
Some academics have moved away from portraying neo-liberalism as the major force behind 
the professionalism-managerialism identity blending. For them, NPM has been wrongly 
presented as a ‘blanket discourse’ that has been “colonizing the public services” (Thomas and 
Davies, 2005, p. 689). To these scholars, the strength and cohesion of the NPM discourse are 
context dependent: NPM does not control the public sector professional in ‘deterministic’ and 
‘unidirectional’ ways towards a business or market thinking. Rather, it exercises partial 
control over the public sector’s professional in a variety of possible ways that may be more 
diverse and multi-directional than previously thought.  
 
As introduced in Chapter 1 and as further examined in this chapter, NHS ‘hybrids’ are a 
‘composite’ of different elements (Fischer and Ferlie, 2013), i.e. they are individuals who 
engage in managerial activities, while also engaging in medical practice. Hybrids have been 
studied mostly in the context of healthcare providers. For instance, Waring and Currie (2009, 
p. 774) describe hospital doctors-managers in the following way: “As professionals 
internalize management techniques in an endeavor to stave off management encroachment, 
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they become increasingly managerial in terms of their practice and identity.” Hybrids and 
their practices and identities have not been studied much in the context of NHS 
commissioning, especially in the newly-established CCGs – a gap that was already 
mentioned in Chapter 1.  
 
4.5. The NHS commissioner: Work identities and daily practices 
 
 4.5.1. Commissioners as purchasers and procurement specialists 
 
One of the many responsibilities of NHS commissioners involves purchasing and 
procurement. The procurement process involves needs assessment for a local population and 
the development of specifications for healthcare products and services (Lonsdale 2012; 
Lonsdale and Watson, 2005). With respect to the purchasing of acute healthcare, buyer-
supplier negotiations lead to the development of contracts through formal contractual 
arrangements (Lonsdale, 2012). Usually, these arrangements are highly complex and legally 
binding.  
 
Two of the major challenges to purchasing and procurement in general, and CCG 
commissioning in particular, have been the presence of incomplete or poor quality 
information and conflicts of interests and priorities: the former PCTs, for example, had often 
been criticised for making decisions based “on a very poor information base and with very 
limited analytical skills” (p. 89). Yet another challenge, according to the same source, has 
been the concept of ‘trust’ discussed in Nooteboom (2002) – trust not necessarily in the 
capabilities of the supplier to deliver the agreed-upon goods or services up to standard 
(‘competence trust’), but trust in the motivations of the supplier (‘intentional trust’). Agency 
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theory’s concepts of ex-ante ‘hidden information’ (or ‘adverse selection’) and ex-post ‘hidden 
action’ (or ‘moral hazard’) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) are 
seen as two varieties of ‘information asymmetry’ that are meant to protect the interests of the 
principal, while constraining the actions of the agent (Broadbent, Dietrich and Laughlin, 
1996). 
 
Although purchaser-supplier relationships are often free of unethical self-interest, sometimes 
opportunism may imbue these relationships. Williamson (1996) defines ‘opportunism’ as 
behaviour that furthers self-interest and divides it into ‘blatant’ and ‘subtle’ (see Lonsdale, 
2012). Thus, Lonsdale would argue, in a worst case scenario, a CCG or a NHS trust would 
display ‘blatant’ opportunism if it engaged in breaking written or unwritten contracts, by 
lying to the other party or by cheating or stealing. ‘Subtle’ opportunism, on the other hand, 
“is understood as self-interest seeking with guile and refers to acts whereby there is an 
incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, the aim of which is to mislead, confuse or 
disguise true intent” (p. 92). Examples of ‘subtle’ opportunism, the author further observes, 
may be: “adverse selection, strategic misrepresentation, asymmetrical lock-in, and moral 
hazard” (Ibid.). A perceived moral hazard within NHS commissioning led in part to moving 
away from block contracts in acute care:  
“It was, and is, hoped that Payment by Results will eradicate the complacency 
apparently encouraged by block contracts. The practice of ‘up-coding’, that is, 
unjustifiably recording the most expensive diagnosis under the Payment by 
Results tariff system (Mannion and Street, 2009), is a further example of 
moral hazard … as is provider-induced demand, another problem thought to 
have been an unintended consequence of Payment by Results” (Lonsdale, 
2012, pp. 100-101).  
 
Although instances of the unethical behaviour described above may not occur often, NHS 
commissioners need to be skilled enough to recognise such behaviour, should it surface: 
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“[B]uying organisations [need] to carefully select staff members for critical negotiations, 
ensure that those staff members receive extensive training and, crucially, provide them with 
the necessary time to both properly prepare and bargain” (p. 99). In addition, buyer-supplier 
relations may further be exacerbated if buyer-supplier power relations are present (Lonsdale, 
2012).    
 
 4.5.2. Commissioners as economists 
 
Besides purchasers and procurers, NHS commissioners should also behave like economists. 
As such, they sometimes need to make decisions based on value for money (VFM) 
considerations. Watt (2012) adapts the following table (Table 1) from Friedman and 
Friedman. 
 
 
Table 1 
Different types of spending 
 
Adapted from: Friedman and Friedman, cited in Watt (2012, p. 170) 
 
On whom spent?
You                Someone else
  Whose money?
  Yours Shopping - incentive to get VFM For example, a present. Incentive to 
economise but not to get VFM - at least as 
judged by the recipient. 
  Someone Expense account - incentive to Little incentive to economise or to get good
  else's get good value for money, but VFM for the recipient. 
not to keep spending down
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Watt determines that NHS commissioning falls into the lower right-hand side category, 
‘Little incentive to economise or to get good VFM for the recipient.’ That is, NHS 
commissioners spend someone else’s money (taxpayers’ money) on someone else (on their 
local populations). Commissioning uses someone else’s money to purchase healthcare; 
therefore, the commissioner is an intermediary (an agent or representative) between NHS 
healthcare providers and the local population, i.e. the link between suppliers and patients 
(Watt, 2012).  
 
The concept of supply and demand is studied by macro-economics, i.e. commissioners have 
to reconcile supply with demand, just like economists. Local populations, many of whom are 
also taxpayers, do not engage directly with healthcare purchasing since it is very complex in 
nature; besides, local populations cannot control the suppliers of acute healthcare (Ibid.). 
While performing their duties, just like economists, commissioners should also take into 
account allocative and technical efficiency considerations. Allocative efficiency, according to 
Williams and Robinson (2012, p. 70, based on Drummond) is,  
“concerned with how budgets should be allocated to achieve greatest 
efficiency within a population … [while] [t]echnical efficiency is concerned 
with the efficient production of services (Drummond, 1991). Thus, the interest 
for allocative efficiency is in what services to provide, while for technical 
efficiency it is in providing services at the least possible cost.” 
 
In making efficiency and resource allocation decisions, commissioners may be facilitated by 
using two economic approaches – economic evaluation and programme budgeting and 
marginal analysis (Williams and Robinson, 2012). Cost-effectiveness, cost-utility, and cost-
benefit analyses, note the authors, are three types of economic evaluation. Another economic 
evaluation method is the incremental cost effectiveness ratio (ICER) which divides the 
difference in cost by the difference in outcomes for each type of medical intervention. All 
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these economic analysis methods are predominantly quantitative in nature (Donaldson et al., 
2010) and “make little reference to affordability … [while] the additional health gain in the 
ICER often comes with additional costs” (Williams and Robinson, 2012, p. 73).  
 
 4.5.3. Commissioners as strategists, managers, and accountants  
 
Another broad function of NHS commissioners is business and management oriented: they 
act as organisational strategists, manager, and accountants. Commissioners, similarly to 
management accountants, are expected to be “knowing subjects and organisational truth 
tellers” (Lambert and Pezet, 2011, p. 10). If ‘accounting’ is generally understood as 
‘calculative practices’ (Miller, 1990, 2001), then commissioners will be expected to act as 
accountants, as well. Commissioning involves so many diverse functions, that it has 
appropriately been compared to the ‘brain,’ ‘conscience,’ and ‘eyes and ears’ of the NHS 
(Glasby, 2012b; Smith and Mays, 2005; Wade et al., 2006). Given its centrality in the NHS 
system, it is surprising that so far, there is only one university in the UK, the University of 
Birmingham, that offers degree and certificate programmes in public sector commissioning 
(Ibid.).  
 
Just like a strategic planner, the NHS manager should be prepared to do healthcare needs 
assessments. Needs assessment
30
 aims to determine which health services should be provided 
for a catchment population:  
“The starting point for needs assessment is that there is a mismatch between 
the services provided and the services we believe ought to be provided. 
Fundamentally, this is because the factors that determine what services are 
provided are not the same as the factors that determine what services we 
believe ought to be provided” (Marshall and Hothersall, 2012, p.43).  
                                                          
30
 For more details on needs’ assessment, please see Stevens et al. (2007). 
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Needs assessment is of three types – epidemiological, corporate, and comparative.31 What 
services ‘ought’ to be provided may be a matter of one’s philosophical inclinations. The next 
section elaborates on this matter. Since the healthcare services provided are often driven by 
decisions made in the past (Marshall and Hothersall, 2012), historical data are taken into 
consideration when preparing the new budget allocations among different disease types, 
something a healthcare manager or management accountant would do. Just like insightful 
managers, NHS commissioners ought to be aware of the fact that what the user or patient 
demands may not necessarily be what he or she actually needs:  
“A … problem with matching service provision to need is that demand is not 
simply the sum of individually expressed demands for health and social care. 
Individual service users are sometimes poor at distinguishing between 
effective and ineffective care, particularly in a healthcare setting. Therefore, 
even if services perfectly reflected what patients demanded, they would not 
reflect what they need (Newhouse, 1993)” (Marshall and Hothersall, 2012, p. 
44). 
 
From the above citation, one can see that healthcare demand is different from healthcare 
need. Both are constrained by healthcare supply. There may be situations of healthcare 
“supply but no need, need but no supply or supply and need but no demand” (p. 45). All this 
adds to the complexity of the commissioning function.  
 
Commissioners should be both consistent and transparent as to their chosen perception of 
healthcare need (p. 46). Consistency and transparency are two concepts that financial 
accountants are often concerned with. Moreover, just like management accountants, 
commissioners should get involved in participatory budgeting and use management 
accounting systems and information (Bryer, 2014; Pettersen and Solstad, 2014; Seal and Ball, 
                                                          
31
 For more information on these three types of needs’ assessment, please see Marshall and Hothersall (2012). 
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2011). Also, just like managers, they need to think about performance management, a term 
which Walburg (2006b, p. 23) defines as: 
“the use of interrelated strategies to improve the performance of individuals, 
teams and organisations. It enables organisational leaders to monitor and 
respond to how the organisation delivers its goods. The performance 
management system will involve measuring progress against a series of 
performance indicators.” 
 
Walburg (2006b) sees a difference between illness-specific clinical outcomes and outcomes 
that are more general in nature, for instance quality of life. Thus, Walburg (2006a, b) 
develops an ‘outcome quadrant’ which situates into space four outcomes: clinical outcomes 
and costs and life quality and patient satisfaction (see Figure 3). The above four outcomes, 
however, are not the only healthcare outcomes that a commissioner may use in his or her 
analysis.  
 
Figure 3 
Outcome quadrant 
 
 
Adapted from: Walburg (2006b, p. 26) 
 
Following the logic of the ‘outcome quadrant,’ a manager may need to weigh the cost of 
treatment against the other three indicators – clinical outcomes, life quality, and patients’ 
     Life quality      Patients satisfaction
Clinical outcomes
Cost
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satisfaction (Walburg, 2006a). For instance, if the current treatment of a health condition 
costs more but leads to better outcomes (better life quality, better patient satisfaction, etc.) 
than alternative treatments, it may be necessary for the commissioner to do a more in-depth 
cost-effectiveness analysis of the current treatment before ruling out the option of pursuing 
this treatment. 
 
 4.5.4. Commissioners as philosophers 
 
Reconciling healthcare demand and need to healthcare supply is often contingent upon one’s 
personal value judgements. This is one reason why commissioners are expected to act 
similarly to philosophers. Commissioners need to think about health equalities (distributional 
justice) and procedural justice.
32
 Justice and equity are deeply philosophical concepts. 
Williams and Robinson (2012) opine that given the multiplicity of available ethical principles 
for priority-setting purposes and the need to put together social values with other drivers for 
decision making, recent attention has primarily concentrated on procedural justice, i.e. on fair 
decision processes. The authors note further that one of the most significant sources on 
procedural justice is Daniels and Sabin (2008), a source that incorporates some elements of 
‘communitarianism.’ Communitarianism and individualism are two opposed philosophical 
concepts that differ in the priority they ascribe to communal or personal interests and 
objectives. Modern Western societies for instance are largely viewed as individualistic in 
orientation (‘to each his own’), while many non-Western societies – as communal (‘all for 
one’). These are two different philosophical stances on community cohesiveness.  
 
                                                          
32
 A big part of the NHS Constitution is based on these two kinds of justice. 
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The possible definitions of ‘healthcare need’ are also based on various philosophical stances. 
For example, Marshall and Hothersall (2012) see need as a ‘duty to provide’ healthcare 
services (a deontological philosophical view), a determination set by health professionals (a 
professional judgment view) or a ‘capacity to benefit’ (a teleological view). Some people 
believe for instance that complex and expensive surgeries should be performed on anyone 
who needs them, regardless of his or her age and physical condition, while others take a 
different stand – only people with a higher capacity to benefit, i.e. those more likely to 
survive the surgery and recover well, given their age and condition, should be operated on. 
All these dilemmas are set in the context of the NHS Constitution that stands for health 
equalities, i.e. absence of discrimination on any kind or basis. 
 
Another philosophical question would be whether the healthcare needs of those partially or 
entirely responsible for causing their own illness should be attended to in a publicly-funded 
healthcare system (Ibid.). Such would be those who smoke, take illegal drugs, or those who 
drink excessively. In the presence of tight state budgets, priority setting,
33
 or prioritisation, 
becomes more pronounced than in the ideal but impossible case of unlimited resources.  
 
 4.5.5. Commissioners as public relations (PR) representatives   
 
NHS commissioners have to engage with the public, just like PR representatives. There are 
many ways to involve the public in healthcare decision making – through focus groups, 
surveys, leaflets, and newsletters, just to list a few (Ellins, 2012; Rowe and Frewer, 2005). 
CCG commissioners are expected to communicate their plans to the public and gather the 
                                                          
33 Priority setting is defined as “the setting of rules, processes and criteria for restricting access to care on 
grounds of cost” (Williams and Robinson, 2012, p. 64).   
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public’s opinions and views, something that would help them in future decision making. This 
is a two-way process. Patients and the public’s involvement in the NHS dates from 1974 and 
has been based on three rationales: the right of the public to be involved (‘nothing about me 
without me’), a ‘means for better ends’ for patients, and ‘active citizenship’ that connects 
people from the same communities thanks to NHS public meetings (Ellins, 2012). Rowe and 
Frewer (2005), mentioned in Ellins’ (2012) work, elaborate on three levels of public 
involvement in a public agency’s decision-making processes: communication, consultation, 
and participation. The determinant for these three is the direction of information flow: from 
the public agency to the public, from the public to the public agency, and both ways, 
respectively.  
 
 4.5.6. Commissioners as de-commissioners 
 
Another role of CCG commissioners is to de-commission certain healthcare services, if 
necessary. A service may be de-commissioned for a variety of reasons – because of a change 
in law, financial considerations, changes in technology, and many more. When “a service that 
has been used historically may have been superseded or have been found to be ineffective 
since its inception … disinvestment or decommissioning is necessary” (Marshall and 
Hothersall, 2012, p. 45). Although de-commissioning is often seen as a loss to some people,
34
 
and a gain to others, if done properly, it may have positive consequences. Bovaird, Dickinson 
and Allen (2012, p. 38) see de-commissioning as a generator of “major improvements in the 
achievement of outcomes that really matter and the junking of processes and outputs that do 
not matter to citizens.”   
                                                          
34 Puffitt and Prince (2012, p. 111) believe that de-commissioning a health service might demoralise the staff 
affected since it may be seen by them as a “direct devaluing of their contribution to the organisation, perhaps 
generating resentment as well as anger and anxiety.”  
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A Maslin multi-dimensional matrix is often used to decide which healthcare services to de-
commission and which ones to keep (Prince and Puffitt, 2001; Puffitt and Prince, 2012). This 
matrix plots on a co-ordinate system the ‘needs of the service user’ and the ‘user-defined’ 
(the person doing the analysis) dimensions for the x- and the y-axes, respectively. The matrix 
plots the different services which are candidates for de-commissioning as ‘high’ or ‘low’ on 
the x- and y- axes. For instance, ‘low need of the service user’ and ‘high user-defined 
dimension.’ The four possible results are to: 1) lobby, rematch, and de-commission the 
service (done with difficulty); 2) withdraw or de-commission the service (done with ease); 3) 
continue the service but monitor and support it; or 4) review and evaluate the service on a 
regular basis. Some scholars share the view that under the Coalition government, health 
service de-commissioning in the English NHS is becoming a dominant trend (Bovaird, 
Dickinson and Allen, 2012). This trend is perhaps exacerbated by the general state of the 
global economy (Puffitt and Prince, 2012), not just by state politics. 
 
4.6. Conclusion  
 
This chapter reviewed the extant literature on the professional identities of clinicians and 
commissioners and their daily practices. It focused on the multiple hats that NHS 
commissioners have to wear: these of economists, managers, accountants, philosophers, PR 
representatives, de-commissioners of services, and many more. It became clear that CCG 
clinicians are now expected to juggle multiple identities and be exposed to a variety of 
practices that require the use of numbers, calculations, statistics, and data analysis. Miller 
(1990, 2001) calls such practices ‘calculative,’ as we saw in Chapter 1. It was important to 
familiarise the reader with the various daily activities of healthcare commissioners because 
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this familiarity would help better understand the research data from Chapter 7. It became 
clear that GPs in CCGs were influenced by a multitude of rationales – political, economic, 
and social – when performing their new commissioning duties. These factors are sometimes 
in harmony, but other times they may clash and conflict with one another. With this in mind, 
we will now turn to Chapter 5, the theoretical framework chapter.   
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CHAPTER 5 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: ‘CALCULATIVE PRACTICES’ AND CONCEPTS 
FROM THE INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS THEORY  
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Chapter 5 presents the theoretical framework used in this research – Miller’s concept of 
‘calculative practices’ and concepts from the Institutional Logics Theory (ILT), also known 
as the Institutional Logics Perspective (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton, 2004; 
Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2012, etc.). It is important to think of the objective and 
research questions from Chapter 1 through the lens of theoretical concepts because often 
theory gives special insights into business issues. This chapter starts with a presentation of 
‘calculative practices’ and the ILT. It then discusses some existing research on institutional 
change in healthcare that uses institutional logics. Reasons for the choice of theory are then 
provided. Afterwards, the theoretical framework of this research is visualised in a figure 
format.  
 
5.2. ‘Calculative practices’ 
 
‘Calculative practices,’ as we saw in Chapter 1, are “technologies of government” or “the 
mechanisms through which programs of government are articulated and made operable” 
(Miller, 2001, p. 379). As it became clear earlier, CCG commissioners are involved in a wide 
range of non-calculative and calculative practices as philosophers, economists, strategists, 
accountants, managers, de-commissioners, and so on as a consequence of a new piece of 
government legislation. Thus, CCGs, besides centres of philosophical decision making, are 
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also ‘centres of calculation’ (Latour, cited in (Miller (1990)) or a “functioning calculative 
network” (Miller, 2001, p. 382). Calculative practices include traditional, textbook-based 
accounting practices but are not limited to them. For example, complex statistical models are 
not yet part of the accounting body of knowledge (managerial, financial, audit or tax) but 
they do involve a large amount of calculations, numbering, modeling, and estimations.  
 
Since this doctoral thesis is in accounting, a short discussion of what ‘accounting’ means is 
warranted. A definition of the term was already presented briefly in Chapter 1. Miller’s 
definition of ‘accounting’ is much broader than the traditional, textbook definitions of it – 
accounting is usually defined in textbooks as the process of identifying, analysing, and 
recording business transactions, along with preparing financial statements. Miller defines 
‘accounting’ (Miller, 1990, pp. 316-317), “not as a narrowly technical mechanism for 
recording transactions. It is understood as a process of attributing financial values and 
rationales to a wide range of social practices, thereby according them a specific visibility, 
calculability, and operational utility …”  In a later work, Miller defines ‘accounting’ as “an 
assemblage of calculative practices and rationales” (Miller, 1998, p. 605). On the same page, 
the author says that, “[a]ccounting is most interesting at its margins,” i.e. in areas that haven’t 
entered the mainstream accounting realm yet. Similarly, CCG commissioning is not purely 
about accounting but about much more. It is in the ‘margins’ of accounting and involves 
strategy, leadership, organisational behaviour, psychology, philosophy, ethics, medicine, and 
law, to list just a few. Commissioning is indeed at the margins of accounting as a complex, 
socially important, and very interdisciplinary process.   
 
‘Problematising’ (Rose and Miller, 1992) is another important concept used by Miller. It is a 
concept that, “adds [new] practices to accounting at its margins” (Miller, 1998, p. 606). In 
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this way, accounting constantly grows and expands its boundaries. So, more and more 
activities or practices may be added to the accounting discipline as time goes on. 
Governments have a lot to do with this. They, according to Miller, have a ‘programmatic 
aspect’ that may be named ‘political rationalities:’ “This [political rationalities] is the field of 
statements, claims and prescriptions that sets out the objects and objectives of government” 
(Ibid.). From this perspective, the white paper (DH, 2010a) and the HSCA 2012 may be seen 
to embody the political rationalities or programmes of government; they helped achieve 
government objectives.  
 
Another aspect of government, in Miller’s view, is “technologies” of government, or a “wide 
range of calculations, procedures and mechanisms of government” (Ibid.). CCG 
commissioning for example may be understood as such a ‘technology’ of government. It does 
involve a lot of calculations, procedures, and mechanisms, as it was shown earlier.  
“Technologies are called upon within political argument to deliver and realize 
abstract aims such as order, efficiency or whatever. Equally, those who devise 
and operate these technologies argue for and promote their significance in 
relation to very general and abstract ends which they promise to bring about. 
There is thus an essential reciprocity between the programmatic and the 
technological aspects of government” (Ibid.).   
  
One may interpret this quote in the context of CCGs. Such ‘abstract aims’ or ideals of 
government may include: improving patient outcomes, achieving NHS cost savings and 
better patient engagement, and many others. Via these technologies, governments wish to 
deliver on their programmes or agendas.  
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5.3. What is the Institutional Logics Theory (ILT)? 
 
The ILT is a relatively new sociological theory which has been used in a variety of academic 
fields – organisation and behavioural studies, management and accounting, and sociology. 
Institutional logics research has proved very popular among scholars in the last few decades. 
This kind of research has turned into one of the fastest growing intellectual research areas in 
organisational theory (Lounsbury and Boxenbaum, 2013). The same source also notes that 
recently, there has been a growing proliferation of ILT publications in top sociology and 
management journals, such as: the American Journal of Sociology, the Administrative 
Science Quarterly, the Academy of Management Journal, and the Academy of Management 
Review. There have been many recent review, as well as theory, papers on the ILT 
(Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache and Santos, 2010; Smets et al., 2015; Thornton and Ocasio, 
2008; Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2012). Institutional logics research is still in its 
relatively early stages, with many opportunities for further theoretical development and 
refinement (Christiansen and Lounsbury, 2013). However, this research does not intend to 
make a major contribution to the ILT. Instead, it intends to use elements or concepts of the 
ILT to enhance understanding of the subjects studied – clinicians in CCGs. This study is an 
elaboration of the ILT and an empirical application of elements of this theory.   
 
The ILT was pioneered by Friedland and Alford’s (1991) paper entitled, ‘Bringing society 
back in: Symbols, practices, and institutional contradictions’ and published in the so-called 
‘Orange book’ edited by Powell and DiMaggio, The new institutionalism in organizational 
analysis. This book is a direct critique of the very popular at the time neo-institutional theory 
(Lounsbury and Boxenbaum, 2013). The Friedland and Alford (1991) article begins by 
criticising rational choice and economics-based theories, as well as organisational theories, 
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that do not take into account the broader societal context of organisations. The ILT sees 
society as a “potentially contradictory interinstitutional system” (p. 240). This theory quickly 
gained momentum after 1991 (Townley, 1997; Wilhelm and Bort, 2013), a trend which 
accelerated especially in the later parts of the 2000s (Lounsbury and Boxenbaum, 2013).  
 
 5.3.1. Institutional logics 
 
‘Institutional logics’ is a term that has become a “buzz-word,” that is, its meaning has been 
“distorted” and “overextended” (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008, p. 99). There are different 
possible definitions of this term. As it is common in institutional work, the definitions of 
terms and their usage vary. Institutional logics dictate the goals and values that agents pursue 
in a societal context and specify what means for doing this are appropriate; thus, logics have 
both a culture-cognitive and a normative dimension (Scott et al., 2000).  
 
Thornton and Ocasio (2008) refer to three possible definitions of the term ‘institutional 
logics:’ Alford and Friedland’s (1985), Jackall’s (1988, 2010), and the definition of Thornton 
and Ocasio (1999). This thesis assumes the third definition, according to which institutional 
logics are: “the socially constructed, historical pattern of material practices, assumptions, 
values, beliefs, and rules [my emphasis] by which individuals produce and reproduce their 
material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality” 
(Thornton and Ocasio, 1999, p. 804). Given this definition, calculative practices, i.e. CCG 
commissioning, are an assembly of institutional logics.  
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5.3.2. Dynamics and interplay amongst institutional logics 
 
  5.3.2.1. Central/dominant institutional logics 
 
Western societies, according to the ILT, are divided into several ‘institutional orders’ or into 
several “central institutions of the contemporary capitalist West” (Friedland and Alford, 
1991, p. 232). The exact number of institutional orders varies in the literature. Some authors 
see five, while others see more, institutional or societal orders. The five institutional orders in 
Friedland and Alford (1991) are: the capitalist market, the bureaucratic state, democracy, the 
nuclear family, and the Christian religion. Thornton (2004), on the other hand, sees six main 
institutional orders: the market, the corporation, the professions, the family, the religions, and 
the state. In a more contemporary work, Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury (2012) add 
another, seventh, institutional order to this list – the community. Institutional orders are 
important because they all host societal-level institutional logics that are specific to them 
(Thornton, 2002).  
 
An institutional order, for example the state, may be composed of several more narrowly 
defined institutional fields: education, healthcare, social care, national defence, 
transportation, commissioning, etc. What would be normal or acceptable as a practice within 
the boundaries of one institutional order or field might be inappropriate in another order or 
field, postulates the ILT (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 
2012). Kneeling down and praying to God, for instance, would be acceptable within the 
religious order, but inappropriate at a secular business meeting within the market order. Thus, 
institutional logics are bound by certain normative (bahaviour-centred) boundaries.   
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Friedland and Alford (1991, p. 248) have determined that each of the institutional orders of 
contemporary Western societies is characterised by a ‘central’ or ‘dominant’ logic, i.e. by “a 
set of material practices and symbolic constructions … which constitutes its organizing 
principles and which is available to organizations and individuals to elaborate.” Each 
institutional order has one or more ‘central’ logic(s) and organising principles (Glynn and 
Raffaelli, 2013; Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2012) which affect actors’ focus of 
cognition, relationships in society, practices, and meanings (Glynn and Raffaelli, 2013). 
Friedland and Alford give some examples of central logics within institutional orders: the 
central institutional logic of the state is the “rationalization and the regulation of human 
activity by legal and bureaucratic hierarchies,” while that of democracy is “participation and 
the extension of popular control over human activity” (Friedland and Alford, 1991, p. 248). 
In a similar fashion, Kury provides the example of the logic of “maximizing shareholder 
value” as being the central logic to the financial markets’ institutional order in the US (Kury, 
2007, p. 376). 
  
It might be debatable which exactly the dominant logic within an institutional order is: thus, 
Cloutier and Langley (2013) point to the fact that the early ILT’s assumption that just one 
logic dominates a stable field is unjustified. So, there may be several simultaneously 
dominant logics within a, usually mature, field. Besides, to some academics, 
dominant/prevailing institutional logics often represent the interests of the most powerful 
institutional actors within an institutional order, while secondary/repressed logics represent 
“subordinated interests,” interests that may become more pronounced and even 
“superordinate” with time (Scott et al., 2000, p. 171).  
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A relevant example from history would be the changes to the prevailing monarchy logic in 
18
th
 century France, changes that were brought by the new logic of the bourgeoisie-led 
French Revolution in 1789. This Revolution established the First French Republic. The 
republic logic was not a prevailing logic up to 1789; yet, it has persisted up to this day, i.e. it 
became the dominant, ‘superordinate’ logic. Today, France is in its Fifth Republic.  
 
In an example from a healthcare perspective, McDonald et al. (2013) view the 2004 reforms 
to UK primary care as, 
“intended to replace the dominant logic of medical professionalism with what 
some commentators have referred to (though not in an institutional context) as 
‘production line medicine’… The former is characterised by professional 
autonomy and discretion … [and] the use of reflective practice... The latter can 
be described in terms of guideline driven care, with standardised treatment 
protocols which leave little room for discretion” (pp. 4-5). 
 
 
From an accounting perspective, dominant institutional logics have been studied for instance 
in the context of companies’ voluntary adoption of the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) (Guerreiro, Rodrigues and Craig, 2012) and in the context of US higher 
education publishing in the second part of the 20
th
 century (Thornton, 2002). It has also been 
proposed that besides dominant logics, there are also ‘retrenching’ logics (Misutka et al., 
2013). The latter may impede innovation and lead to anomalies. These logics are understood 
to be triggered by cultural positioning, behavioural resistance, and feedback shaping and are 
examined by Misutka and colleagues in the setting of the Alberta oil sands case from 2008-
2011.  
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5.3.2.2. Shifts in dominant institutional logics  
 
Scott et al. (2000) recount a series of shifts in dominant logics in US healthcare in the second 
half of the 20th century. ‘Quality of care’ was the first dominant logic, replaced by the ‘logic 
of equity’ emphasising equal access to healthcare. Later, the logic of equity was replaced by 
the ‘market logic’ with its emphasis on efficiency. The professional accounting, architecture, 
and publishing industries in the US have become settings for shifts in dominant institutional 
logics, as well (Thornton, Jones and Kury, 2005). In the 1980s, when US professional 
accounting firms incorporated management consultants in their practices, the structural 
overlap that resulted from this change shifted the dominant institutional logics. 
 
This shift was accompanied by a change in the focus of attention from “overseeing the 
accuracy of clients’ books to using exposure to accounting ledgers to identify consulting 
opportunities” (p. 129). The fiduciary logic of protecting the public interest in terms of 
financial opportunism, a logic that characterised the 1800s-1980s, slowly shifted and was 
replaced by the corporate logic of profit making (p. 132). In the spirit of the profit-making 
logic, “[accountancy] firms began negotiating treatments with their clients rather than 
dictating the standards, all to serve clients and protect their revenue base” (p. 134).35  
 
In the early years of architecture in the US, the dominant logic was the aesthetics logic. This 
logic’s ideal was ‘design.’ With the later arrival of new technologies that made possible the 
building of metal constructions (modern lifts and skyscrapers), a new logic replaced the 
                                                          
35
 Dutch mid-tier accounting firms, Lander, Koene and Linssen (2013) observe, have not experienced a shift in 
dominant logics, but a type of hybradisation of logics – these firms have selectively adopted certain commercial 
logic-related practices, while retaining their main commitment to the trustee logic. 
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aesthetics logic – the ideal of efficiency36 (Thornton, Jones and Kury, 2005). As already 
mentioned earlier, a similar shift occurred in the US publishing industry. The ‘editorial’ logic 
(‘personal capitalism;’ see Thornton, 2004) of the 1950s-1960s succumbed to the ‘market’ 
logic (‘market capitalism’). Üsdiken (2007) provides another example of shifts in logics that 
underpin an institutional field or sector: starting in the 1950s, the field of business education 
in the US started to give way to a new, dominant logic – this of science-based business 
education.  
 
Over the last decade, institutional logics research has moved away from simply studying the 
effects of shifts from one dominant logic to another. It has moved towards studying the 
implications of plural logics and organisational responses to institutional complexity 
(Lounsbury and Boxenbaum, 2013). The study of shifts in dominant logics characterised 
mostly the early ILT research (what Daudigeous, Boutinot and Jaumier (2013) call the 
‘evolutionary or sequential’ model of the theorisation of institutional logics). The authors 
give the example of the field of architecture where the aesthetics and the efficiency logics 
have been taking turns in dominance at various times in history.  
 
5.3.2.3. Multiple/co-existing institutional logics  
 
The central institutions of the contemporary West, i.e. its institutional orders, are “potentially 
contradictory and hence make multiple logics available to individuals and organizations. 
Individuals and organizations transform the institutional relations of society by exploiting 
these contradictions” (Friedland and Alford, 1991, p. 232). So, multiple institutional logics, 
or logics pluralism (Glynn and Raffaelli, 2013) often exist together. It is possible that a single 
                                                          
36
 The emergence of a new logic, efficiency, in the early 20th century US healthcare field is studied in detail in 
Arndt and Bigelow (2006), while the emergence of the new logic of ‘managed care’ is examined in Nigam and 
Ocasio (2010).  
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institutional order (or an institutional field within an order) is inhabited by multiple logics. 
For example, the order of the state (or more specifically, the healthcare field within the state) 
hosts the following logics: the professional, business, governance, and other logics. Multiple 
or co-existing logics have been the object of many studies (Dunn and Jones, 2010; 
Greenwood et al., 2010; Lounsbury, 2008; McDonald et al., 2013; Waldorff, Reay and 
Goodrick, 2013), while the synonymous conception of ‘constellations’ of logics has been 
studied by Goodrick and Reay (2011) and Waldorff, Reay and Goodrick (2013). 
  
Using archival sources from the 1900s and 2000s, Dunn and Jones (2010) identify two logics 
that have been persistently central to medical education – ‘care’ and ‘science.’ This study 
reveals that the plural logics of ‘care’ and ‘science’ in medical education are supported by 
distinct groups of actors with distinct interests. These logics fluctuate with time and create 
tensions as to how exactly to educate the future medical professionals – more like carers and 
less like scientists or vice versa. 
 
5.3.2.4. Competing institutional logics 
 
Plural or multiple logics within institutional orders and fields do not always peacefully co-
exist; instead, they may ‘compete’ with one another for dominance (Kitchener, 2002; Vit, 
2011). Some scholars have proposed that institutional change may be triggered when actors 
develop “mechanisms of collaboration that support the co-existence of competing logics” 
(Reay and Hinings, 2009, p. 647). Thus, collaborative work fosters independence and 
separate identities among collaborators. Previous literature, in their view, has inadequately 
theorised institutional change as just the replacement of one dominant institutional logic by 
another.  
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Competing logics within orders and fields have been studied in the banking sector setting. 
Marquis and Lounsbury (2007) investigate how competing institutional logics facilitate 
resistance to institutional change by focusing on bankers’ resistance to large banks’ acquiring 
small, local banks. They explore the sources of actors’ resistance to institutional change and 
“argue that the national banks’ efforts to introduce a banking logic emphasizing efficiencies 
of geographic diversification triggered new forms of professional entrepreneurialism intended 
to preserve a community logic of banking” (p. 799). Competing logics have also been studied 
in the mutual funds sector: two competing logics (the trustee and performance logics rooted 
in two different locations, Boston and New York) were found to lead to variations in the way 
mutual funds established contracts with independent professional money managers 
(Lounsbury, 2007).  
 
Logics are found to compete within the education sector, as well. Ezzamel, Robson and 
Stapleton (2012) analyse the competing ‘logic of business’ introduced in the UK by the ERA 
1988, the ‘logic of professions’ (the teaching occupation), and the ‘governance logic’ 
(schools and local education authorities). These competing logics, together with the 1988 
legislation, were found to have impacted upon the symbols of budgeting and budgeting 
practice variation in the schools studied.  
 
In another study, a model is developed to predict organisational actors’ preferred responses to 
competing logics (Pache and Santos, 2013). The authors categorise the actors in their study 
into three groups (novice, familiar, and identified) in terms of their level of adherence to each 
institutional logic examined and determine five types of responses that the actors may resort 
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to – ignorance, compliance, resistance, combination, and compartmentalisation. The model 
tries to predict which one of the five responses would be chosen by each actor.   
 
5.3.2.5. Conflicting institutional logics 
 
Conflicting demands on individual and organisational actors stem from the collision of 
different, often countervailing, institutional worlds and worldviews (Pache and Santos, 2010). 
Conflicting demands imply the presence of conflicting institutional logics. Such logics have 
been studied in a variety of contexts – in Lloyd’s reinsurance trading in London (Smets et al., 
2015), in sports management at a religious university (Nite, Singer and Cunningham, 2013), 
in Dutch mid-tier accounting firms (Lander, Koene and Linssen, 2013), and in UK healthcare 
(Macfarlane et al., 2013), to name just a few. Within CCGs as well, highly conflicting logics 
are present. Given shrinking, in real terms, resources for the healthcare sector, GPs’ referral 
activity has lately been more tightly scrutinised (McDonald et al., 2013). Thus, GPs are 
“squeezed between patient demands and field expectations about what constitutes legitimate 
volumes of referrals” (p. 25).  
 
Logics may conflict with, or complement, one another. Thornton gives the example of the 
countervailing editorial (professional) and market logics in the field of publishing which are 
mirrored from the societal level to lower levels of analysis: 
“[T]he society-level logics of the professions and of markets have parallel 
conventions in lower-order logics; the editorial and the market logic in the 
publishing industry are examples of such parallels ... The professions embody 
logics that conflict with corporations, and markets embody logics that are 
complementary to corporations. Therefore, the logics of the professions and 
the markets imply countervailing determinants of organization structure” 
(Thornton, 2002, p. 83). 
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In a study of Research & Development (R&D) collaboration projects between small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and public universities in Denmark, Bjerregaard (2010) 
encounters the presence of conflicting logics, as well: businessmen and academics’ 
conceptions of the time horizon that should be available for R&D projects is found to vary. 
“The public researcher attempted to extend the project period for the R&D work in order to 
ensure the research quality … whilst the SME partner initially tried to pull the project in the 
opposite direction towards fast commercialization and application” (p. 104).  
 
What are the consequences of clashes of logics (conflicts) at the field level? Lander, Koene 
and Linssen (2013) see four possible outcomes of the clash among logics in the literature. 
First, elements of the new logic may get incorporated into the dominant logic; second, 
elements of both logics may become hybridised; third, a shift may occur from the old, 
dominant institutional logic to the newly introduced one; and fourth, both logics may 
permanently co-exist.  
 
Smets et al. (2015) sees ‘conflicting-yet-complementary logics’ in the field of reinsurance. 
Conflicting logics, if combined effectively, may converge into a new artifact and produce 
constructive results. Thus, when institutional complexity and conflicting logics are present, 
organisational actors may act as ‘bricoleurs,’ a term borrowed from Lévy-Staruss, and 
combine different elements from different logics, to design new artifacts (Christiansen and 
Lounsbury, 2013). ‘Bricolage’ is the term for the artifact the bricoleur produces when he or 
she uses whatever materials are available in a given, closed environment. The empirics of this 
study come from a global brewery group that developed such a ‘bricolage’ artifact – a 
responsible drinking guide. The brewery combined elements of the normative social 
responsibility logic (drinking with moderation) and the market logic (profiting from selling 
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alcohol). By crafting a new artifact, the organisation experienced a possible identity change: 
“drawing upon extant organizational resources from different times and spaces [the brewery 
company made] … an effort to reconstitute [its] … collective organizational identity” (p. 
200).   
 
5.4. Institutional change in healthcare and institutional logics 
 
Institutional change has been the object of many studies in the management and accounting 
literatures (for example, Cooper, Greenwood and Brown, 1996; Greenwood, Suddaby and 
Hinings, 2002; Leblebici et al., 1991; McNulty and Ferlie, 2004; North, 1990). This change 
often comes in the form of reforms that may be radical or mild in nature. It may affect the 
public, private or voluntary sectors. Healthcare and other public sector fields have certainly 
not been exempt from institutional change (Macfarlane et al., 2011; Scott et al., 2000). 
Institutional change in the NHS in particular has been examined through the lens of various 
types of institutional and other theories (Checkland et al., 2012; Macfarlane et al., 2013).
37
 
According to Macfarlane et al. (2013), early neo-institutional theory research on the NHS 
considered how the healthcare field was changing as a result of coercive, normative, and 
mimetic influences (Currie and Guah, 2007; Currie and Suhomlinova, 2006). The purpose of 
this section is not to extensively review the literature on institutional change, but to make the 
point that such change in healthcare has often been studied in the light of institutional logics. 
 
To reiterate, the HSCA 2012 brought radical institutional change to the healthcare field in 
England. Besides neo-institutionalism (NPM), the ILT has also proved to be a useful lens for 
                                                          
37
 Institutional theory, claim  Greenwood and Hinings (1996), sees organisational behaviour as a response not 
only to market pressures, but also to pressures from institutions – regulatory agencies (the state, the professions, 
etc.). Pressures coming from social expectations and from leading organisations in the field also may require 
organisational responses.  
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the study of the plurality of norms and beliefs in institutional theories and the processes that 
underline institutional formation and change (Cloutier and Langley, 2013; McDermott, 
Fitzgerald and Buchanan, 2013), be it in healthcare or elsewhere. The introduction of 
institutional logics into institutional theory attempted “to move institutional thinking forward 
by incorporating an explanation for institutional change” (Greenwood et al., 2008, p. 21).  
 
These authors remind that Friedland and Alford’s (1991) model of institutions proposed that 
modern capitalist societies are composed of ‘central institutions’ that are permeated by 
‘potentially incompatible’ logics. Namely this logics’ incompatibility is what provides the 
dynamics behind potential change: institutional actors may recognize opportunities for 
change thanks to their location ‘at the interstices’ of logics in conflict. Such an actor ‘at the 
interstices’ is the ‘doctor in the lead’ in the Dutch context (Witman et al., 2011). Thus, 
doctors may ‘bridge’ the worlds of medical expertise and managerial acumen. Llewelyn 
(2001) called these medics, in the English context, ‘two-way windows,’ as we already saw in 
a previous chapter.   
 
From the Canadian perspective, Reay and Hinings (2005) develop a theoretical model that 
attempts to bring more understanding to change in mature fields, such as healthcare. The 
authors investigate a large-scale, government-led reform in the healthcare field in Alberta, 
Canada via a qualitative case study to understand the process of field recomposition.  Rather 
than try to explain the sources of institutional change, they investigate how a field may 
become reestablished after the implementation of a radical institutional change. The Alberta 
healthcare field experienced a shift from the dominant institutional logic – medical 
professionalism – to another institutional logic called ‘business-like health care.’ Since the 
government wanted change to occur at the field level, claim the authors, it implemented 
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legislation, so that the field’s structure itself might change. Something similar happened with 
the HSCA 2012 reforms and the ensuing reorganisation of the NHS.  
 
Due to different funding mechanisms, new actors were created, while others were rearranged 
in Alberta. Both the field structure and the institutional logic changed, so that the new 
structure and the desired new institutional logic might be consistent with each other, opine 
the authors. In another study (Reay and Hinings, 2009), the same authors see institutional 
change in Canada’s healthcare as set within competing, co-existing logics. Their review of 
documents shows that the government and physicians espoused different logics. The 
documents from the Canadian physicians’ association that were examined in the study 
accentuated the physician-patient relationship. It is clear from this study that physicians did 
not wish to be controlled by the government’s logic of demanding more efficiency.  
 
Institutional change, including this in healthcare, may come in a variety of shapes and forms. 
It may consist of: formation/birth of a new institutional logic or governance structure, 
deinstitutionalisation or dissolution of an existing logic or structure or reinstitutionalisation, 
during which an existing institutional logic or governance structure is replaced by a new logic 
or governance structure (Rao, Monin and Durand, 2003; Scott 2001). In a study of the 
implementation of business process reengineering in the NHS, McNulty and Ferlie (2004) 
suggest that change may be ‘sedimented,’ rather than ‘transformational,’ i.e. that former ways 
of organising behaviour may retain their resilience in current practices.  
 
Besides ‘sedimented’ or ‘transformational,’ institutional change may be of other types, as 
well. Change may be ‘convergent’ or ‘radical,’ ‘revolutionary’ or ‘evolutionary’ (Greenwood 
and Hinings, 1996). Convergent change is about slight ‘fine tuning’ of the existing 
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organisation, while radical change is more about, as its name implies, ‘frame bending’ and 
transformation (Ibid.). In the case of CCGs, the institutional change involved is radical. 
Revolutionary and evolutionary change, further clarify the authors, are defined by the scale 
and speed of change. Evolutionary change in the healthcare field may occur slowly and 
gradually, whereas revolutionary change may happen swiftly and have wide-spread effects, 
just as it happened with the HSCA 2012.  
 
Pouthier, Steele and Ocasio (2013) remark that institutional logics and collective identities, 
including professional identities, are closely inter-related: logics shape identities (Creed, 
Dejordy and Lok, 2010; Friedland and Alford, 1991; Greenwood et al., 2011; Lok, 2010; 
Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2012, etc.) and identities themselves mediate the influence 
of logics (Glynn, 2008; Goodrick and Reay, 2010; Wry, Lounsbury and Glynn, 2011, etc.).  
 
Changes in the strength, content, and permanence of logics-identity relationships among 
‘hospitalists’ (physicians who specialise in the provision of care in hospital settings) in the 
US are examined in Pouthier, Steele and Ocasio (2013). The term ‘hospitalist’ emerged in the 
1990s. At first, the hospitalist identity was theorised in terms of the previously existing logic 
of ‘managed care.’ In the following decades, the authors share, the term became disassociated 
from managed care. They develop a process model of detachment or disassociation from an 
undesired identity. The trigger for this detachment process is found to be “a set of identity 
threats (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996) and opportunities, which 
challenged the ability of hospitalists to maintain a positive identity in the eyes of other key 
stakeholders in the health-care field, and in their own estimation” (Pouthier, Steele and 
Ocasio, 2013, p. 205). Hospitalists were found to respond to identity pressures via ‘cultural 
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differentiation’ and ‘social realignment’ with key stakeholders, such as hospital executives 
and ‘quality of care’ movements.  
 
Hospitalists’ identities in the NHS are enshrined in a complex web of macro-level service and 
policy (Eve and Hodgkin, 1997): some of them interact with politicians, local communities, 
managers, and, of course, patients. Hospitalists’ leadership patterns and the resulting 
organisational outcomes, as well as the creation of new orders of disease worth, also shape 
identities and have attracted the attention in recent academic studies (Fitzerald et al., 2013; 
Mason, 2014). In her study, Mason (2014) shows how commissioning practices in the post-
HSCA 2012 world changed the valuation of public goods through the reframing of the notion 
of ‘sickness and health.’ In a situation of providing the ‘most valuable’ healthcare services, 
rather than a ‘comprehensive’ range of such services, clinicians doubtlessly face the identity 
challenge of being the ones deciding which health conditions in their areas are worth 
spending resources on (see Chapter 4).  
 
In her study of clinical directors’ (senior clinicians who have assumed managerial 
responsibilities over their colleagues) role simultaneously in management and health, 
Llewelyn (2001) opens up the debate on ‘boundary’ role identities and ‘increased 
interchange’ and communication between managers (with their logic of ‘consequences’) and 
clinicians (with their logic of ‘appropriateness’). Mintzberg’s (1987) three main activity 
groups that characterise managers – interpersonal, informational, and decisional – all apply to 
the role of clinical directors. CCG commissioners, as well, engage in these three types of 
managerial roles: they meet with the public, provide information to other parties, and make 
commissioning decisions.   
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5.5. Reasons for the choice of theory 
 
As it became clear from Chapters 1 to 4, a wide variety of factors influence the field of CCG 
commissioning – public sector ideologies (NPM and NPG), new legislature (the HSCA 
2012), new governance arrangements and restructuring of the NHS, individual and party 
political worldviews and aspirations, medical and professional training and concerns, etc. The 
ILT, thanks to its concepts of institutional logics (business, governance, political, 
professional, and others) and dynamics/interplay amongst logics (co-existing, competing, 
conflicting, complementing logics, etc.) naturally feels like a very appropriate choice of 
theory for this research. The ILT does capture many of the issues discussed in Chapters 1 to 4 
and seems to be very likely to help achieve the research objective from Chapter 1. This 
objective was to obtain a better understanding of GPs and other clinicians in CCGs. Miller’s 
(1990, 2001) concept of ‘calculative practices’ is also very appropriate to use in the 
theoretical framework since, as we saw in Chapter 1 and section 4.5, commissioning is itself 
a calculative practice. NHS commissioners are expected to act like managers, accountants, 
statisticians, economists, and many more. This is to say, they are involved in a wide variety 
of calculative practices.  
 
5.6. Theoretical framework used in this research 
 
Coupled with Miller’s concept of ‘calculative practices,’ the concept of ‘institutional logics’ 
and the dynamic interplay amongst these logics are chosen as the theoretical backbone of this 
study. Figure 4 depicts the theoretical framework of this study.  
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Figure 4 
Theoretical framework of this study 
 
 
 
The figure first presents the objective of this research, ‘Towards a better understanding of 
GPs in CCGs.’ On the left-hand side, it lists the four research questions (RQs) from Chapter 
1. These RQs will be answered in Chapter 8. Below them, the figure lists any incidental 
findings and contributions (if any) that may transpire from the research data. These eventual 
incidental contributions will also be presented in Chapter 8. On the right-hand side are 
presented the theoretical concepts used – the concept of ‘calculative practices’ and the 
‘dynamics and interplay amongst institutional logics.’ These institutional logics are: the 
business, professional, governance, and political ones since Chapters 1 to 4 either stated or 
implied that CCG commissioning interweaves these four institutional logics.   
 
The business logic is present since NPM for example is business inspired and affects strongly 
CCG commissioning. Efficiency and cost savings in CCGs are both NPM and business 
     Contributions: Theoretical concepts used:
1) Answer to RQ 1
I. Concept of 'calculative practices'
2) Answer to RQ 2
3) Answer to RQ 3 and
4) Answer to RQ 4
II. Dynamics and interplay amongst
5) Incidental findings      institutional logics (business, professional,
    and contributions      governance, and political)
    (if any)
Objective: Towards a better understanding of GPs in CCGs
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concepts. The professional logic is present since GPs and other clinicians involved in CCGs 
are medical professionals. The governance logic is present because GPs now have to govern 
and lead CCGs, statutorily. Finally, the political logic is also present since CCGs were 
instituted by a political agenda – this of the former Coalition government. The various 
worldviews and mindsets of the business, professional, governance, and political logics are 
embodied in ‘material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules…” (Thornton and 
Ocasio, 1999, p. 804) – the very definition of institutional logics. The dynamics and interplay 
amongst these logics may turn out to be among these discussed in section 5.3.2 – 
central/dominant, co-existing, competing, conflicting, complementing, and so on. 
 
5.7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter introduced the theoretical framework of this research – Peter Miller’s concept of 
‘calculative practices’ and certain elements of the ILT. These elements mostly relate to 
institutional logics and the dynamics amongst various institutional logics – multiple, 
dominant, co-existing, conflicting logics, etc. Reasons for the choice of theory were also 
provided. The main reason was that given what was implied or stated in the preceding four 
chapters (the political and ideological embeddedness of CCG commissioning in broader 
contexts from Chapters 2 and 3 and the social or group identity aspects of commissioning 
hybrids from Chapter 3), several different worldviews or mindsets were found to affect GPs 
in CCGs. These worldviews are embodied in ‘material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, 
and rules…” (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999, p. 804) – the definition of institutional logics. 
Chapter 8 will discuss the research data from the theoretical framework perspective. Before 
that, Chapter 7 will present selected excerpts from the research data collected.  
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CHAPTER 6 
RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY: METHODS AND METHODOLOGY 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
Chapter 6 acquaints the reader with the research philosophy, i.e. the research methods and 
methodology, of this thesis. This chapter is vital to understanding of what specific tools and 
rationales will be used to answer the research questions from Chapter 1 and thus achieve the 
research objective. First, the ontological standpoint of this research is introduced – the 
interpretivist ontology – along with reasons for this choice of ontology. Second, the research 
methods of this thesis are introduced. These are: documents’ content analysis, non-participant 
observation, and semi-structured interviews. It is also explained why these three methods 
have been chosen. Third, the research methodology or design is described and justified. Next, 
the data collection, selection (sampling), coding and data reduction processes, as well as the 
data analysis rationale are introduced. Some ethical consideration and reflexivity issues, as 
well as data validity, reliability, and research limitations, are also explained.  
 
6.2. Ontology  
 
Ontology is “a branch of philosophy that is concerned with the nature of what exists” 
(Blaikie, 2007, p. 13). In other words, ontology is concerned with the nature of reality. 
Moreover, Maylor and Blackmon (2005, p. 156) state that, “[o]ntology … helps us identify 
what we accept to be real and therefore what we can study – the objectivist focuses on 
physical evidence, while the subjectivist accepts that reality can be constructed by patterns of 
behaviour for instance.” On the same page, these authors write that two differing 
130 
 
 
 
epistemological positions in business and management research are positivism (inspired by 
the physical sciences) and subjectivism (derived from the philosophy of the social sciences).  
 
Since accounting, business, management, and organisation studies are all relevant to this 
particular research and since all of them are social sciences, the question behind the nature of 
reality in this research would be more specifically: ‘What is the nature of social reality?’ 
Research ontologies are also known as research ‘paradigms’ or research ‘worldviews’ 
(Hopper and Powell, 1985). Each research paradigm is founded on its own ontological 
assumptions. For instance, research paradigms, “implicitly or explicitly make different claims 
about what kinds of things do or can exist, the conditions of their existence, and the ways in 
which they are related” (Blaikie, 2007, p. 13). 
 
Hopper and Powell (1985, p. 429) recognise that there is no such thing as a, “totally objective 
and value free investigation” and that, “certain fundamental theoretical and philosophical 
assumptions underlie any piece of research.” These authors believe that researchers should 
make sure they are consistent with their own personal beliefs and underlying values 
concerning the nature of society and the sciences. They also hope that a greater tolerance and 
awareness of research inspired by alternative perspectives should be encouraged. In the 
absence of such an awareness, “there would be a danger that people become entrenched 
within well-defined and righteously guarded positions; unproductive claims and counter-
claims may proliferate and constructive academic debate may be stifled” (p. 430). The above-
mentioned study by Hopper and Powell builds upon Burrell and Morgan’s framework of 
ontological types of research and creates a framework of accounting schools of thought and 
their own sociological paradigms. These paradigms are four: radical humanism, radical 
131 
 
 
 
structuralism, interpretivism, and functionalism. They are situated along the x-axis 
‘subjectivism-objectivism’ and the y-axis ‘regulation-radical change.’  
 
‘What is objectivity?’ one might rightfully ask. There are various definitions of the term, one 
of which, this of Stokes (2011, p. 89), is: “A situation or an opinion is said to have objectivity 
when it is seen to be free and independent from particular prejudice, or partial emotions or 
sentiments. When someone or something displays these characteristics he, she or it is said to 
show objectivity.” Subjectivity, on the other hand, “relates to points of, and opinions derived 
from, individual or group collectives’ perspectives and experiences” (p. 123). Some of the 
most commonly used ontologies in the social sciences literature, besides interpretivism, are: 
positivism, the critical ontology, and critical realism (Bhaskar, 1978; Collier, 1994; 
Hallebone and Priest, 2008; Raihi-Belkaoui, 2004).  
 
6.2.1. Interpretivism and reasons for this choice of ontology  
 
The ontology of this research, as already mentioned, is the interpretivist ontology (Raihi-
Belkaoui, 2004; Searle, 1995). If this ontology is assumed, “the goal of the research is not to 
explain human behaviour, but to understand it” (Maylor and Blackmon, 2005, p. 157). 
Interpretivism is subjectivist in nature. Subjectivism here is not considered a weakness. Some 
of the seminal social science pieces of work using the interpretivist paradigm are: Berger and 
Luckmann (1967) and Giddens (1984, 1987). The interpretivist ontology is a direct critique 
of the mainstream paradigm used in much of the early and present-day social science research 
– positivism (Chua, 1986; Hopper and Powell, 1985; Williams and Vogt, 2011). 
Interpretivism “holds that reality is made subjectively by (and sometimes through) our 
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knowledge” (Smyth, 2013, p. 3), i.e. reality does not exist independently of people’s 
perceptions. We often construct reality via the so-called ‘social construction’ of reality.  
 
Interpretivism, just like positivism, has also been the object of critique. The critical 
ontological approach for example critiques both positivism and interpretivism in that none of 
them really contributes to positive social change by and of itself. In some extreme variants of 
post-modernism and post-structuralism (two other ontologies), notes on the same page 
Smyth, interpretivism is critiqued because, “reality only exists in human knowledge and more 
particularly language (or discourse),” and not in people’s perceptions.   
 
Interpretivism emerged as an anti-positivist ontology in the 1960s and 1970s and is related to 
interpretation and hermeneutics (Hiley, Bohman and Shusterman, 1991). It was popularised 
by the sociologist Max Weber. It holds that reality is socially constructed via the creation of 
‘meanings’ (Hallebone and Priest, 2008; Raihi-Belkaoui, 2004). What would be socially 
meaningful in one context, such as one culture, may be entirely meaningless in another. Thus, 
reality does not pre-exist the observer; it is created by the observer. This contextual aspect of 
interpretivism is in agreement with the ILT’s idea that institutional logics are contextual (see 
Chapter 5).  
 
The interpretivist ontology was chosen in this research because of its emphasis on 
subjectivity and interpretation, a fact which is believed by the researcher to contribute to a 
certain richness of interpretation that cannot be fully captured by positivism and other 
ontologies, both on the level of data and data interpretation. Such richness may be observed 
in several accounting studies, for instance in Ellwood (2008) and Rutherford (2003). In the 
former, Ellwood explains that accounting, while not ‘real’ (one cannot touch or feel it), “is 
133 
 
 
 
real in its consequences and can lead to biased decision-making, service closures and job 
losses” (p.399). She continues that the planned compliance of NHS trusts with IFRS may 
contribute to the modification and manipulation of the NHS accounting reality and the further 
construction of NHS meanings. Similarly, in this research, even though founded on meanings 
and interpretations that are partially based on DH (2010a) and the HSCA 2012, the 
consequences of CCG commissioning are real and affect the lives and wellbeing of millions 
of people in England, as well as the work of CCG clinicians.  
 
6.3. Research methods: documents’ content analysis, observation, and interviews  
 
Both primary and secondary data are used in this research. Primary data are data that one has 
collected oneself, specifically for the research project, while secondary data are collected or 
created by others for their own aims or for commercial reasons (Maylor and Blackmon, 
2005), but used in one’s own research. Both primary and secondary data have their 
advantages and disadvantages. For example, primary data may take a long time to collect, 
transcribe, and organise and are often expensive and difficult to collect, while secondary data 
may save money, time, and effort. Primary data are supposed to better answer certain 
research questions than secondary data since they are specifically collected to answer these 
questions.  
 
Research methods are tools for answering a research question. The same research question 
may be answered by using different methods. Examples of methods are: surveys or 
questionnaires, interviews, participant or non-participant observation, panels, action research, 
archival research, and many others (Dunleavy, 2003; Fisher, 2007; Hancock and Algozzine, 
2006; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009; Yin, 1984). In this thesis, a multiple-method 
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approach is used, as opposed to a ‘mono method’ (Horn, 2009). This kind of approach is also 
called ‘data triangulation.’ Triangulation may be used to collect various types of data (Gibson 
and Brown, 2009). A multiple-method approach is used here in the sense that three different 
research methods are used: documents’content analysis (secondary data), non-participant 
observation of meetings and conferences (secondary data), and semi-structured in-person 
interviews (primary data). Other research on healthcare commissioning in the NHS has also 
used some of these three methods (Checkland et al., 2013; Coleman et al., 2015).  
 
Even though data triangulation may be used to test the trustworthiness of different sources of 
data, here some research questions will be answered by using certain methods, while other 
research questions will be answered by using other methods. Another circumstance for using 
data triangulation, according to Maylor and Blackmon (2005, p. 256), is “when you want to 
conduct your research in stages, and different methods are appropriate for each stage of your 
research.” Thus, because CCGs were not operational yet when this fieldwork began 
(September 2012), CCG meetings could not be observed until after 1 April 2013. Data 
triangulation is used here because different methods help shed some light on possible answers 
to each of the research questions within the time and resources available for the research; for 
example, what managers, accountants, and clinicians say about clinicians’ commissioning 
practices and professional identities (via interviews), how clinicians act in commissioning 
meetings and conferences (via observation), and what government documents say about what 
clinicians’ practices should be (via documents’ content analysis). During interviews, the 
research subjects may give personal accounts of their practices and engage in discourses 
about their identities (discursive data). Their behaviour may also be observed during 
interviews (behavioural data). Observational methods may be both bahavioural and 
135 
 
 
 
discursive in nature, as well. The three methods used here provide a richness of data that 
would have been compromised, had only one or two methods been used instead.  
 
 6.3.1. Reasons for the choice of methods 
 
The choice of methods is dictated by the research questions and ontology assumed. The 
research methods should be appropriately chosen to help answer the research questions. 
Often, one research question may be answered using a wide variety of appropriate methods.  
The first research question (RQ 1) was, ‘How appropriate is it for clinicians to be involved in 
acute care commissioning?’ Documents’ content analysis (Neuendorf, 2002; Krippendorff 
and Bock, 2009) will be conducted on the texts of DH (2010a) and the HSCA 2012. This 
analysis will help answer the first research question. More about the details of the documents’ 
content analysis will follow in section 6.4.1. Official government documents, including laws, 
are a good source to consider when trying to understand the appropriateness of clinicians’ 
involvement in acute care commissioning. Such documents are often readily available online 
and represent the government’s official views on a topic of interest. Semi-structured 
interviews with clinicians and NHS managers and accountants will also be used to answer 
RQ 1. Non-participant observation of CCG meetings and NHS conferences will be used for 
this purpose, too (see Table 2).  
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Table 2: Research questions and methods used to answer them 
 
Research questions Methods used 
RQ 1: ‘How appropriate is it for clinicians to 
be involved in acute care commissioning?’ 
Documents’ content analysis – DH (2010a) 
and the HSCA 2012; 
 
Semi-structured, in-depth  interviews; 
 
Non-participant observation of CCG 
meetings and NHS conferences. 
 
RQ 2: ‘What motivates clinicians to assume 
leadership roles in CCGs?’ 
Semi-structured, in-depth  interviews; 
 
Non-participant observation of CCG 
meetings and NHS conferences. 
 
RQ 3: ‘How involved are clinicians in CCG 
calculative practices?’ 
Semi-structured, in-depth interviews; 
 
Non-participant observation of CCG 
meetings and NHS conferences. 
 
RQ 4: ‘To what extent do hybridity and 
calculative practices affect clinicians’ 
professional identities in CCGs?’ 
Semi-structured, in-depth interviews; 
 
Non-participant observation of CCG 
meetings and NHS conferences. 
 
 
 
It was determined that the researcher would have the time and resources (though limited) 
during the course of her Ph.D. to travel to the workplaces of NHS employees and 
independent contractors and interview them personally, as well as attend CCG meetings and 
NHS conferences where she could directly observe clinicians’ behaviour. Non-participant 
observation helped the researcher see for herself how agents behaved, hear what they said, 
and observe how they spoke and acted.  
 
In-person, semi-structured interviews are one of the most commonly known and used 
methods for doing qualitative research (Liamputtong, 2013). The reason for this, according to 
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the author, is that conversation is, “a fundamental means of interaction among individuals in 
society” (p. 51). Through oral communication, individuals may talk about their feelings, 
experiences, the world they live in (Kvale, 2007), and their self-perceived identities. The 
interview method has its strengths and weaknesses, just like any other method. It can help 
gather valid and reliable data that are relevant to the research questions asked (Saunders, 
Lewis and Thornhill, 1997a).  
 
Let us elaborate briefly on the interview method of research. Interviews vary in level of 
formality and structure – there are structured, semi-structured, and unstructured interviews. 
Structured interviews were not used in this research. These interviews are based on pre-
determined questions in an interview guide/schedule, without room for any deviation during 
the interview itself. Unstructured interviews were not used here, either. Such interviews are 
usually informal and help explore topics in greater depth than structured interviews. In this 
research, the researcher needed to ask questions on specific topics (for instance, calculative 
practices and clinicians’ professional identities in CCGs) that stemmed from the research 
gaps. This specificity provided a certain structure to the interviews. At the same time, some 
level of flexibility, digression, and depth of exploration was also desired. This would be the 
case if the interviewees responded too shortly to an interview question or if they said 
something interesting or unclear that the researcher wanted more details about. In such cases, 
the researcher wanted to ask additional or clarification questions that were not on the 
interview guide, to solicit a longer or clear answer.  
 
Thus, this research uses semi-structured interviews, the middle ground between structured 
and unstructured ones. “In semi-structured interviews the researcher will have a list of themes 
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and questions to be covered, although these may vary from interview to interview,” state 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (1997c, p. 212). They also write: 
“This means that you may omit some questions in particular in interviews 
given the specific organisational context which is encountered in relation to 
the research topic. The order of questions may also be varied depending on the 
flow of the conversation … [A]dditional questions may be required to explore 
your research question and objectives given the nature of events within 
particular organisations” (Ibid.). 
 
The interviews conducted for this research are in-depth interviews. In-depth interviews, 
highlights Liamputtong (2013), are usually face-to-face and one-on-one between the 
researcher and the research participant. Johnson and Rowlands (2012, p. 99) note that this 
particular method seeks to build, “the kind of intimacy that is common for mutual self-
disclosure.” The depth of self-expression in in-depth interviews is greater than that in other 
methods (for instance surveys) since the researcher may ask clarifying or follow-up questions 
if a point the interviewee makes is not very clear to the researcher. These questions usually 
solicit a more detailed answer that may help clarify ambiguities. Detailed answers were 
judged to be very important for this research. For instance, the interview subjects were 
encouraged to give specific examples from their own experience about the issues discussed.  
 
The second research question (RQ 2) was, ‘What motivates clinicians to assume leadership 
roles in CCGs?’ and the third research question (RQ 3) was, ‘How involved are clinicians in 
CCG calculative practices?’ These two questions will also be answered by using data from 
semi-structured, in-depth interviews with NHS managers, accountants, and clinicians and 
data from non-participant observation of CCG meetings and NHS conferences (see Table 2). 
Some clinicians, managers, and accountants work in CCGs on a regular basis. Thus, they 
should be reasonably expected to know what motivates clinicians to assume CCG leadership 
roles. They should also most likely know how involved clinicians are in the calculative 
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practices of these new organisations. It seems like NHS clinicians, managers, and accountants 
are the right people to help find answers to RQ 2 and RQ 3. Therefore, this research looks at 
their perceptions of the level of involvement of clinicians in calculative practices. Direct 
observation of CCG meetings and NHS conferences should also be reasonably expected to 
help form some idea about clinicians’ motivation and level of involvement. For example, 
during a NHS conference, a clinician may directly say why she chose to be a CCG 
Accountable Officer or may make a presentation and talk about what her clinical colleagues 
are doing in CCGs.   
 
The last, fourth research question (RQ 4) was, ‘To what extent do hybridity and calculative 
practices affect clinicians’ professional identities in CCGs?’ This question will also be 
answered based on semi-structured, in-depth interviews with NHS accountants, managers, 
and clinicians and observation of CCG meetings and NHS conferences (see Table 2). 
Clinicians and the people working with them in CCGs (managers and accountants) should be 
expected to know best how clinicians feel, or seem to feel, doing hybrid work, either through 
direct experience of these feelings (the clinicians themselves) or indirect experience (the NHS 
managers and accountants). Talking about clinicians’ personal experiences with calculative 
practices in CCGs during interviews would be a good way to help answer RQ 4. Observing 
clinicians’ behaviour (verbal and non-verbal) during CCG meetings and NHS conferences 
may also provide some helpful clues about how their professional identities may or may not 
be affected by hybridity and calculative practices. More information about the four CCG 
meetings and three NHS conferences attended may be found in Table 3. Appendices A, B, 
and C provide detailed information on the programmes of the three NHS conferences 
observed. 
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Table 3 
 
 CCG meetings (anonymised) and NHS conferences attended 
 
 
Events observed Locations Dates 
Commissioning Show 2013 London 25-26 June 2014 
Commissioning Show 2014 London 12-13 June 2013 
The Big Care Debate (CCG 
1’s meeting with the public) 
Location 1  18 October 2013 
Hospital Directions 2013 
Conference 
London 26-27 November 2013 
Health Forum meeting of 
CCG 1 
Location 1 9 December 2013 
CCG 2’s Board meeting with 
the public 
Location 2 25 March 2014 
CCG 3’s Board meeting with 
the public 
Location 3 27 March 2014 
 
 
6.4. Research methodology or design and its justification 
 
This section elaborates on the research methodology, also known as research design, by 
explaining how, when, with whom, and where the research study was conducted.  
 
 6.4.1. Design of the documents’ content analysis part of this research  
 
As already noted, documents’ content analysis is a method used toward the answer of the first 
research question, RQ 1. The content analysis of the two government documents (DH, 2010a 
and the HSCA 2012) involved reading thoroughly through their texts and finding sentences 
and paragraphs that conveyed the government’s views (stated or suggested) on the 
appropriateness of clinicians to be involved in acute care commissioning. This is to say, 
‘Does the government think clinicians are fit to be acute care commissioners?’ The researcher 
141 
 
 
 
also used keyword searches; for example, ‘GP,’ ‘commissioning, ‘consortia’ (CCGs were 
first announced in the white paper as ‘consortia,’ rather than as ‘groups’).  
 
 6.4.2. Design of the observational part of this research 
 
Through the non-participant observation method, the talk and behaviour of clinicians (verbal 
and non-verbal) in four CCG meetings and three NHS conferences was observed directly by 
the researcher (see Table 3). The CCGs and their locations have been anonymised for 
confidentiality reasons (CCG 1, 2, and 3 and Location 1, 2, and 3, respectively). The number 
of meetings and conferences attended was judged to be adequate by the researcher given the 
time and resource limitations of this study. 
 
Regarding RQ 1, before attending the meetings and conferences, the researcher wrote down 
what kinds of talk and behaviour (verbal or non-verbal) were expected to signal whether it 
was ‘appropriate’ or not for clinicians to be involved in acute commissioning; for example, 
do they speak the language of commissioning with ease, do they seem to be comfortable in 
these leadership roles, and do they seem to be overwhelmed? The list was not exhaustive. For 
example, a clinician might say during a conference presentation that GPs should not be given 
commissioning responsibilities at all since they went to medical school, not business school, 
i.e. they are not trained in business processes and calculative practices but in medicine. Also, 
the vocabulary used was determined to be important – would clinicians use with ease 
business and commissioning vocabulary and concepts, would it be difficult to spot who the 
managers and accountants and who the clinicians are in the room since all of them might use 
business concepts, such as: ‘revenues,’ ‘costs,’ ‘expenses,’ ‘assets,’ and ‘liabilities’? Non-
verbal behaviour, such as confidence and poise, might also signal a level of ‘appropriateness’ 
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in some situations. If clinicians shy away from speaking or seem indifferent at these meetings 
and conferences, then perhaps their level of involvement is not very appropriate.  
 
Regarding RQ 2, prior to attending the meetings and conferences, the researcher wrote down 
what kinds of talk and behaviour would signal various possible motivations to assume 
leadership roles in CCGs. Such motivations may include, but are not limited to, the desire to 
help and make a difference in many people’s lives, a genuine interest in health leadership, the 
desire to improve healthcare services, etc. Some indicative of these motivations talk and 
behaviour would be for example: “I have always wanted to use my medical expertise to 
redesign services on a large scale.” 
 
Regarding RQ 3, prior to attending the meetings and conferences, the researcher also wrote 
down what kinds of talk and behaviour (verbal or non-verbal) she might expect regarding 
clinicians’ level of involvement in CCG calculative practices. For example, if a clinician 
mentioned that his medical colleagues have prepared a budget allocation report by themselves 
and have worked on it for several weeks, this might signal that clinicians are very involved in 
calculative practices in CCGs. If they say that they plan to delegate this job to someone else 
altogether, perhaps they are not so involved in CCG calculative practices. Again, this is not 
an exhaustive list.  
 
Regarding RQ 4, prior to attending the meetings and conferences, the researcher also wrote 
down what kinds of talk and behaviour (verbal or non-verbal) she should pay attention to 
during the meetings and conferences. For example, would the clinicians wear name tags with 
the name of the CCG and their own name written on them? This might be a non-verbal clue 
that these clinicians have chosen to wear their CCG name tags as a sign of some level of 
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professional identification with hybridity and calculative practices. However, it may not 
necessarily signal a strong effect of hybridity and calculative practices on their professional 
identities in CCGs since it might as well be that clinicians have not chosen, but are expected 
to wear these name tags. With respect to verbal clues, perhaps speaking with pride or 
enthusiasm about CCG funds’ allocation processes might possibly be a clue that clinicians do 
identify with hybridity to a great extent. It might as well be a clue that these clinicians are just 
showing enthusiasm, while in reality they may be indifferent or reluctant to participate in 
allocation processes.  
 
6.4.3. Design of the interviews part of this research  
 
Table 4 provides the interview guide, i.e. the questions asked during the interviews. The 
researcher tried to ask most of these questions of each interview participant. Not all questions 
were actually asked of each interviewee, however, due to time constraints, conversation flow, 
and relevance. Since the interviews were semi-structured, some additional questions not 
listed here were also asked of some interview participants, mostly for clarification purposes. 
The questions asked changed somehow during the fieldwork as time went on (some new 
questions were added and others deleted), for example to accommodate updated research 
questions or new knowledge on the side of the researcher. A contributing factor to this was 
the long time span of the fieldwork – about two years.   
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Table 4 
 Interview guide 
 
Ice breakers: 
 
1) Please tell me about your involvement in the NHS. 
2) What was your involvement in commissioning before the most recent NHS reforms, if 
applicable? 
 
Interview questions: 
 
3) What is your involvement in the current commissioning system? 
4) Do you think the reforms to clinicians’ involvement in acute commissioning were 
necessary in this form and time? Why or why not? 
5) In your opinion, how can the CCG system improve in the future? 
6) What challenges have you experienced in CCG acute commissioning so far? Please 
provide some examples from your own (or others’) experience. 
7) What are the advantages of clinical involvement in commissioning? Please provide 
some examples from your own (or others’) experience.  
8) Do you think clinicians are in a good position to be the leaders of acute care 
commissioning? Why or why not? 
9) Do you think clinicians are in a good position to handle duties, such as: priority 
setting, strategic planning, budget rationing, other accounting-related tasks, contract 
monitoring, etc.? Why or why not? 
10) Do you see clinicians’ professional identity change as a result of their involvement in 
CCGs? How? 
 
Concluding remarks: 
 
11) Anything else you would like to share? 
12) Any personal contacts that you think might be interested in giving an interview for 
this research?  
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Table 5 shows how each interview question was expected to solicit answers to help answer 
RQs 2, 3, and 4. 
 
 
Table 5 
Interview questions and related research questions (RQs) 
 
Interview questions 
(from Table 4) 
Related research questions 
1) RQ 2, 3 
2) RQ 2 
3) RQ 3 
4) RQ 1 
5) RQ 1, 3 
6) RQ 1, 3, 4 
7) RQ 1, 3, 4 
8) RQ 1, 3, 4 
9) RQ 1, 3, 4 
10) RQ 4 
11) RQ 1, 2, 3, 4 
12) n/a 
 
 
Chapter 7 will present selected excerpts from the research interviews, together with 
observational data and documents’ content data, in four general sections: data that help 
answer RQs 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Generally, the interview subjects may be categorised 
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into two groups: 1) NHS clinicians and 2) NHS managers and accountants. Chapter 7 will 
present the chosen quotes from the clinicians under, ‘Views from the clinicians’ and the 
chosen quotes from the non-clinicians under, ‘Views from the managers and accountants.’ It 
was determined beneficial to interview both groups, as opposed to just clinicians, to have 
wider views on clinicians in CCGs. Besides, the response rate among the clinicians invited 
for an interview was rather low (about 8%). This is another reason why managers and 
accountants were also invited for interviews. Moreover, it would be interesting to see whether 
the two groups share the same or different views on the interview questions asked of them. 
Table 6 provides more details on the interview subjects (anonymised), their organisations, 
and the timing of the interviews. 
 
 
Table 6 
 
 List of interviews (anonymised) used in this research 
Interview 
number 
Entity 
(type) 
Interviewee 
(type)  
Job title Date of 
interview 
1 a 
(provider) 
 
A 
(clinician) 
Director of Clinical 
Finance 
19 Sept. 2012 
1 a 
(provider) 
 
B 
(accountant) 
Chief Financial Officer 19 Sept. 2012 
2 b  
(provider) 
                      
C 
(manager) 
Director of Business 
Development 
 
20 Sept. 2012 
3 c 
(provider) 
D 
(manager) 
Associate Director of 
Major Capital 
Developments 
 
25 Sept. 2012 
4 d 
(provider) 
 
E 
(clinician) 
Retired GP 
 
28 Feb. 2013 
5 f  
(commissioner) 
 
F 
(clinician) 
GP 22 March 2013 
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6 g 
(commissioner) 
 
G 
(clinician) 
GP, CCG Board Member 
 
25 June 2013 
7 h 
(commissioner) 
 
H 
(accountant) 
Head of Financial 
Strategy 
5 July 2013 
8 i 
(provider) 
 
I 
(manager) 
Former Chairman 
 
29 July 2013 
9 i 
(provider) 
 
J 
(manager) 
Current Chairman 29 July 2013 
10 i 
(provider) 
 
K 
(accountant) 
Director of Finance and 
Deputy Chief Executive 
 
29 July 2013 
11 h 
(commissioner) 
 
H 
(accountant) 
Head of Financial 
Strategy 
15 Oct. 2013 
12 j 
(provider) 
L 
(clinician) 
Former Nurse, current 
Educator in Public 
Health  
 
28 Oct. 2013 
13 k 
(commissioner)  
M 
(clinician) 
Retired M.D., current 
Health Forum 
representative of the 
local population to a 
CCG 
 
9 Dec. 2013 
14 l 
(commissioner) 
N 
(manager) 
Head of Service 
Development, former 
CCG employee 
 
19 Dec. 2013 
15 m 
(commissioner) 
O 
(clinician) 
GP and Accountable 
Officer 
23 Jan., 2014 
16 n 
(commissioner) 
 
P 
(accountant) 
Director of Finance and 
former Director of 
Finance of a SHA 
 
11 Feb. 2014 
17 o 
(commissioner) 
 
Q 
(clinician) 
GP and Chair and 
Clinical Lead 
28 Feb. 2014 
 
 
18 
p 
(commissioner) 
R 
(manager) 
Chief Officer 
(Accountable Officer) 
 
 
5 March 2014 
19 h 
(commissioner) 
 
H 
(accountant) 
Head of Financial 
Strategy 
 
17 Apr. 2014 
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The NHS managers interviewed were six, the NHS accountants interviewed – four, and the 
NHS clinicians (mostly working or retired GPs) interviewed – ten. Twenty-one interviews 
were conducted. The intuitive assumption might be that clinicians would adhere mostly to the 
professional, medical logic and managers and accountants – to the business logic. Clinicians 
engaged, among other things, in self-categorisation (Hogg and Terry, 2000) and identity 
“self-positionings” (Morales and Lambert, 2013, p. 228) between two professional identities 
– managers/commissioners and clinicians. The managers and accountants, on the other hand, 
provided their views and perceptions of clinicians in CCGs.  
 
6.5. Data collection and selection (sampling), data coding and reduction, and data 
analysis rationale 
 
The research collection fieldwork took place in the period September 2012 – September 
2014. Thus, this study is slightly longitudinal in nature. It covers the time before and after the 
CCG reforms became effective – 1 April 2013. Some data collection had already taken place 
prior to this date due to the timing of this Ph.D. (2011-2015).  
 
It has been recognised that while in quantitative research sampling is usually random, in 
qualitative research one should try to select a sample that represents the concepts, rather than 
the population (Maylor and Blackmon, 2005). Sampling is a technique used with many 
20 q  
(commissioner) 
 
S 
(clinician) 
Retired GP and CCG 
Governing Board 
member 
19 May 2014 
21 r  
(commissioner) 
 
T 
(clinician) 
GP and CCG Chair 3 Sept. 2014 
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methods in order to reduce the amount of data that need to be collected down to a practicable 
amount. In other words, sampling makes research more manageable. Maylor and Blackmon 
recommend the use of either ‘theoretical’ or ‘purposive’ sampling where a maximum variety 
of responses, rather than uniformity of responses, is valued. Similarly, in this research, 
purposive sampling is used, as described next.  
 
6.5.1. Data collection and selection (sampling) 
 
Regarding the quote selection from the secondary data, as already mentioned, this stage 
involved reading through DH (2010a) and the HSCA 2012 and identifying instances that 
conveyed the government’s views on the appropriateness of clinicians to be involved in CCG 
acute care commissioning. To do the data selection from these online sources, the researcher 
used keyword searches. Only the most relevant parts of the documents were either cited 
directly or paraphrased in Chapter 7, the data presentation and analysis chapter.  
 
Regarding the collection of observational data, the researcher took the following steps. She 
audio recorded with a Sony digital recorder some of the meetings and conferences attended, 
while hand-written notes were taken during all meetings and conferences. The verbal and 
non-verbal behaviour guidelines described in the research design section 6.4.2 were observed. 
Available conference brochures and pamphlets were collected during the conferences. A 
cloth bag full of conference and advertising materials was presented to each attendee at the 
entrance to the three NHS conferences in London. Materials were provided for free to all 
members of the public attending the four CCG meetings – mostly, printed agendas and 
reports which sometimes amounted to more than 100 pages.  
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Regarding the issue of which exactly CCG meetings and NHS conferences to attend 
(sampling), the researcher chose convenience, relevance, and importance. The three NHS 
conferences in London for example took place just an hour and a half away from the location 
of the researcher at the time – Colchester, Essex. These conferences were not only considered 
to be relatively nearby, but also very relevant and important. Many NHS leaders spoke at 
these conferences (see Appendices A, B, and C). Thousands of clinicians and NHS managers 
and accountants were in attendance, as well. Clinicians were given continuing education 
hours for their time spent at the three NHS conferences. As far as the selection of CCG 
meetings is concerned (sampling), this decision was guided by similar principles – ease of 
access and convenient timing. CCG governing board meetings with the public only take place 
about once every quarter. 
 
Regarding the collection of interview data, twenty interview subjects (Interviewees A to T) 
gave twenty-one semi-structured interviews (see Table 6) of about 45 minutes each. The 
interviews were conducted in the interview subjects’ offices, except in one situation when the 
interview was conducted via Skype due to the big geographical distance between the 
researcher and the interviewee. Appendix D provides more information on twelve additional 
interviews conducted by the researcher in the course of this Ph.D.; however, due to a change 
of topic (from NHS public-private partnerships to the current topic), these interviews were 
not used as data in this Ph.D. thesis. All interviews were recorded with a Sony digital 
recorder and transcribed verbatim using the Express Scribe software. This software was 
chosen since it allowed for the slowing down and fast forwarding of the MP3 recordings’ 
audio.  
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Regarding the selection (sampling) of interview subjects, interview invitations describing the 
research topic, researcher’s affiliation, approximate timing of the interview, and a list of 
sample questions to be asked were sent out by email or first-class mail to members of the 
governing bodies of CCGs in Essex, Suffolk, Norfolk, London, the Midlands, 
Cambridgeshire, Sussex, and other areas of England at a reasonable distance from the 
location of the researcher. Interview invitations were also sent out to GPs working in GP 
practices nearby. CCGs and GPs’ contact information was found to be readily available 
online. 
 
The invitations were sent out at intervals, just in case a large number of people from the last 
mailing batch responded positively to the invitation. The researcher tried to arrange an 
interview soon after an invitation was accepted. Most invitations did not result in an answer 
or an interview. After each interview, the researcher asked the interview subjects to provide 
some personal contacts (NHS co-workers) who might also be interested in an interview. A 
couple of these referrals did give an interview.  
 
The acceptance rate among clinicians and non-clinicians was about 10% (20 individuals 
actually gave an interview, while about 200 individuals were invited for an interview). This 
low acceptance rate was perhaps due to the fact that CCGs were too new at the time. Perhaps, 
most individuals invited did not feel prepared enough to answer the sample questions from 
the invitation letters. Or, given that GPs and NHS managers and accountants have very busy 
schedules, it was probably very difficult for them to accommodate a 45 minute, in-depth 
interview. In fact, one GP responded that she could not participate in an interview due to her 
tight schedule.     
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6.5.2. Data coding   
 
The interview transcripts were coded with the computer-assisted qualitative data analysis 
(CAQDAS) software MAXQDA10. This software allows the user to highlight text excerpts 
and assign to them a code by using a colour and a code description. The coding was done in 
two stages (Saldaña, 2013). The first stage involved ‘structural’ coding, i.e. coding according 
to research question category. There were four structural codes – one for each research 
question.  
 
The second stage was more detailed and involved ‘descriptive’ coding. More than twenty 
descriptive codes were identified. For example, if a clinician said that being a hybrid had 
better helped her come to grips with her professional identity as a GP, this excerpt was coded 
as, ‘RQ 4_high positive extent.’ If she had said that she felt that her professional identity had 
remained the same before and after joining her CCG, the code would have been, “RQ 4_no 
effect.’ Bear in mind that RQ 4 was, ‘To what extent do hybridity and calculative practices 
affect clinicians’ professional identities in CCGs?’ Table 7 presents a sample list of structural 
and descriptive codes. Two levels of descriptive codes are sometimes used in Table 7. They 
are designated by the ‘_’ sign. There were also about fifteen additional codes for excerpts that 
did not help answer any of the research questions. These excerpts came mostly from answers 
to interview question 11 (see Table 4), but also from answers to any of the other interview 
questions and from answers to spontaneous questions.  
 
 
 
 
153 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Partial list of structural and descriptive codes 
   
Structural codes Descriptive codes 
RQ 1 Very appropriate_they know best; 
Inappropriate_they lack training; 
Appropriate but not to this extent, etc. 
 
RQ 2 Interest in business processes; 
Desire to make macro-level impact; 
Prior experience in commissioning; 
Monetary compensation, etc. 
 
RQ 3 Somehow involved_GPs don’t commission alone; 
Little involved_GPs delegate calculative practices; 
More and more involved_GPs take business training, etc. 
 
RQ 4 Small extent_this is just temporary;; 
High positive extent_CCG has changed me; 
Positive extent_I think about commissioning a lot, etc.  
 
 
 
 6.5.3. Data reduction 
 
After coding but before analysing the interview data (Maylor and Blackmon, 2005; Crowther 
and Lancaster, 2009), data reduction was performed. Data reduction is the process of 
selecting, simplifying, and shortening qualitative data to a practical and reasonable size. Data 
reduction is necessary when a large amount of data is collected. Collis and Hussey (2009, p. 
163) rightly observe that, “in some published studies, it is difficult to appreciate how the 
researcher structured and summarized hundreds of pages of qualitative data to arrive at the 
findings.” Data reduction may be very challenging – too much data reduction takes away 
from the richness of the data and too little might leave little room for analysis.  
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Data reduction may be linked to some hard to avoid level of bias. The data reduction bias is a 
type of observer bias that is almost inevitable when only one researcher works on a study. 
Coding and interview segment selection may vary from one researcher to another. Due to the 
individual nature of this Ph.D., data reduction basis was inevitable. Crowther and Lancaster 
(2009, p. 195) also observe that data reduction is a subjective process:  
“[T]he very process of selecting and identifying chunks of data into patterns, 
inevitably means that the researcher’s own often subjective view-points and 
ideas serve to shape and determine the data reduction process. One might 
argue, therefore, that at this stage the process is still entirely subjective and 
unscientific. However, so long as the reasons for, and thinking behind, the data 
reduction process are made clear by the researcher, then the validity and 
reliability or otherwise of this first stage of analysing qualitative data can at 
least be assessed and evaluated by others.” 
 
Subjectivity is not a weakness in qualitative research. It adds to the depth of analysis of such 
research, a depth that often lacks in quantitative research. In this thesis, the data reduction 
was done with the help of data segment ‘weights,’ tools available in the MAXQDA10 
software. The higher the weight assigned to a segment of transcribed text during the coding 
stage, the more likely this particular segment was to be used, as a direct quote or paraphrased, 
in the data presentation chapter, Chapter 7. High weights were assigned to segments that 
either represented opinions shared by several interview subjects, or represented a unique, 
diverse view.  
 
 6.5.4. Data analysis rationale  
 
Figure 5 visualises the data analysis rationale of this research. Figure 6 is an extension of 
Figure 4. Figure 5 adds cells in which to keep track of the various institutional logics that are 
entailed in the answer to each research question. The ‘…… logics’ part is reserved for the 
type of logic (business, professional, governance or political) and the ‘…….. type of 
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dynamics’ part is reserved for the nature of the interplay among these logics. The same 
applies to any incidental findings and contributions from the data. For example, if Chapter 7’s 
data is conductive to saying that RQ 1’s answer involves the professional/medical logic vs. 
the business logic, the first cell in Figure 5 will be filled in like this:  
 
Professional vs. business logic (conflicting logics) 
 
The cells from Figure 5 will be filled in Figure 6, which is a summary of this research. 
 
Figure 5 
Data analysis rationale 
 
 
                
I. Concept of 'calculative practices'
     &
     Contributions: II. Dynamics and interplay amongst
     institutional logics (business, professional,
Answers to RQs:      governance, and political)
1) Answer to RQ 1 1) …………………. logics (….. type of dynamics)
2) Answer to RQ 2 2) …………………. logics (….. type of dynamics)
3) Answer to RQ 3 3) …………………. logics (….. type of dynamics)
4) Answer to RQ 4 4) …………………. logics (….. type of dynamics)
Incidental findings and contributions
(if any)
1) …………………. logics (….. type of dynamics)
List contributions here (if any) 2) …………………. logics (….. type of dynamics)
3) …………………. logics (….. type of dynamics)
4) …………………. logics (….. type of dynamics)
5) …………………. logics (….. type of dynamics)
Objective: Towards a better understanding of GPs in CCGs
    Theoretical concepts used:
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6.6. Ethical considerations and reflexivity 
 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (1997c, p. 109) give the following definition of ‘ethics’ in 
scholarly research: “In the context of research, ethics refers to the appropriateness of your 
behaviour in relation to the rights of those who become the subject of your work, or are 
affected by it.” It is recognised, the authors state, that ethical considerations may emerge 
during all stages of the research process – planning, the seeking of access to organisations 
and individuals, data collection, coding, reduction, and analysis, data reporting, and the 
drawing of conclusions. Examples of lack of ethical behaviour in research practice would 
include: planning a research on a topic that the chosen population of study finds extremely 
offensive to discuss for religious, cultural or other reasons, being too forceful or too persistent 
in trying to obtain access to interview subjects in cases where multiple interview invitations 
have been received by the recipients but have been consistently ignored by them, claiming to 
have done interviews that have never been conducted in reality, and many others.  
 
Ethical considerations were taken seriously during all the stages of this research, with a view 
of the rights of the research subjects and other people affected by this research (the readers of 
this thesis, for instance, who may draw certain conclusions from this work). The interview 
invitation letters and emails sent were as descriptive, as possible, not to be misleading. After 
reading the interview invitations, the interview subjects were in a position to give informed 
consent by participating in the described research. All interviewees were asked at the 
beginning of the interviews whether they gave permission for the interview to be audio 
recorded, i.e. the interviewees were given the right of choice (Myers, 2009, p. 48). Nobody 
refused to be audio recorded. If there had been refusals, notes could have been taken by the 
researcher instead.  
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It is believed that confidentiality is a vital part of research since it provides reassurance to the 
research subjects as to the fact that they will not be penalised or otherwise disadvantaged for 
participating in the study or sharing certain opinions. The research participants’ right to 
confidentiality was observed by giving a signed and dated confidentiality agreement sheet to 
each interview subject at the beginning of each interview. This agreement stated that the 
researcher agreed not to disclose the names and employing organisations of the research 
subjects in this thesis and in any conference papers or publications that may result from it. In 
the case of the CCGs whose meetings were observed, these CCG names were also kept 
confidential. In the case where the job title of an interviewee was too unique (perhaps, the 
only such job title in the country), this job title was slightly altered, to protect the 
interviewee’s confidentiality. In this respect, Hooley, Marriott and Wellens (2012, p. 35) note 
a concern with research participant reidentification:  
“Even though individuals’ identities can be disguised through the use of 
pseudonyms, it may be relatively straightforward to re-identify individuals. 
The power of tools such as Google means that any direct quotation used in the 
dissemination of research findings can be easily traced back to its original 
context.” 
 
The ethical principles of ‘beneficence,’ ‘respect,’ and ‘justice’ (Mertens, 2012) were also 
observed during the course of this research. The very choice of topic in the planning stage of 
this research (the socially significant topic of NHS commissioning) is intended to ‘benefit’ 
English society due to studying the new and important issue of CCG commissioning. The 
interview subjects’ right to decline or not to respond to an interview invitation was respected. 
‘Justice,’ defined as, “the process of ensuring that the people who participate in the research 
benefit from the research” (p. 27), was also sought. The researcher plans to keep the promise 
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she made in the interview invitations by emailing a summary of the research findings to the 
interview participants upon the completion of this research. 
 
Reflexivity is defined as, “an awareness of the researcher’s role in the practice of research 
and the way this is influenced by the object of the research, enabling the researcher to 
acknowledge the way in which he or she affects both the research process and outcomes” 
(Haynes, 2012, p. 72). Reflexivity may be theoretical. In this case, the researcher revises his 
or her, “theoretical assumptions and understandings” (p. 81), for example the theoretical 
framework in Figure 4, based on, “the new understandings gained during the process of 
research, which will then go on to inform new theoretical knowledge” (p. 82). The reflexivity 
informed theoretical framework through which this research intends to contribute to 
knowledge will be presented in Figure 6.  
 
Another important type of reflexivity, methodological reflexivity, was also observed in the 
course of this research. Methodological reflexivity stands for the revision of methodology as 
the research unfolds (Haynes, 2012). “By considering the effectiveness, conduct and process 
of data collection, researchers may reinterpret and revise their methodological position to 
take account of such issues as ethics, power relations or the use of language” (p. 82). For 
example, with respect to the language used in the interview guide, the researcher altered some 
of the questions as the research transitioned from the pre-reform time span to the post-reform 
one.  
 
 
 
 
159 
 
 
 
6.7. Research validity and reliability 
 
Research validity is, “concerned with whether the findings are really about what they appear 
to be about” (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 1997b, p. 82). These authors refer to a 1991 
study by Easterby-Smith and colleagues, according to which the question, ‘Will similar 
observations be made by different researchers on different occasions?’ may be used to assess 
the reliability of research findings. Given that the NHS is a big institution with 211 CCGs, 
each with very diverse populations, locales, practices, and outcomes, it is clear that the 
answer to the above question is probably, ‘Maybe.’ It is hard to compare a CCG from London 
or Manchester with a CCG from a small rural area in Norfolk on a like-to-like basis. 
However, in qualitative research, reliability is not such a highly treasured concept as it is in 
quantitative research. Qualitative research values mostly variability, depth of analysis, and 
subjectivity. In it, diversity, not consistency among populations (like in quantitative 
research), is valued more (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 1997b).  
 
According to the same source, there are four threats to research reliability: subject error, 
subject bias, observer error, and observer bias. Regarding subject error, one may find, claim 
the authors, that a questionnaire completed on different days of the week may generate 
different results. For example, a questionnaire filled out on Friday just before the end of the 
workday may show more optimistic attitudes than the same questionnaire filled out by the 
same person in the middle of the week when job duties often tend to be the most stressful. 
Regarding subject bias, one may notice that research subjects give the answers that they 
believe their bosses would like to hear, write the authors. Besides, introducing a, ‘high degree 
of structure’ to the interview guide would reduce the threat to reliability (Ibid.). Finally, 
observer bias is reduced when more than one researcher are involved in interpreting the 
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results. In this research, there had to be only one researcher for obvious reasons and thus, 
there was an unavoidable threat of observer bias. However, the researcher made a genuine 
effort to reduce this threat by trying to look objectively at the data and analyse them free of 
personal bias. For example, when two contrary views were presented (one of which coincided 
with the personal views of the researcher), the researcher quoted the two contrary views, not 
just the one she personally favoured.   
 
6.8. Research limitations 
 
Research limitations are an inherent weakness of any research, no matter what methods, 
methodologies or theories are used. This research also has its own research limitations. First, 
if different people had accepted the research invitations and given interviews, perhaps their 
answers to the questions from Table 4 would have been different from those of the people 
who actually gave an interview. Moreover, if the same people who were actually interviewed 
were asked the same questions at a different time or place, maybe their answers to the same 
questions would have varied, too (an example of the subject error discussed above). Second, 
if different CCG meetings or NHS conferences were attended, perhaps different observations 
would have been gathered. Thus, research data are time and context specific, a limitation to 
all research. Third, CCGs are new and highly complex entities that involve a multitude of 
actors and structures; therefore, only certain of their aspects and processes were studied here 
– GP hybrid professional identities, calculative practices, and acute care commissioning. 
Other important aspects of GPs in CCGs were not addressed in this research – work burnout 
(such as stress level on the job) or desire to continue serving as a CCG leader. Fourth, not all 
views expressed during the interviews were cited or paraphrased in this thesis, just a selection 
of the most representative, interesting, diverse, controversial and/or thought-provoking ones. 
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By no means does this mean that the views left uncited or unparaphrased were unimportant. 
Lastly, as any other qualitative research, this research assumes a certain degree of researcher 
bias in terms of the analysis and conclusions drawn.      
 
6.9. Conclusion  
 
Chapter 6 introduced the research philosophy of this thesis – the research methodology and 
methods. Reasons for the choice of methodology and methods were given. The ontology and 
the research design of this study were also discussed – interpretivism, data collection and 
sampling, coding, data reduction, data analysis rationale, ethics, reflexivity, validity, 
reliability, and limitations. This chapter was important because, among other things, it 
exposed the rationale for the data analysis and discussion (Figure 5) for Chapter 8. Now, 
Chapters 7 will present and analyse the reduced research data, so that the four research 
questions posed in Chapter 1 may be answered later in Chapter 8.  
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CHAPTER 7 
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
The research data presented and analysed in this chapter come from the primary and 
secondary sources mentioned in Chapter 6. To reiterate, the primary data consist of semi-
structured interviews with NHS managers and clinicians (see Table 6). The secondary data 
consist of non-participant observation of CCG meetings and NHS conferences (see Table 3 
and Appendices A, B, and C) and government documents (DH, 2010a and the HSCA 2012).   
 
7.2. Data used to help answer RQ 1 
 
Research Question 1 (RQ 1) was, ‘How appropriate is it for clinicians to be involved in CCG 
acute care commissioning?’ This section will present and briefly analyse selected secondary 
and primary data which will help answer RQ 1 later in Chapter 8.  
 
 7.2.1. Views from the documents 
 
The views presented here are these of the Coalition government expressed in the white paper 
(DH, 2010a) and the HSCA 2012. The government’s rationale for adding healthcare 
commissioning to the usual duties of GPs and other clinicians in England was first announced 
in the above-mentioned white paper. The white paper and the resulting legislation are 
expected to have a long-lasting and profound impact on the English NHS.  
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The white paper states that, 
“Doctors and nurses must … be able to use their professional judgement about 
what is right for patients. We will support this by giving frontline staff more 
control … Of course, our massive deficit and growing debt means there are 
some difficult decisions to make … But far from that being reason to abandon 
reform, it demands that we accelerate it. Only by putting patients first and 
trusting professionals will we drive up standards, deliver better value for 
money and create a healthier nation” (DH, 2010a, p.1).  
 
It also says: 
“The Government will devolve power and responsibility for commissioning 
services to the healthcare professionals closest to patients: GPs and their 
practice teams working in consortia [the original name of CCGs]” (DH, 
2010a, p. 4). 
 
 
It also says that,  
 
“In order to shift decision-making as close as possible to individual patients, 
the Department will devolve power and responsibility for commissioning 
services to local consortia of GP practices. This change will build on the 
pivotal and trusted role that primary care professionals already play in 
coordinating patient care … Primary care professionals coordinate all the 
services that patients receive, helping them to navigate the system and ensure 
they get the best care (of course, they do not deliver all the care themselves). 
For this reason they are best placed to coordinate the commissioning of care 
for their patients while involving all other clinical professionals who are also 
part of any pathway of care … Commissioning by GP consortia will mean that 
the redesign of patient pathways and local services is always clinically-led and 
based on more effective dialogue and partnership with hospital specialists. It 
will bring together responsibility for clinical decisions and for the financial 
consequences of these decisions. This will reinforce the crucial role that GPs 
already play in committing NHS resources through their daily clinical 
decisions – not only in terms of referrals and prescribing, but also how well 
they manage long-term conditions, and the accessibility of their services. It 
will increase efficiency, by enabling GPs to strip out activities that do not have 
appreciable benefits for patients’ health or healthcare” (DH, 2010a, p. 27). 
 
 
Based on the three quotes from the white paper above, one can see that the government at the 
time really trusted clinicians, the NHS frontline workers, in a time of deficit and growing 
national debt. It saw them as, ‘best placed to coordinate the commissioning of care’ for 
patients. Now, let us turn to the HSCA 2012. 
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The HSCA (2012, s. 25(1)) mandates that, “each provider of primary medical services … 
[be] a member of a clinical commissioning group.” According to the same sub-section, each 
CCG must have a constitution of its own and a governing body. The main functions of the 
governing body are, “to ensure that the group has made appropriate arrangements for 
ensuring that it complies with … its obligations … and … such generally accepted principles 
of good governance as are relevant to it.” A GP-led CCG may have its own employees and 
may also hire others (for instance, non-employees from CSUs) to provide services on its 
behalf.  
 
The legislated duties of CCGs, according to the HSCA (2012, s. 26), are various in nature and 
cover a wide spectrum of issues. A CCG, among other things, needs to: promote the NHS 
Constitution, “exercise its functions effectively, efficiently and economically,” improve the 
quality of services “in connection with the prevention, diagnosis or treatment of illness,” 
obtain appropriate advice “from persons who (taken together) have a broad range of 
professional expertise,” advocate public involvement and consultation, publish 
commissioning plans and annual reports on a regular basis and present the annual report to 
members of the public. The business emphasis of CCG duties is evident in the HSCA (2012, 
s. 27) which states that a CCG, “must ensure that its capital [and revenue] resource use in a 
financial year does not exceed the amount specified by direction of the Board [i.e. NHS 
England].”  
 
According to Schedule 2 of the HSCA 2012, a CCG must have an Accountable Officer who 
is appointed by NHS England. One of his duties, according to this schedule, is to ensure that 
the CCG, “exercises its functions in a way which provides good value for money,” another 
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requirement inspired by business reasoning processes. Schedule 2 also provides for an 
optional auditing provision: the “[the] accounts prepared … must be audited in accordance 
with the Audit Commission Act 1998 by an auditor or auditors”  
 
Based on the above quotes from the HSCA 2012, one can see that clinicians were entrusted 
with a lot of important commissioning duties by the government. The HSCA 2012 is more 
technical and procedural in nature than the white paper and does not go into details about the 
appropriateness of choosing clinicians for these important roles the way the white paper does.  
 
7.2.2. Views from the managers and accountants 
 
In terms of appropriateness to be involved in CCG acute care commissioning (and 
commissioning in general), GPs were perceived by several managers and accountants as 
being not strategic enough. It was implied that being strategic was a key skill for a good 
commissioner. Interviewees H, N, and J shared the perception that GPs were not very 
strategic in CCGs due to the fact that their professional training was not business training, but 
one based on a medical doctor-patient, individual-level relationship. 
 
Interviewee H said: 
“Hm, in theory it’s a good idea [for GPs to be involved in commissioning] 
because they would be the clinical leaders of the system and all healthcare 
starts with primary care. In practice, it’s extremely variable because the 
quality of primary care is extremely variable and hasn’t really been addressed 
through the new contract” (Interview 7; Quote 1).  
 
Interviewee H also shared: 
“No, they [GPs]’ve had no [business] training whatsoever other than some 
kind of corporate development support, but it’s no way near enough. So, a lot 
of them don’t really know how to run a legally-constructed public organisation 
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and what the governance rules are, how boards should operate, how conflicts 
of interest should work, the roles of the Chair, the Accountable Officer, CFO 
... So, quite a lot of them are quite inexperienced and it will take some time for 
them to gain that experience. And they also’ve got a tendency to do what are 
called ‘silo gazing.’ They look inward to their own organisation, not outward, 
at strategic level” (Interview 7; Quote 2).  
 
 
Interviewee N said the following: 
 
“I think GPs … their professional culture is one of independence. So … 
managing large organisations is quite difficult for them. I also think there are 
gaps in their knowledge and skill in terms of some of the managerial aspects 
of commissioning. Hm, but on the positive side, I think they do bring, they 
certainly bring some practical experience to the discussion. And they tend to, 
they also, in some cases, bring some analytical skill, as well. But I don’t think, 
generally, they are very strategic” (Quote 3).  
 
 
Interviewee J expressed the following opinion: 
 
“I think they, the whole CCG lacks vision and strategy, so I think that’s an 
area where management would help them develop. I think it was always going 
to be the case that the CCGs would have to have managers and a Chief 
Executive who is experienced and so on. And I think Andrew Lansley really in 
initiating the changes didn’t make that plan. So, people got very concerned 
about GPs running a huge budget and never having any experience” (Quote 
4).   
 
From the four quotes above, one can see that some managers and accountants expressed 
skeptical views on the issue of how appropriate it is for clinicians to be involved in acute 
commissioning. They mentioned that clinicians lacked management training and skills, that 
‘they are not very strategic,’ and engaged in ‘silo gazing.’  
 
Besides, GPs were perceived to be not ‘all at one voice.’ The interview data seemed to 
suggest that there was a lack of consensus among clinicians with respect to how to 
commission acute healthcare. Interviewees B, J, N, and R all agreed that GPs were not 
always in agreement with one another in terms of acute and other commissioning practices. 
Interviewee B shared: 
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“And they are making collectively decisions about commissioning, I think 
they find amongst themselves … that would be really challenging because 
they haven’t really had to think in that way collectively before. I think that 
those who are leading the CCGs are starting to find that particular challenge. 
They’ve got GPs who aren’t all at one voice” (Quote 5).  
 
Interviewee N disclosed that, ‘not all the GPs [in his area] … [got] on [well] with each other 
[laughing]. So, they decided to have two groups’ (Quote 6). Interviewee J mentioned:  
“Hm, one other thing is there is a general consensus, a general view, that                                                                   
CCGs are being run by GPs, represent GPs’ views generally, and can get GPs 
to do things. That’s not true. You know, the CCG struggles more to get the 
GPs to align to their commissioning intentions than they do to get acute 
hospitals to. So, we are very keen to introduce for example integrated care for 
the elderly but the GPs are not so keen. When the commissioners (the CCGs) 
commission a pathway, the GPs don’t all buy into it. They do their own thing” 
(Quote 7).  
 
Interviewee R shared:  
“[T]here’s quite a lot of rivalry between practices. They are very competitive 
with each other … Or, actually, for micro-businessmen [they are] quite 
competitive between each other … But I find it causes me more problems 
managing … between them [GPs] … This does cause friction between them” 
(Quote 8).  
 
It seems that even if it may be appropriate for clinicians to be involved in commissioning, 
how exactly they are involved and how exactly they commission are other issues that bring 
with themselves even more complexities – disagreements among clinicians, competitiveness, 
and sometimes friction. 
 
7.2.3. Views from the clinicians 
 
Interviewee A, a hospital medical specialist, shared:  
“[I]t’s an experiment … And that’s quite a high risk experiment, one of the 
higher risk things that the government have done. If it works, what it will 
allow is GPs, potentially, to redesign care pathways, so that patients always 
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don’t go to secondary care which is generally quite an expensive option. And 
so, if an elderly patient is having multiple falls, they often come to the hospital 
and spend a week in hospital, whereas they would be better managed in a non-
hospital setting. So, the ideal is the people who know when it’s best to design 
a pathway are in charge of it; whereas, previously there was a lot of inertia in 
the system because the GPs didn’t really have much financial responsibility 
and therefore were doing what was the easiest thing which is to send the 
patients to hospital. Now they’ve got financial incentivisation, not necessarily 
personally, but because they have to live within a constrained budget, they 
might do something differently” (Quote 9).  
 
Interviewee O, a GP, suggested that it was appropriate to build a ‘synergy’ between clinicians 
and managers in order to have a successful commissioning system: 
“Hm, I think … the big advantage of clinical commissioning is it says to the 
clinicians, ‘You are responsible for the whole of your health system.’ So, if 
it’s not working, you are able to do things to put it right, you are able to take 
control, whereas previously in PCTs, it was not necessarily just the PCT that 
stepped back from engaging clinicians. It was sometimes the GPs and other 
professionals who stepped back from their responsibility. So, by putting it on 
the shoulders of the clinicians and saying, ‘You use the tools that you need to 
sort it out’ … and what we find is that it is a partnership between clinical 
leaders and expert managers and it doesn’t work with one or the other on their 
own. It has to be that synergy” (Quote 10).  
 
Interviewee O shared:                                                                                                                                                                
“So, I would much rather have inherited the end-to-end responsibility of the 
PCT but with that requirement that it is the responsibility of the local 
clinicians to make it work. And then we would make sure that we have the 
managerial expertise in the organisation to discharge that responsibility. But 
we would then have been able to influence the whole system, whereas now we 
can only influence parts of it … [F]or example we don’t commission general 
practice, we don’t commission specialist services, we don’t commission 
forensic services, things like that. And all of those have an impact. It’s not, 
none of these exist in isolation, they all interrelate. The problem at the moment 
is that my priorities as a commissioner may not align with the priorities of the 
commissioners for the other system (parts of the system) but impact my 
population. So, public health going off to local government for example has 
created a big dis-connect in what was a very successful strategy between 
public health and health services’ commissioning, where the PCT quite rightly 
had chosen to put more investment in public health than elsewhere. But what’s 
happened is that then disappeared out of our control” (Quote 11). 
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Interviewee G, a GP, said: 
“When CCGs were formed, one of the key reasons for its formation was that 
NHS was running with cash starvation. And they had to find new ways to 
control the cost but at the same time make sure that the quality and services 
are well preserved and I think that giving it in the hands of clinicians addresses 
that focus and especially at our CCG level, the clinicians are in charge and 
they think more rationally, innovatively, to find the quality of care and to 
produce efficiency, so when there is like a war, people are at their best. So, 
when you have less money, to produce the same results, you have more 
innovation, and you think more differently to address those problems” (Quote 
12). 
 
Interviewee E, a retired GP, said: 
“But I mean most doctors will say, ‘I am the clinician. I’ve been trained to 
treat people and care for people. Somebody else should be dealing with how 
all this is funded and how it might maximise the value of the service at the 
lowest cost level to the organisation … I think, probably two aspects of that, 
really. Doctors by and large have sort of common sense financial management 
you might get from running your own home. Doctors are not trained in 
financial management and therefore I think they probably have only a limited 
capability in these Clinical Commissioning Groups ‘cause they are not used to 
dealing with, you know, multi-million pound budgets. I think most doctors see 
their skills as treating their patient population and knowing what the needs of 
their own patients, individual patients are, rather than knowing the needs of a 
wide population, you know, in a big city. I think the other thing that is starting 
to come out of this really is that if you have the GP as a service provider and 
also the GP as the purchaser of the services, you’ve got the GP trying to act in 
both roles. They are trying to provide the service at the coalface, if you like, 
for their individual patients. But that same GP may be involved in budget 
allocation. And I think there is a potential conflict of interest there that you are 
both a provider and a purchaser, the person who’s deciding what sort of 
service provision needs to be bought from various health areas” (Quote 13).  
 
In agreement with the managers and accountants’ views from above, Interviewee E doubted 
the ‘financial management’ skills of clinicians. This interview was conducted only in early 
2013, before CCGs became operational, so the reference to ‘conflict of interest,’ conflict 
which has been somehow mitigated later on, was a relevant issue at the time. Interviewee G 
was more optimistic about clinicians’ aptness to commission well – in his CCG, ‘the 
clinicians … [were] in charge and they … [thought] more rationally, innovatively.’ 
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Interviewee A suggested that GPs would be careful commissioners due to the fact that now 
they were given more ‘financial responsibility.’ Interviewee O accentuated on the fact that a 
‘partnership’ between clinicians and managers would be appropriate in commissioning and 
lamented the fact that now clinicians can only ‘influence parts of it [the system],’ unlike 
PCTs which could influence bigger parts of the system.  
 
7.2.4. Observation of meetings and conferences 
 
Some of the secondary data, i.e. data from the observation of CCG meetings and NHS 
conferences, gave some good clues as to the appropriateness of clinicians to be involved in 
acute care commissioning. The researcher observed a large variety of talk and behaviour at 
the Commissioning Show 2013, the Hospital Directions 2013 Conference, and the 
Commissioning Show 2014. During the Big Care Debate of CCG 1, the Accountable Officer 
who was a GP openly shared with the audience the challenges this CCG was facing – a 
growing elderly population, an increasing number of people with complex needs and long-
term conditions, and a shortage of qualified medical personnel. He encouraged the audience 
to form groups of about eight people per table and write suggestions about what healthcare 
services they thought worked well in their local area and what services needed improvement. 
After discussing these issues in small groups, one person from each group summarised his or 
her group’s concerns for everyone to hear. The notes of each group were then passed to the 
Accountable Officer who promised to personally read each one of them.  
 
The Big Care Debate showed this GP-Accountable Officer in the light of a clinician and 
leader who was both financially and clinically competent and genuinely interested in finding 
out what the public thought about the healthcare services in his local area. This GP seemed to 
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be very well fit to be involved in acute and other commissioning. He used financial words, 
such as ‘underfunded,’ ‘financial prognosis,’ ‘benchmarks,’ ‘demand,’ etc.  
 
The Health Forum meeting of CCG 1 was led by a retired GP. There were about twenty-five 
members of the public present. The most elderly person present was in his early 90s and was 
acknowledged during the meeting by the retired GP leader. This former GP wanted to hear 
views from the public on certain issues taking place in the local NHS trust, issues which were 
the object of close media attention at the time. He announced that he would make these views 
known to the local CCG. This GP displayed qualities of an outspoken leader, concerned 
medical professional, and visionary. He was well informed about the A&E challenges in the 
local area, the results of patient satisfaction surveys, and media news. He also responded to 
some business and finance-related questions from the members of the public with 
competence and ease.   
 
Another meeting, CCG 2’s Board of governors’ meeting with the public, was attended by 
nine governing body members. The Chair of the board who was a GP participated very 
actively in the meeting. The meeting lasted for three hours. The Chair opened the meeting at 
2:00 pm and presented the board members to the nine members of the public present. Then, 
the Chair summarised the declarations of conflicts of interest,
38
 the items exempt from the 
Freedom of Information Act 2000, the minutes from the last board meeting from January 
2014, and the action log. At about 2:30 pm, he welcomed any questions from the members of 
the public and answered some of them or invited members of the board to do so.  
 
                                                          
38
 The agenda of CCG 2’s Board of governors’ meeting with the public explained that if the Chairman and 
members had any pecuniary interest (direct or indirect), in any contract, proposed contract or other matter 
subject to consideration at the meeting, they had to disclose during the meeting this fact and not take part in the 
consideration or discussion on this contract, proposed contract or other matter, nor vote on any question with 
respect to it. There were a couple of declarations of potential conflict of interest.   
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Among the items from the minutes of the previous board meeting that this GP-Chair 
summarised were: a patient’s story which was presented by the author in the form of a long 
poem, discussions about a commissioning report that was being prepared, and a performance 
report. Throughout the meeting, this clinician demonstrated excellent leadership skills and 
made use of business and accounting vocabulary with great ease. He used vocabulary, such 
as: ‘deterioration in costs,’ ‘transformation funds,’ ‘fluctuating costs,’ ‘processes and 
controls,’ and ‘impact on anticipated savings.’  
 
At yet another meeting, CCG 3’s Board of governors’ meeting with the public, twelve board 
members were present. Two of them (the Chair and the Director of Nursing and Quality) 
were clinicians – a GP and a nurse, respectively. The meeting started at 1:30 pm and finished 
at 6:00 pm. Similarly to the Chair of CCG 2, the Chair of CCG 3 led the first part of the 
meeting (from 1:30 to 2:25 pm). She introduced the board members in attendance to the ten 
members of the public present, read the apologies of the absentees and the declarations of 
interests report, gave a summary of the minutes from the last board meeting, talked about 
matters arising from the last meeting, gave the Chair’s update, and finally introduced the 
Accountable Officer who gave an update on some CCG governance issues.  
 
Later during the meeting, the Chair presented the minutes from the last CCG Audit 
Committee meeting from January 2014 and used terminology, such as: ‘internal audit tender,’ 
‘CSU KPIs [Key Performance Indicators],’ ‘financial position,’ ‘new financial ledger,’ ‘risk 
report,’ and ‘counter-fraud progress report.’ It was observed that the GP-Chair was well fit 
for her role. She facilitated the discussion of various issues with great ease and answered 
clearly and informatively several questions from the public regarding the workings of the 
CCG.  
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7.3. Data used to help answer RQ 2 
 
As outlined in Chapter 6, interview excerpts and observational data from CCG meetings and 
NHS conferences will be used to help answer RQ 2. This research question was, ‘What 
motivates clinicians to assume leadership roles in CCGs?’ Before clinicians’ motivation is 
discussed, it would be helpful to see who the clinicians involved in CCG leadership roles are, 
i.e. to look into their background – training and work history, both in medicine and previous 
forms of commissioning, if any.  
 
 7.3.1. Clinicians’ backgrounds, i.e. training and work history 
 
Several of the GPs interviewed (Interviewees O, Q, S, and T) shared that they had extensive 
prior experience in commissioning from earlier NHS commissioning reforms, such as the 
voluntary GP fundholding and PBC. One GP shared: 
“Hm, so, I trained … as a doctor and I qualified in 1996 and I … did my pre-
registration house officer jobs and their surgical rotation … through to 2008. 
Then, I passed my membership in the Royal College of Surgeons exams. Due 
to some health problems, I decided to change career and train as a GP. So, 
then did a GP vocational training scheme … for another two years and 
qualified in 2000 and then came over to [county] to work as a GP. Sorry, then 
I had a year … as a GP registrar in [town] in [county]. Then, I came over in 
2001 to [county] to work. And in 2002, I became a Partner in practice in the 
[town] area. By two thousand and, I think 2003, I started doing some part-time 
work with the [county] Strategic Health Authority, as it was at the time, 
supporting the Connecting for Health Programme (the National Programme 
for IT as it was at the time). And … they gradually increased my commitment 
there until … in 2006, I was doing two days a week work there and that work 
gradually evolved into supporting Practice Based Commissioning and, hm, I 
continued that work for a couple of years till the SHA [Strategic Health 
Authority] dissolved in 2008, I think. Hm, and during that period I’d also 
become the leader for the [town] Practice Based Commissioning Group. In 
2009 … Yes, it’s been a very interesting journey. And then, during that period 
of around 2010 when the government was setting out its new strategy around 
the Health and Social Care Bill, we consolidated with the [town] Clinical 
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Commissioning Group, which had been the neighbouring Practice Based 
Commissioning Group, to form a single group … I certainly spent quite a lot 
of time contributing to national policy and thinking around clinical leadership. 
I wouldn’t claim that I influenced that hugely since these things are complex 
and difficult to influence and a lot of people have input into them, but 
certainly we were pushing in that direction for a very long time. So, during 
this time (in about 2007, I think, maybe 2008) I became the, one of the two 
clinical commissioning champions for the NHS Alliance, which is a national 
membership organisation that was formed around the time fundholding was 
introduced and through that I networked with a lot of like-minded people 
across the country but also got involved in a lot of work with the Department 
of Health and with, you know, kind of shaping thinking and working with 
think tanks and policy fund organisations to contribute to the thinking about 
how clinical leadership could be a positive contribution” (Interviewee O; 
Quote 14). 
 
Another GP said: 
“I started off, I did, hm, went to school in [county], went to [university], did a 
natural sciences degree, which is mainly chemistry, and left and joined the 
[military body] for, it was a total of 16 years, but the first eight years I was 
flying and I left, went to medical school and then went back in as a doctor for 
the next six years, so … there was a gap in between. And then 12 years ago, I 
left the [military body] and came to [town] as a GP. So, 12 years ago, I joined 
the NHS as a General Practitioner. And through that I got involved first in 
Practice-Based Commissioning and then – Clinical Commissioning Groups. 
So, effectively we had a Practice-Based Commissioning Consortium in [name] 
CCG for the past 7-8 years … We were quite a cohesive team … so we’ve 
always been recognised as being one of, if you like, the leaders as far as CCGs 
in [part of England]” (Interviewee Q; Quote 15). 
 
 
Yet another GP said: 
“So, I should probably just tell you to start with that, hm, I stopped doing 
general practice about 18 months ago, but I carried, I carried on doing the 
commissioning work, OK? So, I don’t do clinical work anymore, but I am just 
doing this work. OK? … So, I was a GP for over 20 years in [town] and, hm, 
for probably the last, hm, 15 years I’ve been involved in, with all the various 
NHS, hm, reforms and whatever, in some way. So, initially in the Primary 
Care Groups and then in Primary Care Trusts, I’ve been involved in linking up 
with the practices in [town] and the … area to working together to deliver the 
sort of the national agenda. So, so, so, working in the NHS as a GP and then 
working alongside that in a commissioning role … Well, since, yeah, it would 
have been since 97, I think, when the Labour Party came in and then that was 
the demise of fundholding and the beginning of Primary Care Groups. So, I 
don’t know if you know the history going back, but I was involved in them, 
really” (Interviewee S; Quote 16).  
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Interviewee T, also a GP, shared his experience:  
“So, I qualified in 1988, [city] Medical School, and did a range of hospital 
jobs which you are required to do in order to fulfilled GP training. Then, I did 
a year as a GP, as a trainee back then (there wasn’t a Registrar back then) and 
then I did a year of research in epidemiology based mainly in [city], but then I 
came back, we came back to [town], and I’ve been a GP since then. Did a little 
bit of locum work for about 8 or 9 months and then became a Partner about 18 
or 19 years ago in the practice that I am at now. So, I’ve been a GP there ever 
since. I was full time to start with. Currently, my clinical work is one and a 
half days and I, my other sort of main involvement’s been a bit of work with 
the Local Medical Committee (the LMC). I’ve done that for quite a number of 
years and I still do a little bit of that but I do a lot less of that now because of 
the CCG involvement. The CCG involvement’s been, well it’s grown, and it’s 
now three days a week” (Quote 17). 
 
Another GP who was retired at the time of the interview said: 
“Well, I’ve retired, I retired ten years ago but I started working for the NHS as 
a junior doctor in 1963 and I retired in 2003. OK?  … My specialty, before 
you are a consultant, you work generally in everything but when I was 
appointed a consultant in 1975, it was a consultant in general medicine, 
diabetes, and endocrinology. So, the general medicine is taken as being 
something that everyone does, but my specialty interest was diabetes and 
endocrinology” (Interviewee M; Quote 18).  
 
Another GP shared the following: 
“OK. I will start off saying that I started working in the NHS in 1987. I started 
off with being a hospital doctor, working in oncology, radio-oncology and I 
spent about five years doing patients’ cancer treatment, chemo-therapy and 
radio therapy treatment. Then, in 1991, I changed my course, became a GP 
and since then I am a GP in [city]. Since 1992 till now it’s about 20 odd years. 
But I am also a Board member of the CCG and I’ve been a Board member of 
previous organisations like the PCT and the PCG. Since 2002, I have been 
involved in NHS management. And my current role is that I am the Clinical 
Safety Officer for the CCG and the Innovative Lead for the CCG and I have 
four or five of my programmes that I lead on. Most of them are cardio-
vascular, MSK [musculo-skeletal] but it’s all based around a teaching concept 
and training concept which is the ‘three T concept’ … In the PCTs, in the 
previous system, I have always been a Board member of the PCT, as well. For 
three or four years in between I wasn’t in medical management but most of the 
years I’ve spent in it” (Interviewee G; Quote 19).  
 
 
Yet another GP said: 
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“So, I graduated from [city] Medical School in the year 2000 and I did my first 
jobs at [city] Teaching Hospitals and [religious denomination] District General 
Hospital in …. [town] and I did three and a half years as a surgical trainee at 
various places – [religious denomination] Hospital, [city] Hospital in [city] 
again and I did general surgery, urology, neurosurgery, orthopaedics, Accident 
& Emergency medicine and then I changed to general practice training after 
doing six months paediatrics at [religious denomination] Hospital. I moved to 
[town] and I worked at [name] NHS Trust and I did psychiatry, gynaecology, 
for a number of years, and training in a GP practice. Then, I finished my GP 
training in 2007 and then moved to the [name] Practice in the centre of [town] 
as a GP Partner and I worked there for five and a half years and then recently 
this year I moved to … Scotland and from the beginning of last month, I am 
working at the medical practice here as a GP … Yeah, so during my career 
I’ve had quite a lot of medico-political experience, as well. When I was a GP 
trainee, I was the regional representative on to the British Medical Association 
[BMA] Board for GP registrars where I used to go to kind of meetings in 
London and also to the kind of Annual Conference for junior doctors and to 
the BMA. And I was also the registrar representative on the Local Medical 
Committee [LMC]. When I became a GP, I carried on their kind of property 
from the LMC and last year I had about six months of being the Medical 
Secretary of [town] LMC and I’ve been to the LMC conference several times. 
So, I knew quite a lot about kind of the politics of primary care and things like 
that” (Interviewee F; Quote 20).  
 
From the seven quotes above, it becomes clear that many of the clinical interviewees who had 
assumed leadership roles in CCGs had had a long and diverse experience working in 
medicine. General practice, as well as medical specialisations, were both mentioned. 
Interestingly, a continuity of involvement from various kinds of prior commissioning – GP 
fundholding and PBC – was often observed. These clinicians became naturally and 
seamlessly the CCG leaders of their respective geographical areas. This is to say, these 
clinicians were recycled through the commissioning system, most likely thanks to their prior 
commissioning experience, experience which many of their clinical colleagues perhaps 
lacked at the time.   
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 7.3.2. Why did clinicians assume leadership roles in CCGs?   
 
Now that clinicians’ training and work history were presented, what can be found out about 
their motivation to assume leadership roles in CCGs? 
 
  7.3.2.1. Views from the clinicians 
 
In terms of why he undertook a CCG leadership role, Interviewee F was found to like the 
politics of medicine – Interviewee E said about another interviewee whom he knew as a 
former colleague, “I think he [Interviewee F] volunteered to be there [in a commissioning 
leadership role], yeah, ‘cause he quite likes the politics of medicine” (Quote 21).  
 
When asked why she got involved in a CCG leadership role, Interviewee S responded:   
“I think that, probably along with a lot of people, just doing full time general 
practice is just too head banging. It’s just too dreadful [laughing]. So, you 
need to find something else to do … to help keep your enthusiasm going … to 
help deliver on … I think I thought I wanted to do it on a bigger scale than just 
in a [GP] practice. So, I think that was partly what it was – to have a more … 
of a public health type, more of a population-type impact than just in an 
individual practice” (Quote 22).  
 
Interviewee T expressed the following view: 
“Under our Constitution [of our CCG], we have: four GPs on the governing 
body are elected by the GPs across the city and then four GPs are elected by 
each one of four localities (elected or selected by those localities). So, four of 
them are elected city-wide and four of them are elected within the localities. 
That was, that is a sort of historical arrangement because we had these 
localities before, with a strong identity, and they wanted their representative to 
be there. I am one of the locality GPs. To be, to be Chair, under our 
Constitution, you are elected by, those eight, one of those eight GPs is elected 
by the other GPs. So, the GPs choose who the Chair, the GPs on the governing 
body through that electoral, elections process, choose who’s gonna be the 
Chair. So, I put my name forward ‘cause nobody else did … Well, I had, I’ve 
had some experience of this type of work through LMC work and through the 
work that was going on before CCGs were invented. And I’ve probably done 
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more of it than any of the other GPs. So, so, there’s a little bit, that I had 
probably more experience than others but there’s also, just continuing to be 
interested in doing it, more interested actually than I thought I would be. So, 
that’s been, you know, sort of a, almost a personal discovery … I do have, I 
am interested in that. And I am interested in how … organisations generally 
[are run]. So, that can be any kind of organisation ... Hm, I am also quite 
attracted to the fact that you can shape services in the NHS for patients, hm, 
(How do I put it?) at a different level in the organisation, rather than just in the 
consulting room where you do it for one patient within the existing 
framework. You can actually change the framework and in that way, make 
things better for the patient, but of course you don’t just do it for the one 
patient. You do it for lots and lots of patients. So, there’s the opportunity to 
make a difference for lots of patients though using that organisational 
structure” (Quote 23). 
 
Interviewee Q shared, “Well, I was elected (officially) but there was no other applicant 
because that’s what I’ve been doing, effectively; we just moved, seamlessly, from what we 
were doing before into this [CCG commissioning]. So, officially, yeah, there was an election” 
(Quote 24). 
 
From the above, Interviewees S and T seemed to be motivated by the idea of making a 
difference on a more macro level than the micro level of a doctor-patient one-to-one 
professional encounter. They wanted to help shape national policy and thus help many 
patients. Moreover, being involved in something other than clinical practice seemed 
refreshing to Interviewee S. It kept her ‘enthusiasm going.’ Interviewee T was found to have 
joined a leadership role in his CCG as the CCG Chair because of his prior experience and 
personal interest in how organisations were run. Interviewee Q was ‘moved … seamlessly’ 
into a CCG leadership role also thanks to his prior experience in commissioning – perhaps, 
his prior experience was his motivator.  
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7.3.2.2. Views from the managers and accountants  
 
Interviewee H, an accountant, brought up the issue that perhaps some GPs might be assuming 
CCG leadership roles because of the monetary compensation involved: 
“The new GP contract came in 2004-5 or whatever it is. There hasn’t really 
been a coherent effort to, to level the playing field around the quality and 
rationing of both access to primary care and the sort of services that primary 
care offers. And that’s a real problem. So, essentially it means that you have 
some interested good GPs and some really bad GPs and the problem is they all 
want pay. So, it doesn’t matter what they do; they all want pay at their practice 
profit rates. So, £150-200 an hour is what they charge to take part in meetings” 
(Interview 7; Quote 25).  
 
Interviewee E, a retired GP, shared the following with respect to the latest GP contract: 
“They [GPs] are independent contractors, yeah. And some would say very 
expensive to employ ‘cause when they renegotiated the new GP contract, GPs 
seemed to come out of it very well because they had substantially increased 
salaries … Hm, probably [this happened] eight years ago or something like 
that. Yeah, the Labour government negotiated a new contract for General 
Practitioners for the British Medical Association and basically the amount of 
on-call that GPs have to do was dramatically reduced. But they seemed to end 
up with a significant increase in salary. So, it was a good deal for the GPs but 
it wasn’t a good deal financially for the running of the National Health Service 
… The British Medical Association negotiated a very good deal for general 
practice” (Quote 26). 
 
Interviewee R, a manager, shared: 
“But I find it causes me more problems managing between, between them 
[GPs]. You know, one practice is, is fed up cost, I mean, some of the GPs are 
very social, socially conscious when it suits them. You know, they are very, 
very socially minded, whereas, there’s some that are a bit more business 
minded and this does cause friction between them. Yeah, I have had a few 
interesting tussles. But I think people, I think if anything casts a negative light 
on CCGs, it would be public perception about GPs doing it for the money. 
And I think, you know, as I say, for an ordinary person in the street, looking in 
on that, I can fully understand why they might feel like that. It is a bit like 
herding cats, I’m telling you. They are an interesting bunch” (Quote 27).  
 
 
While the two clinicians above (Interviewees S and T) expressed idealistic views with respect 
to clinicians’ motivation to assume leadership roles in CCGs, two of the managers and 
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accountants (Interviewees H and R) expressed more worldly and skeptical views related to 
the monetary motivation.  
 
7.3.2.3. Observation of meetings and conferences 
 
What did the CCG meetings and NHS conferences prompt in terms of clinicians’ motivation 
to join CCG leadership? The Big Care Debate and the Health Forum of CCG 1 shed some 
light on this question. The Big Care Debate was led by a GP who was also the Accountable 
Officer of CCG 1. He and other members of staff from the CCG addressed an audience of 
more than 100 members of the public. Due to the remote location of the meeting from the 
local town, the CCG had arranged for the free transportation for those members of the public 
who had no means of transportation. This showed the concern of the CCG to hear views from 
vulnerable and less privileged members of the public. Perhaps, this concern with helping their 
local populations was a motivation to assume these leadership roles? Also, at the 2013 
Commissioning Show, one clinician said that if he and other clinicians were not interested in 
helping people lead better and healthier lives, those clinicians would not be there, i.e. at the 
Commissioning Show.  
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7.4. Data used to help answer RQ 3  
 
This part presents data that will help answer RQ 3, ‘How involved are clinicians in CCG 
calculative practices?’  
 
7.4.1. Views from the managers and accountants 
 
When asked what exactly clinicians did in CCGs in terms of business, accounting, and other 
financial activities, i.e. calculative practices, Interview H (Interview 19) shared that they were 
involved in budgeting and managerial accounting allocations, as members of a team. 
However, to his knowledge, clinicians were not involved directly in any financial accounting 
practices: 
“They are not [involved], not at all [in financial accounting-related practices]. 
It’s all contracted out to CSUs; however, I am aware in [city A] of eight CCGs 
are now, they’ve given notice on their CSU contract and are bringing their 
services back in but as a shared service” (Quote 28). 
 
 
Interviewee H added later in the same interview: “But, I mean, GPs wouldn’t have any 
knowledge of accounting, in the same way that the management teams of the old PCTs 
didn’t, either. It’s the Finance Director that might have accounting knowledge, but that’s it” 
(Quote 29). When asked how clinicians were involved in calculative practices, such as 
budgeting and cost accounting, Interviewee R responded: 
“I think it’s probably variable. They all have a reasonable insight into 
accounting practice, you know, but some of them have a deeper insight than 
others … [I]f you are a Senior Partner in a practice, you probably know more 
about the numbers and you probably know more about accounting practice 
than if you are just a jobbing salaried GP. If you are a Practice Manager, you 
actually might even come from a financial services background (a lot of them 
do), you probably have a good understanding of the numbers. I think it’s quite 
variable, actually. It is variable” (Quote 30). 
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She also added from her personal experience: 
“You know, accounting conventions just drive me nuts, but … you intuitively 
understand the numbers. I just had an earlier meeting with a provider (with the 
Director of Finance) in the room and I think he’s gone away not very happy 
‘cause I knew the numbers better than he did and he is the Director of Finance. 
Only because I made it my business to go through and understand because 
what I was trying to do was, ‘What are these numbers telling me by way of a 
story?’ So, yeah, yeah, whether they [clinicians] would be familiar with 
accounting techniques, I think, is a different question. All of them would have 
a reasonable financial orientation” (Quote 31). 
 
Interviewee I shared that in his commissioning experience, GPs were sometimes helped by 
advisors from CSUs. According to him, the clinicians involved in CCGs were not left alone 
in dealing with the rigorous demands of commissioning: 
“There is an issue, quite a serious issue, about the capacity of GPs to provide 
capacity, the experience of GPs in relation to financial, contracting, Human 
Resource, and others. ‘What is the extent to which a GP has the experience of 
running a business?’ That’s essentially the question and as a solution to that 
question the Commissioning Support Units is a fairly obvious solution … I 
think that this is the only way forward under the current circumstances” 
(Quote 32).  
 
Interviewee H (Interview 19) shared that he knew from personal experience that some GPs 
were withdrawing from their commissioning leadership posts: 
“[T]he NHS is very, very complicated, particularly in terms of how the 
activity and financial flows happen and it takes a great deal of commitment 
and time to do it. So, I don’t blame GPs for deciding (some of them), starting 
to decide that it’s not really the sort of thing they want to do” (Quote 33). 
 
Clinicians were not left alone in commissioning, as Interviewee I shared; yet, there seemed to 
be some instances of clinicians’ disinvolvement from commissioning leadership. 
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7.4.2. Views from the clinicians 
 
Interviewee O, a GP, pointed out his involvement with a large variety of other parties. This 
involvement required a ‘vast array of skills,’ calculative and non-calculative: 
“So, if I look at the drivers on me, as the leader of the organisation, I’ve got: 
the expectations of my practices, the expectations of my elected practice 
members, the expectations of my staff, the expectations of the local public, the 
local media, the politicians at, at least, four or five different levels of local 
government, then we’ve got the regional expectations in the Health Service, 
the expectations from social care, we’ve got the national expectations from 
NHS England, then we’ve got the Department of Health and the Secretary of 
State’s expectations laid separately on top of those, then we have the 
expectation of the national political debate and then we have trends in national 
and international healthcare and everything that that brings with it … That’s a, 
that’s a complex environment. And in all of that I’ve got to do Delivery for 
Today, Awareness for the Future, Transformational Change … 
communication, public engagement, you know, a vast array of skills and that 
is a challenging environment to be in and therefore you have a funnel of 
people who are capable of doing it down to a very small number, a bit like you 
do with medicine and law where you have to be highly capable, skillful, and 
dedicated to survive in those environments” (Quote 34).  
 
When asked what he did on a day-to-day basis for the CCG in terms of business-related (i.e. 
calculative) activities, Interviewee Q answered: 
“[T]he Chair of a CCG is almost a pure leadership role … so there isn’t, if you 
like, a list of daily tasks or, you know, I don’t have, in terms of reference, I 
don’t have a team as such. What I have to do is fill in the gaps, act as liaison 
with outside agencies, try and preempt any problems. If there are problems, try 
and troubleshoot them, again mainly by liaison with outside agencies. Hm, 
obviously ensure that the team is happy, that they’ve got the right level of 
support, that the Chief Executive is managing the organisation in the right 
way, so … it’s a very ill-defined job. If you asked me to write down exactly 
what I did on a piece of paper, I don’t think I would be able to. But that’s very 
much the nature of leadership” (Quote 35).   
 
When asked the same question, Interviewee S responded: 
“OK, so all general practices are in fact businesses, OK. So, they all have 
some knowledge and awareness of how their business runs, so I think that, I 
would say that if you are going to be a Partner in general practice, you do have 
some awareness about, about budgets and how you run, how you run a 
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business, really. Hm, so I would think that you are not coming from ‘no 
knowledge at all.’ Certainly, there has been some training available for people 
to look at NHS budgeting and whatever, if people wanted to take advantage of 
it” (Quote 36). 
 
 
Interviewee O shared: 
“So, what I am learning, what my colleagues are learning is what is our added 
value as clinicians in discharging those functions well. So, I don’t attempt to 
do the accountancy for the CCG, but I do now know how it’s done and I do 
pay attention to the result of it as the leader of the CCG, but also as a local 
clinician because I know we have to make that money work effectively for us” 
(Quote 37).  
 
Interviewee Q accentuated on the fact that clinicians were the leaders of the new 
commissioning system: 
“[A]s Chair of the Board, I mean, clearly, I don’t do the, you wouldn’t do the 
operational budget setting but, actually, the high-level strategy is clearly, you 
know, something that I’d lead a team on, developing that … I mean, actually, 
one of the things that I’ve put in my personal development plan this year for 
my appraisal is to get greater insight into the accounting processes … Hm, you 
know, because I see that as a definite educational need in this role, so I plan to 
spend some time with the Finance team and actually go through, watch them, 
go through with them in their preparation of the end-of-year accounts, so that I 
can understand it from, you know … which would certainly allow me to 
perform this role a bit better” (Quote 38). 
 
Interviewee T shared that the clinicians in his CCG were involved ‘to a limited extent’ in 
business- and accounting-related practices, i.e. calculative practices: 
“Yeah, to a limited extent ... We have been visiting practices to look at their 
activity against a nominal budget which has been assigned to each practice in 
the city. We’ve actually asked the GPs in the practices to look at their activity 
compared with what the budget, the nominal budget if you like, actually shows 
that they do. So, there is that level of awareness of budgetary issues. Hm, at 
sort of the other end of the scale, if you like, we always, at the governing body 
every month have a financial statement introduced by the Chief Finance 
Officer for us all to have a look at, line by line. It amounts to, I don’t know, 
10-15 pages and, you know, the spreadsheets and the summary and so on ... 
And so, the GPs around the table are invited to comment on these, if you like, 
at a summary level. So, there’s the practice-level activity going on right 
through to the summary level across the entire CCG. So, yes, GPs are 
involved, the most definitely involved, in all of that. Those are more or less 
routine things that are going on” (Quote 39).  
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Interviewee T continued: 
“There’s also, every year we put together our commissioning intentions ... We 
decide what sort of things the service should be like and then with the help of 
the Finance Department, we have a comment, if you like, about how much 
resource we invest into each of our new commissioning plans. So, there’s an 
input but it’s from the body, it’s not from individual GPs, it’s from the body of 
GPs and those around the table. So, it’s a corporate view but of course it’s 
informed by the GPs’ view. The GPs are in the majority of our governing 
body, so it’s a majority GP view about what we should do, but of course it is 
very much held by the financial team helping us to do that. We might say, ‘We 
think that should be more and that should be less.’ And then there’s a 
discussion about how we make that happen. So, yeah, there’s a variety of 
inputs into the finance that goes on in the governing body. We don’t of course 
do any of the technical parts of public sector accounting. I don’t think any of 
us have tried to get involved in that. There’s not really any reason why we 
shouldn’t do it if we were interested. We could start taking a really in-depth 
interest in it. But I think we all view it in a way, as I said, as a tool and enabler 
to do the things that we think we need to do to make the service better, rather 
than an interest in itself in its own right, we think of it as a means to an end, 
not the other way around” (Quote 40). 
 
 
Interviewee O, just like Interviewee I above, shared that in his CCG, clinicians were not 
responsible for doing all parts of the commissioning cycle themselves. They were assisted by 
others: 
“You don’t do it [accounting-related and other calculative practices] yourself. 
But it’s still your responsibility. So … I don’t have enough years left in my 
life to learn all those skills. But I’ve got a team of very skilled people who do 
that, who are the managers … Yeah, the employees of the CCG or the 
Commissioning Support Service or whoever we get in to help us to do it. So, 
there’s a difference between the accountability and responsibility for doing it 
and having all those skills yourself” (Quote 41).  
 
 
The quotes above provided evidence to the fact that clinicians were indeed involved in many 
calculative practices within CCGs – ‘GPs are involved, the most definitely involved, in all of 
that,’ as Interviewee T shared. However, this was not done as an end to itself, as the same 
interviewee said, but ‘as a means to an end.’ Clinicians were said to be involved mostly in 
leadership, managerial accounting (not financial accounting) teamwork, including the 
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allocation of budgets, and high-level strategy setting. They turned out to have a basic 
understanding of accounting-related practices and were also found willing to obtain a more 
in-depth accounting and finance training to do their jobs better.  
 
It also became clear from the data above that clinicians did not commission alone, but were 
aided by CCG employees and CSUs. Yet, clinicians were the ones responsible for 
commissioning. Clinicians are the agents collectively and ultimately accountable for billions 
of pounds of CCG budgets each year.  
 
 7.4.3. Observation of meetings and conferences 
 
Similar findings to the ones above were obtained from the observational data. At one of the 
commissioning shows, several clinicians discussed their CCG’s work with the Winter 
Pressures Fund and how they distributed the funds across their locale. Other clinicians talked 
about how they tried to define the words ‘health outcomes’ for patients and how to measure 
outcomes – a calculative practice. Again, clinicians seemed to be involved in CCG 
calculative practices to a significant extent and more than before the reforms; yet, they were 
not alone in this involvement.  
 
7.5. Data used to help answer RQ 4 
 
This part of the chapter will present data in support of the answer to RQ 4, ‘To what extent do 
hybridity and calculative practices affect clinicians’ professional identities in CCGs?’ Both 
interview and observational data will be used here. Who are GPs in the NHS? These are 
independent contractors of the NHS who work in small businesses. They are not NHS 
187 
 
 
 
employees like specialist medical consultants in hospitals, for example. Because of this, GPs 
are considered to be business people.  
 
7.5.1. Views from the managers and accountants 
 
Interviewee R shared the following: 
“I think we need to acknowledge that GPs are businessmen. So, it isn’t that 
they are not business-like and managerial. It’s … compared to the 
commissioning business though, they are in micro-businesses; so, they are 
business-like and they are, you know, financially aware, but in a small 
business setting as providers. And I think, a bit of the struggle I have in the 
commissioning side of the business is thinking large, you know, thinking big. 
So, if you went along, let me try and give you an example, if you said to a 
practice, ‘You know, what do you want us to do differently around 
commissioning services for you?’ they’ll probably say, ‘Oh, well, we want 
counselling in the practice, you know. Five grand, it will cost about 5K.’ 
Whereas, I want them to tell me, ‘What are the really big ticket things that you 
want to change? Are, you know, are there any big-ticket items you want to 
change? Because you, Mr. GP in your practice, are now part of an organisation 
that controls £300 million worth of resources, not 5,000!’ So, there’s 
something about the scale, the perspective, that is not quite, you know … it’s 
quite a struggle to get them to think about… ‘You control 250-300 million 
quid, guys’” (Quote 42).  
 
 
The professional identity of clinicians therefore is changing – from a micro-level identity of 
less hybridity and micro-level calculative practices to a more macro-level identity, one of 
more hybridity and macro-level calculative practices. Interviewee R also added: 
“It isn’t that they are not good leaders, but they are used to leading something 
different. So, if they are at Senior Partner in a practice, that’s a leadership job 
of running a small business; it’s not the same as being a leader of a 
commissioning organisation. So … the doctors, they are individual 
practitioners. That’s how we train doctors – we train them to be individual 
practitioners, making their own judgements … their own, scientific 
knowledge, intuition, we train them as individuals, but what we’ve done is we 
now expect them to be corporate people” (Quote 43).  
 
These two quotes are particularly telling. They convey the message that medical doctors have 
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been trained to use their individual, independent professional judgement on a small-scale 
level, while the neo-liberal hybridity and CCG calculative practices have now pushed them 
toward a much larger-scale level of business commitment than they are used to. Now, they 
are expected to be ‘corporate people.’ Their professional identity is perhaps also changing as 
a result. 
 
Interviewee N talked about how management, and by implication commissioning, was 
generally viewed in the NHS: 
“Yeah, I think the GPs genuinely try to become what they are as a 
commissioner … But I think they also … the NHS is interesting, I think, in 
terms of how it views management, generally. It generally doesn’t have a very 
high opinion of managers. It believes, they are putting it bluntly, that being a 
clinician is good and being a manger is bad [laughing] … And I think they 
probably don’t value, don’t always value, management as a profession in its 
own right. I think they see, I think they think anyone can be a manager. Hm, I 
am generalising, but I think there is a view that anyone can be a manager and 
that generally management is about managing budgets and signing leave cards 
and, you know, it’s about, about not the most important things. The patient 
care would be seen as the most important thing. And, you know, I think, I 
think on the whole a lot of politicians would take the view that we shouldn’t 
be too worried about the money, that patient care is what’s important to us … 
The two are linked” (Quote 44). 
 
He continued his reflections by next talking about the values of the clinicians involved in 
commissioning. Identity is generally considered to be based on values and beliefs:   
“And I would say these particular GPs who are actively involved [in CCGs], 
they would tend to be in the minority and would actually, probably would 
value management a bit more and probably would be very concerned about the 
money, particularly now that they are responsible for it, because in the past 
GPs did not feel responsible for the money. They could write any number of 
prescriptions or send people for any number of hospital appointments and it 
didn’t affect them in any way in terms of their budget” (Quote 45).  
 
Interviewee P acknowledged the fact that clinicians were not managers, nor accountants. 
Still, in his opinion, both clinical and managerial ‘qualities’ were needed of successful 
commissioners: 
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“I do think that primary care clinicians have got a big role to play and I am 
happy with them leading it … What I do expect of the primary care clinician 
(and the advantage of putting them in the leadership role) is to be responsible 
for the commissioning decisions that they take. And that’s not dissimilar to 
what I expect from a clinician in a hospital. They are making resource 
decisions all the time … based on clinical need and clinical practice. What you 
need is to have those two things aligned … And actually, because I don’t 
expect a clinician to be an accountant any more than a clinician would expect 
me to be a doctor, the best bit is the marrying up of those qualities and 
attributes in an appropriate organisational form” (Quote 46).  
 
The managers and accountants quoted in this section tended to see hybridity as a matter of 
“values” (Quote 45), “qualities” (Quote 46) and “attributes” (Ibid.). Clinicians are now 
making new types of large-scale resource allocation and de-commissioning decisions. Only 
clinicians can speak for themselves in terms of their professional identity or professional self-
understanding; so, let us now turn to some views expressed by clinicians themselves.  
 
7.5.2. Views from the clinicians 
 
Interviewee Q shared a similar view to the one of Interviewee R with respect to GPs 
traditionally being businessmen and businesswomen on a micro, not macro, level: 
“I think it’s especially difficult if you just come from general practice where 
you have an organisation that you can understand from top to bottom almost 
… you can have the control of pretty much everything. To come into a larger 
organisation [a CCG] where you have to have systems and processes you trust 
and you can’t … possibly have an oversight of everything” (Quote 47). 
 
 
Interviewee S noted that having ‘managerially competent clinicians’ and ‘clinically 
competent managers’ was a good perspective to have in healthcare: 
“[A] long time ago … I went to a meeting where people talked about 
managerially competent clinicians and clinically competent managers and I 
think that actually works really well. If you’ve got people who can understand 
the drive of what the clinicians want and then can put that into place, those are 
very good managers. And if you’ve got clinicians who understand some of the 
limitations of what managers can do, then that would serve you well, too. But 
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if you don’t have that, then you end up with everyone being unhappy ‘cause 
you can’t deliver anything” (Quote 48). 
 
 
Some interviewees signaled that there was a lack of interest among clinicians in undertaking 
commissioning leadership roles: 
“Well, they [GPs] are not particularly interested in it [commissioning]. 
Nobody, you know, as part of your training this isn’t part of what you learn … 
When you sign up to do general practice, this isn’t part of what you sign up to 
do. You sign up to provide healthcare to people in primary care. You don’t … 
sign up for this. This is a government initiative. It’s not what we learned at 
medical school … Hm, I think, certainly locally, we are finding that a number 
of people who are towards the end of their work as clinicians have been doing 
this [commissioning], I mean, our governing body is quite heavily towards the 
end of their working period … rather than new people coming through and 
we’ve had to work quite hard to try and see if people are interested and 
involved. And that’s partly just from a time point of view, I think, and they are 
making the time commitment” (Interviewee S; Quote 49). 
 
Others seemed to welcome the commissioning challenge as an opportunity. The words, 
“When you sign up to do general practice, this isn’t part of what you sign up to do … This is 
a government initiative” (Quote 49) speak to the fact that perhaps clinicians don’t identify 
strongly with their new hybrid responsibilities. Commissioning has been imposed on them 
from the top down. The GPs who are at an earlier stage of their careers are perhaps too 
hesitant to embrace too many new to them tasks, including commissioning. 
 
Interviewee Q shared, “It is a … challenge, I think, inevitably, you know, trying to do two 
things part time, having 2-3 quarter-time jobs” (Quote 50). No matter what the challenges, 
Interviewee O noticed a deep change in his professional identity due to his hybrid role: 
“[A]bout the change in … [my] identity … absolutely yes! It [CCG 
commissioning] has changed my identity fundamentally. So, although I 
remain a practicing clinician locally, I see myself as a system leader for the 
local health service and I think that’s a really profound, important change. And 
hopefully, what my colleagues see is if they are not the leaders of the system, 
they certainly have a contribution to making the whole system work well and 
the responsibility to ensure that it happens. And they do that either by coming 
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and participating in some of that leadership (which you know a number of 
them do) or by allowing us to do it as their representatives. I think that, you 
know, the kind of mandating process by the [GP] practices is really quite 
important to us. Even if they are not actively participating, they are permitting 
and that’s quite an important contribution, as well.” (Quote 51). 
 
Interviewee T, when asked whether he had experienced a deep identity change or just a 
superficial role change, shared: 
“It’s about half way between the two. I do feel like I would walk away from it 
sometimes and do the clinical role again, more full time, but at the same time I 
do spend a lot of my own time thinking about the issues that we are trying to 
deal with. It’s not just in meetings and then I leave the office and forget about 
it. It’s not like that at all. So, it’s quite interesting. Some of it is just a role 
change and you could quite easily see the role could change back … There is 
something more than that, actually. It’s a bit more [thinking]. For example, the 
leadership aspect of the role is a completely brand-new one and if you don’t 
identify with it to some extent, then that’s a, potentially, could be a difficult 
aspect of the job. So, that’s, a relatively, obviously, relatively fundamental 
thing, really, in terms of identity, self-identity … It’s not a superficial thing. I 
think you have to … you have to care about what it is that you are trying to do. 
At times, it’s stressful. So, you have to actually have a degree of an emotional 
investment, I think. Otherwise, you just don’t bother doing it” (Quote 52).  
 
The last six quotes expressed a variety of views on clinicians’ hybrid identities as doctors and 
commissioners. The clinicians were both skeptical and optimistic vis-à-vis the hybrid role 
identity of GPs as commissioners and clinicians. Interviewee O for instance had experienced 
‘a really profound, important change’ in his professional identity because of this dual role.  
 
7.5.3. Observation of conferences and meetings  
 
The observational data seemed to confirm the fact that the dual medical-commissioning 
identity was present indeed. In the CCG meetings, it would have been difficult to know who 
exactly the managers and the physicians in the boards were without seeing the name tags of 
the board members and the abbreviation ‘Dr.’ Both groups spoke the same language of 
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business and healthcare. Perhaps, the fact that clinicians spoke just like managers meant that 
CCG clinicians had acquired a new identity? At the NHS conferences, there were many 
clinicians who spoke with conviction, pride and enthusiasm about their CCGs’ new 
achievements. They talked about their challenges with concern. These feelings of pride, 
enthusiasm, and concern were also perhaps indications of the presence of a new identity. 
Otherwise, why invest emotionally in CCGs, as Interviewee T said?  
 
7.6. Conclusion 
 
Chapter 7 presented and briefly analysed excerpts from the primary and secondary data 
collected in the course of this research. The data presented were the result of the data coding 
and data reduction processes described in Chapter 6. Sometimes, the quotes from the 
interviews were not shortened too much. They were intentionally kept long, so that to provide 
a richer basis for analysis and discussion. Shortening a quote excessively would take away 
from its contextuality, if was believed. The interview data was quoted according to two 
groups – 1) the clinicians and 2) the managers and accountants. The next chapter will 
concentrate on a further discussion of the primary and secondary data, given the theoretical 
framework from Figure 4 and the data analysis rationale from Figure 5. Chapter 8 will answer 
the four research questions posed in Chapter 1 and delineate the contributions of this 
research. 
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CHAPTER 8 
DISCUSSION 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
Chapter 8 provides a further discussion on the data presented and analysed in Chapter 7. As 
already mentioned, this research is an elaboration of an existing theory, the ILT, and Peter 
Miller’s concept of ‘calculative practices.’ It aims to increase understanding of the research 
subjects – clinicians in CCGs. This discussion chapter weaves together the information 
already presented in the previous chapters and may be seen as the culmination of this 
research. First, this chapter answers the four research questions originally asked in Chapter 1 
– RQs 1 to 4. It is important to note that the answers given are not the only possible answers 
to these research questions. This is due to the qualitative nature of this research and the 
interpretivist ontology that was assumed, an ontology which is based on subjectivity and 
personal interpretation. Second, this chapter lists in a table format some additional data, 
findings and contributions. These contributions are contributions to current policy/legislation 
and practice. They came up incidentally from the research data. Many of the interview quotes 
supporting these unforeseen in the beginning of the research contributions came from the 
unstructured part of the interviews, for instance from answers to interview question 11 (see 
Table 4).  
 
8.2. Answer to RQ 1 
 
The first research question (RQ 1) was, ‘How appropriate is it for clinicians to be involved in 
CCG acute care commissioning?’ This question will be answered based on documents’ 
content analysis and the interview and observational data from section 7.2.  
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First, according to the two government documents examined – the white paper (DH, 2010a) 
and the HSCA 2012 – the answer to RQ 1 would be that it is very appropriate for clinicians, 
mostly GPs, to be involved in CCG acute care commissioning, a set of calculative and other 
practices, as we saw in Chapters 1 and 4. In section 7.2.1, family doctors were found to be 
‘best placed’ for commissioning, according to the white paper. This document stated that 
doctors and nurses had to use their ‘professional judgement about what … [was] right for 
patients’ and that trusting these professionals would ‘drive up standards.’ Besides, GPs were 
seen as ‘the healthcare professionals closest to the patients.’ GPs ‘coordinate all the services 
that patients receive, helping them to navigate the system…’  By mandating a membership in 
a CCG for all GPs in England via the HSCA 2012, the Coalition government once again 
expressed the idea that it was highly appropriate for clinicians to be involved in acute care 
commissioning. The government did not loosen its stance on commissioning by possibly 
allowing GPs to opt out of membership. In this way, it reinforced its idea that clinicians were 
very appropriately placed to commission care. By ensuring that a CCG’s ‘capital [and 
revenue] resource use … [did] not exceed the amount specified by direction of the Board…’ 
(examples of calculative requirements), the Coalition government pledged its faith in the 
calculative abilities of CCGs. Moreover, CCGs should provide ‘good value for money’ and 
its accounts should be ‘audited,’ according to the HSCA 2012.   
 
Second, according to the managers and accountants interviewed, the answer to RQ 1 would 
be less straightforward than according to the two documents examined above. The answer 
would perhaps be that it is questionable whether clinicians should be involved in acute care 
commissioning. The reasons for this conclusion are that in section 7.2.2 GPs were seen by 
several managers and accountants as having ‘no [business training than some kind of 
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corporate development support,’ as ‘quite inexperienced’ in commissioning, as involved in 
‘silo gazing,’ as not ‘all at one voice,’ and as ‘very competitive’ with one another. 
Interviewee H saw this involvement as good in theory, but not so much in practice (Quote 1). 
Thus, based on the interview data, the managers and accountants interviewed did seem to 
share the view that it is challenging and perhaps not very appropriate for clinicians to be 
involved in leadership roles in CCG acute care commissioning. 
 
Third, according to the clinicians quoted in section 7.2.3, the answer to RQ 1 would be that it 
is not very clear whether it is appropriate for clinicians to be involved in acute care 
commissioning. This is to say that there were views that evoked either perceptions of 
appropriateness or inappropriateness of involvement. For example, Interviewee A in Quote 9 
suggested that it would be appropriate for clinicians to be involved in acute care 
commissioning because more “financial responsibility” was now placed in their hands than 
before; because of this, now they thought more carefully before referring a patient to 
expensive acute care. Interviewee O also spoke about clinicians’ responsibility for the “whole 
… health system” (Quote 10) and emphasised the fact that partnerships between “clinical 
leaders and expert managers,” not just clinicians, were important to CCG commissioning. 
Clinicians, therefore, were found to not be alone in commissioning. Interviewees O and E, 
respectively, spoke about the challenges that made clinicians’ involvement difficult – the 
disintegration of commissioning (‘[N]ow we can only influence parts of it [commissioning]’) 
– and the lack of management training among GPs (‘Doctors are not trained in financial 
management and therefore … have only a limited capacity in these Clinical Commissioning 
Groups’).   
 
Fourth, based on the observation of CCG meetings and NHS conferences in section 7.2.4, the 
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answer to RQ 1 would be that it is very appropriate for clinicians, mostly GPs, to be involved 
in acute care commissioning. The observational data spoke to the fact that many of the 
clinicians who had assumed leadership roles in the CCGs observed and many of the clinicians 
who attended the three NHS conferences were the right people to be involved in 
commissioning: they talked about financial numbers and budgets with great ease, they made 
use of accounting and business vocabulary and answered both finance- and business-related 
questions from the public with remarkable competence. It would have been hard to know for 
example who the managers and the clinicians in the boards of governors were, had their 
names and titles not been written down on plates in front of them.  
 
The conclusions from the three methods seem to be divergent. The government and the 
researcher tended to lean toward appropriateness, while the people directly affected by CCG 
commissioning – the NHS managers, accountants, and clinicians – had more diverse views. 
The managers and accountants tended to be the most skeptical ones. Maybe because the 
government and the researcher were not directly involved in commissioning on a day-to-day-
basis, they tended to be more idealistic and perceived the involvement as very appropriate. 
From the interviews, the traditional professional/medical logic to which GPs have always 
adhered seemed to be perceived as both in conflict (Quotes 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 13) and in 
harmony (Quotes 9, 10, 12, and the observational data) with the new macro-level CCG 
governance/leadership logic and the neo-liberal business logic (see Figure 6).   
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8.3. Answer to RQ 2 
 
The second research question (RQ 2) was, ‘What motivates clinicians to assume leadership 
roles in CCGs?’ This question will be answered based on the interview and observational 
data from section 7.3. Before presenting the data on motivation, Chapter 7 discussed 
clinicians’ backgrounds, i.e. training and work history, in section 7.3.1. It became clear that 
there was a continuity of involvement in CCG commissioning by the same medics who had 
been involved in prior forms of commissioning. 
 
First, according to the clinicians quoted in section 7.3.2.1, the answer to RQ 2 would be that 
among the things that motivate clinicians to assume leadership roles in CCGs is a variety of 
factors: a liking for the “politics of medicine” (Quote 21), a desire to keep one’s “enthusiasm 
going” (Quote 22), and a desire to volunteer because “nobody else did” (Quote 23) and a 
desire to make a positive difference in many patients’ lives. All these motivators appear to be 
others-centred, rather than self-centred. Most clinicians appeared to have joined their CCG 
leaderships out of a genuine desire to contribute to the improvement of health services in 
their geographical areas.  
 
Second, according to the managers and accountants quoted in section 7.3.2.2, the answer to 
RQ 2 would be that what motivates clinician-leaders is the monetary compensation. 
Interviewee H mentioned a “£150-200 an hour … to take part in meetings” (Quote 25). 
Interviewee R said that GPs were “socially conscious when it … [suited] them” and that there 
was a “public perception about GPs doing it [commissioning] for the money” (Quote 27). 
The clinicians interviewed presented more idealistic views on their sources of motivation, 
while the managers and accountants expressed some more skeptical views. Of course, the 
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money motivator and the large-scale social good motivator are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. They may walk hand in hand, as long as they are reasonable and help toward the 
common good of the NHS.  
 
Third, based on the observation of CCG meetings and NHS conferences in section 7.3.2.3, 
the answer to RQ 2 would be that what motivates clinicians to assume leadership roles is 
probably a sincere concern to hear views from a diverse body of the public, including the 
frail and vulnerable. One CCG had arranged for the free transportation of those without 
means of transportation who wanted to attend the CCG meeting. The clinicians observed at 
the meetings and conferences also showed that they really cared. Perhaps, they were 
motivated by a desire to contribute to the wellbeing of their local populations? 
 
The conclusions from the three methods seem to be divergent, just like in RQ 1’s case. The 
managers and accountants expressed some skeptical views about the motivation of GPs (the 
good monetary compensation), while the clinicians and the researcher saw less self-centred 
motivators. If the money motivator was indeed a factor, most likely the clinicians would not 
have confessed this in an interview out of confidentiality or discreetness. In the UK, personal 
money matters are usually considered a taboo.  
 
The professional logic was found to be in harmony with the governance and business logics, 
according to the clinicians (Quotes 21, 22, 23, and 24) and the researcher’s observation, since 
their motivations were found to be mostly positive and altruistic in this new governance, 
professional, and economic arrangement, the CCG. The business logic (personal profit) was 
found to be taking the upper hand via the governance logic, according to the managers and 
accountants (Quotes 26 and 27). The governance logic was mentioned here because CCG 
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leadership (a governance structure) was conductive to this private gain. It would be wrong to 
claim that the business logic was found to take the upper hand over the professional logic 
since a doctor may be highly paid and still care well for patients. In sum, the professional, 
business, and governance logics were found to be in harmony but sometimes in disbalance 
(see Figure 6). 
 
8.4. Answer to RQ 3 
 
The third research question (RQ 3) was, ‘How involved are clinicians in CCG calculative 
practices?’ This question will be answered based on the interview and observational data 
from section 7.4.  
 
First, according to the managers and accountants cited in section 7.4.1, clinicians were 
involved partially and to various degrees in CCG calculative practices. Interviewee H said 
that clinicians were not involved at all in financial accounting practices, such as the 
preparation of financial reports and accounts since this task was “contracted out to CSUs” 
(Quote 28). Clinicians were found to be more involved in budget allocations and other 
management accounting activities than in financial accounting ones. They worked as 
members of a team where calculative practices would be the realm of Finance Directors 
(Quote 29). In Interviewee R’s view, the picture was “variable” (Quote 30), i.e. some GPs 
were more involved in calculative practices (for example, GP Practice Managers) than others. 
Interviewee I saw CSUs as “the only way forward under the current circumstances” (Quote 
32). Even though clinicians were found not to be left alone in CCG calculative practices and 
received a lot of help from experts, some of them had decided to withdraw from their CCG 
leadership due to the complexity of how “activity and financial flows happen” (Quote 33).    
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Second, according to the clinicians cited in section 7.4.2, clinicians were also involved 
partially in CCG calculative practices. Interviewee O for example shared that he did not 
“attempt to do the accountancy for the CCG, but … [he did] know how it … [was] done and 
… [he did] pay attention to the result of it as the leader of the CCG” (Quote 37). Interviewee 
Q said, “I don’t do the … operational budget setting but, actually, the high-level strategy” 
(Quote 38). Interviewee T mentioned in Quote 39 that clinicians were involved “to a limited 
extent” in CCG calculative practices. They were welcome to comment on the financial 
statements, line by line, as presented by the CFO. This interviewee continued, “We don’t of 
course do any of the technical parts of public sector accounting … There’s not really any 
reason why we shouldn’t do it if we were interested” (Quote 40). He saw calculative practices 
as an “enabler,” as a “means to an end” (Ibid.). Interviewee O brought up the point that even 
though calculative practices in CCG were performed mostly by non-clinicians, the 
responsibility and accountability still belonged to clinicians (Quote 41).  
 
Third, according to the observation of meetings and conferences in section 7.4.3, clinicians 
were also somewhat involved in CCG calculative practices: at some of the conferences 
attended, clinicians talked about their involvement in various calculative practices – Winter 
Pressures Fund allocations, health outcomes measurement, and others. This involvement 
appeared to be on a macro, leadership, and strategic level, rather than on a technical, 
operational level. For example, clinicians did not appear to be involved in the bookkeeping 
for the Winter Pressures Fund; instead, they were the ones who were involved in decisions on 
channelling this fund to the neediest departments of their health locales.  
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As Llewellyn (2001, p. 596) put it, “[N]ew cross-boundary tasks of budgeting, rationing, 
performance review and risk management have emerged.” Doubtlessly, GP-commissioners 
are not just low-level, operational managers (Fauré and Rouleau, 2011; Staehle and Schirmer, 
1992) or middle managers in healthcare commissioning (Buchanan et al., 2013; Checkland et 
al., 2013). They have higher-level, strategic responsibilities. It also looks like the job of the 
GP-commissioner is an ‘extreme’ job (Buchanan et al., 2013, p. 646), a job that requires long 
hours and working with “conflicting priorities, being required to do more with fewer 
resources, [and] responding to regulatory bodies.” Perhaps, Clark (2012, p. 437) is right in 
foretelling that, “the era of strong general management may be replaced by one where non-
clinical managers and clinicians work in partnership to optimise the different expertise, 
experience and values to achieve high quality, productive and patient-focused care.”  
 
In summary, based on the three methods, one can conclude that clinicians are partially and 
somehow involved (Quotes 37, 38, 39, 40, and the observational data) in the calculative 
practices of CCGs. They are involved to various degrees (Quotes 30, 31, and 33). They are 
also involved on a macro, strategic level, not so much on an operational level. Clinicians are 
greatly aided by CCG employees and CSUs (Quotes 28, 32, and 41). Therefore, the dynamics 
between the professional, business, and governance logics here are in harmony thanks to the 
great cooperation of different agents in CCGs (see Figure 6).  
 
8.5. Answer to RQ 4 
 
The fourth research question (RQ 4) was, ‘To what extent do hybridity and calculative 
practices affect clinicians’ professional identities in CCGs?’ This question will be answered 
based on the interview and observational data from section 7.5.   
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According to the managers and accountants (see section 7.5.1), the answer to RQ 4 would be 
that hybridity and calculative practices affect clinicians’ professional identities in CCGs to a 
large extent – from a micro-level identity towards a more macro-level identity. These are 
clinicians’ identities perceived by others (the managers and accountants). GPs in the English 
NHS are businessmen and businesswomen “in micro-businesses … [and are] business-like 
and … financially aware, but in a small business setting as providers” (Quote 42). 
Traditionally, they have thought on a smaller scale, while now they have to get used to 
“thinking big” (Ibid.). GPs “are used to leading something different” and now “we expect 
them to be corporate people” (Quote 43). Thus, their micro-level business identity as small 
business owners is seen by outsiders as changing towards the more macro-level business 
identity of CCG commissioners. One’s identity is closely linked to one’s values and beliefs. 
Interviewee N shared that in his opinion, “these particular GPs who … [were] actively 
involved [in CCGs] … would tend to be in the minority and would … probably … value 
management a bit more and probably would be very concerned about the money…” (Quote 
45). Interviewee P shared that he did not “expect a clinician to be an accountant any more 
than a clinician would expect … [him] to be a doctor, the best bit … [was] the marrying up of 
those qualities and attributes…” (Quote 46). Thus, certain foundations of one’s identity – 
values and beliefs, such as the belief in the usefulness of management – reinforced the new 
macro-level professional identity of some GPs commissioners.   
 
According to the clinicians (see section 7.5.2), the answer to RQ 4 would be that hybridity 
and calculative practices affect clinicians’ professional identities in CCGs to various degrees. 
The focus here is not identifying oneself with a particular CCG, i.e. organisational identity 
(Hatch and Schultz, 2004; Kenny, Whittle and Willmott, 2011; Wetherell and Mohanty, 
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2010; Whetten and Godfrey, 1998), but identifying oneself with a profession/occupation – 
commissioner and clinician. How deep is GPs’ identity change – fleeting, ephemeral, and 
shallow (just another role to play) or deep and stable? Given the discussion on the evolution 
of identity studies in Chapter 4, the identity change of clinicians in CCGs tends to be perhaps 
still in the making because it is still relatively early into the reforms.  
 
Some clinicians thought of their hybrid roles as commissioners and medics as just a 
superficial role change imposed externally on them by the government, while others thought 
of it as a deep identity change, not just a role change. For instance, Interviewee Q talk about a 
shift in control – before the reforms, GPs felt like they had “control over pretty much 
everything [in their GP practices]” (Quote 47). Now, in CCGs, they could not “have an 
oversight of everything” (Ibid.). CCGs are much more complex in terms of activities and 
calculative practices than a GP surgery. Thus, the identity of GPs is probably becoming more 
versatile, while control over ‘everything’ is weakening. Interviewee S alluded to a superficial 
role change due to hybridity: “When you sign up to do general practice, this [commissioning] 
isn’t part of what you sign up to do … This is a government initiative” (Quote 49). She 
continued by saying that her CCG’s governing body was “quite heavily towards the end of 
their working period … rather than new people coming through…” (Ibid.). This lack of 
interest among young clinicians may be a sign that they do not strongly identify with a new 
commissioning role. This reform has been imposed from the top down and hence, this lack of 
enthusiasm may be indeed present among some clinicians.  
 
Opposite views were expressed by Interviewees O and T. Interviewee O responded: “[CCG 
commissioning] has changed my identity fundamentally” (Quote 51). He added that, “[e]ven 
if they [some GPs] … [were] not actively participating [in commissioning], they … [were] 
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permitting [other GPs to lead commissioning] and that’s quite an important contribution” 
(Ibid.). Interviewee T felt “about half way between the two [between a just role change and a 
deep identity change]” (Quote 52). He felt like walking “away from it [commissioning] 
sometimes and do the clinical role again, more full time, but at the same time … [he did] 
spend a lot of … his own time thinking about … [commissioning]” (Ibid.). He mentioned that 
he didn’t just think about these issues in the office and forget all about them at home. “Some 
of it is just a role change … There is something more than that, actually” (Ibid.). Interviewee 
T thus felt that his hybrid role and the commissioning, calculative activities he was involved 
in did change his professional identity in ways deeper than just superficial.   
 
The clinicians in the study didn’t seem to see clinicians’ identity as put at risk, “destabilized” 
(Kornberger, Justesen and Mouritsen, 2011, p. 514) or debased, but as enabled by the CCG 
reforms. So, the usual focus of the literature on ‘identity threats’ (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; 
Elsbach and Kramer, 1996) was not found to be present here. None of the clinicians 
interviewed saw himself or herself as less of a medic and to the detriment of his or her 
professional identity or status. Rather, a new ‘identity opportunity’ (Pouthier, Steele and 
Ocasio, 2013), not an ‘identity threat,’ was sensed from the optimism with which many 
interviewees talked about their clinical input in CCG commissioning.  
 
Based on the observation of meetings and conferences (see section 7.5.3), the answer to RQ 4 
would be that hybridity and calculative practices affect clinicians’ professional identities in 
CCGs to a noticeable extent. This is so because while observing the CCG meetings and NHS 
conferences, it was clear for the researcher that clinicians talked like more than just 
clinicians; they talked like project managers or administrators. They discussed adhering to 
guidelines and protocol and it was generally hard to discern who the real managers and the 
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clinicians were in the room. Identity is a very personal thing, so whether the clinicians 
present were playing just a role and wearing just another hat or whether they felt a true 
change in their self-concept deep inside was difficult to know for sure.    
 
In the future, even more changes to the roles and responsibilities of GP commissioners are 
expected (Holder et al., 2015; Naylor et al., 2013; NHS England et al., 2015). Speaking of 
the recently announced ‘co-commissioning’ initiative of some parts of primary care between 
CCGs and NHS England, more changes are immanent. In co-commissioning, there will be a 
significant expansion of GP roles within CCGs. Clinicians may face enhanced conflicts of 
interest (Holder et al., 2015). One of the findings from the case study approach undertaken in 
this last source is that clinical involvement in CCGs is at risk of being unsustainable, given 
the “waning levels” (p. 4) of GP leaders’ engagement in CCGs. Besides, this study noticed a 
problem with the recruitment and retention of GP leaders in CCGs, as well as time and 
capacity constraints. Many GPs will soon reach the end of their CCG appointments and may 
get attracted to posts within provider organisations, claims the source. A good example of this 
is the recent move of the Clinical Chief Officer of the North-East Essex CCG, Dr. Shane 
Gordon, to serve as the Chief Operating Officer of the Colchester Hospital University FT 
(Welikala, 2015a).  
 
It is unclear what will become of commissioning hybrid identities in the future. GP-
commissioners are becoming ‘1st order policy recipients’ and ‘2nd order change agents’ of 
institutional change (McDermott, Fitzgerald and Buchanan, 2013). They receive policy from 
central government and have to make it work on a local level. Their ‘dispersed’ or 
‘distributed’ and ‘encompassing’ leadership may involve “leaderism [which is] a new form of 
privileged agency” (O’Reilly and Reed, 2011, p. 1079). 
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To sum up the above, it is ambiguous whether GPs in CCGs are experiencing a deep identity 
change or a shallow role change due to their hybridity and exposure to calculative practices. 
The extent of the effect of hybridity and calculative practices on their professional identities 
is hard to know exactly since identity is very personal and difficult to observe from outside. 
Yet, there is plenty of evidence that this extent is rather high (Quotes 45, 51, 52, and the 
observational data). Even though Quote 49 mentioned just a role change (since this is just a 
fleeting government initiative, in Interviewee S’s opinion) and even though Interview H 
mentioned about CCG clinicians stepping down, similar quotes were relatively rare. The 
business logic here seems to take up a new shape (from a micro to a macro level) since GPs 
now have to “think… big” (Quote 42). They are still business people but a different kind of 
business people. The professional logic (traditional medical identities) seems to be 
metamorphosing as well thanks to the new governance logic (CCG leadership duties) and the 
reshaped business logic. Thus, these three logics are in flux; their boundaries are 
metamorphosing (see Figure 6).    
 
8.6. Contribution to policy and legislation 
 
Now that the four research questions have been answered (hopefully, a meaningful 
contribution to knowledge and understanding of GPs in CCGs), this research will try to make 
a further contribution – to policy/legislation. This contribution is incidental to this research 
and transpired mostly from the unstructured part of the interviews; for example, from 
responses to the question about what else the interviewees wanted to share that was not 
already asked of them during the interviews (see Table 4).  
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The terms ‘policy’ and ‘legislation’ are not synonymous. Legislation is a statutory law passed 
through Parliament (the House of Commons and the House of Lords) that applies to the 
whole country (or parts of it), while policy is not voted by Parliament. Policy is organisation-
specific; it may be issued by a specific department, such as the DH, or by an organisation. 
Policy has a much lower authoritative status than legislation (Partington, 2014; Norton, 
2013). Table 8 summarises the three key contributions to policy/legislation that arose from 
this research. 
 
Table 8 
Contributions to policy/legislation 
      
Contribution to  Nature of the contribution  Relevant quotes from the data 
policy/legislation   to policy or legislation    
number     
 
    
           1 The research data suggest that 
legislation should be very 
carefully crafted in the future since 
it is harder to undo legislation 
compared to policy. 
 
Quote 53: “I think Andrew Lansley 
wanted to make sure that his reforms 
could not be undone, so I think (as 
you probably know that there are 
different ways of getting things done) 
he has, what he has done is, a lot of 
the reforms have been done using 
primary legislation which is very hard 
to undo. If you make something, you 
know, if you take something through 
Parliament and create primary 
legislation, it takes a lot to undo that, 
whereas getting GPs involved and 
making these reforms happen in a 
softer way is easily changed by policy 
as opposed by change to legislation. 
So, I think he’s done what he’s done 
because he’s made it very, very 
difficult, if not impossible, to change” 
(Quote) (Interviewee K). 
Quote 54: “It’s a law. Extraordinary! 
It’s an amendment to the NHS Act [of 
2006], the Health Reform Act” 
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(Interviewee H).  
Quote 55: “[S]peaking as somebody 
who works in the system, I think that 
we could have achieved greater and 
better GP involvement in 
commissioning without actually 
making these structural reforms that 
we did. So, I think … the objective 
could have been achieved without 
actually such wide-ranging reforms” 
(Interviewee K). 
Quote 56: “[I]f you’d asked me two 
years ago ‘Does commissioning need 
reforming?’ I would have said, ‘It 
needs improving.’ PCTs were very 
heavy on administration, very low on 
innovation and creativity or 
partnering. And so I would say the 
clinical input to commissioning 
needed to be increased at that time. 
So, I don’t think it needed reform but 
I think it needed improving. 
Obviously, Andrew Lansley decided it 
needed reforming … but I think the 
reforms that he has developed are 
correct in principle but we can argue 
about how effective they are in 
practice. So, in summary, PCTs could 
have been smaller and more clinically 
focused and more innovative than 
they were when Andrew Lansley was 
viewing the situation. Did they need 
wholesale reform? I would have 
thought not” (Interviewee J). 
Quote 57: “Could you have done it in 
a different way? Yes, you could have 
taken a Primary Care Trust and you 
could have structurally altered it, so it 
took far more managerial recognition 
of the views of its primary care 
clinicians. Could have done that, but 
that wasn’t really the nature of the 
beast. The nature of the beast was: 
reduce bureaucracy, get more 
clinicians involved in the decision-
making process, put them in charge of 
the money (the rhetoric could have 
said) and basically get rid of a load of 
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administration and management … so 
that locally clinicians were front and 
centre of the commissioning process” 
(Interviewee P).  
Quote 58: “Do I think they [the 
commissioning reforms] were 
necessary? No. And one of the 
reasons I don’t think they were 
necessary was because the Primary 
Care Trust was beginning to become a 
mature organisation. So, it’s quite a 
new organisation itself, but it was 
beginning to operate effectively as an 
organisation. So, at the point where 
the changes happened, it caused a lot 
of upheaval. And there are other ways 
of involving clinicians without 
completely changing the system” 
(Interviewee N). 
             2 Simplicity, rather than complexity 
in policy/legislation design, seems 
to create better receptivity by 
organisations. In addition, CCG 
commissioning loses its strategic 
scope by overdoing the localism 
agenda and fragmentation.  
Quote 59: “[W]e have a kind of 
complicated system in England, really 
… An example would be in [town X], 
if the local authority set up a service 
like re-enablement to support people 
coming out of hospital, if you have a 
local commissioning group that 
covers [county Y], those [county Y] 
residents wouldn’t be able to use that 
service. They would have to talk to 
[Y] County Council. And [Y] County 
Council would be talking to a 
different local commissioning group, 
so it gets very complicated. So … I 
think that kind of thing is an 
unintended consequence of allowing 
GPs the right to determine their own 
boundaries” (Interviewee N).  
Quote 60: “[T]he NHS is very, very 
complicated, particularly in terms of 
how the activity and financial flows 
happen and it takes a great deal of 
commitment and time to do it. So, I 
don’t blame GPs for deciding (some 
of them), starting to decide that it’s 
not really the sort of thing they want 
to do” (Interviewee H).  
Quote 61: “So, I would much rather 
210 
 
 
 
have inherited the end-to-end 
responsibility of the PCT but with that 
requirement that it is the responsibility 
of the local clinicians to make it work. 
And then we would make sure that we 
have the managerial expertise in the 
organisation to discharge that 
responsibility. But we would then 
have been able to influence the whole 
system, whereas now we can only 
influence parts of it … [F]or example 
we don’t commission general practice, 
we don’t commission specialist 
services, we don’t commission 
forensic services, things like that. And 
all of those have an impact. It’s not, 
none of these exist in isolation, they 
all interrelate. The problem at the 
moment is that my priorities as a 
commissioner may not align with the 
priorities of the commissioners for the 
other system (parts of the system) but 
impact my population. So, public 
health going off to local government 
for example has created a big 
disconnect in what was a very 
successful strategy between public 
health and health services’ 
commissioning, where the PCT quite 
rightly had chosen to put more 
investment in public health than 
elsewhere. But what’s happened is 
that then disappeared out of our 
control” (Interviewee O). 
Quote 62: “So, when I was here 
before [under the PCT system], I had 
all this money. So, if I took an 
example of … commissioning for 
coronary heart disease, I had all the 
money for smoking cessation, I had 
all the money for primary care 
doctors, if they get in prescribing … I 
had all the money for (when you go 
into hospital, you get your echo, your 
cardiac catheterisation) and all the 
money for heart/lung transplant. So, if 
you had a coronary heart disease 
problem, we commissioned the whole 
array of services end-to-end. Now, 
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smoking cessation’s public health and 
council, primary care’s NHS England, 
hospital care and rehabilitation – the 
CCG, complicated care (tertiary care) 
is NHS England. Three separate 
organisations now commissioning 
that. And that’s complicated, I think, 
compared to what it used to be. But, 
you know, we live with it” 
(Interviewee R).  
Quote 63: “[I]t’s a variable picture. 
It’s too early yet to see very clearly. 
We are only six months into the 
reforms but at the moment the 
evidence we’ve got is that there is 
instability in the system through the 
sheer number of CCGs, I mean, 
there’s over 200 nationally and quite a 
few of them are significantly 
financially challenged. So, if you look 
at London, for example, out of 32 
CCGs … 9 or 10 of them have 
significant financial challenge. So, 
and nationally between 25 and 30% of 
CCGs are in a spot of financial 
trouble. And they are gonna find it 
difficult to work their way out of that. 
So, the problem, the structural 
problem with the reform, is that CCGs 
are not big enough to act as the place 
for strategic change and yet they have 
obstacles in front of them to working 
strategically with their neighbouring 
CCGs. So, they are accountable to 
their management bodies, for 
example. So, I can think of very real 
situations where you’ve got 
neighbouring CCGs, one of whom is 
rich and the other one poor, and the 
rich one does not want to work 
strategically with the poor one 
because it fears having their money 
taken, a risk share” (Interviewee H).  
Quote 64: “What I am absolutely sure 
[of] is we have too many CCGs … 
But I think you need to bring CCGs 
together” (Interviewee P). 
Quote 65: “The money and the need 
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to commission certain things or some 
of the decisions around 
commissioning need to be done at 
scale. But you can do that without 
removing the clinical leadership piece. 
That’s the big keep” (Interviewee P). 
             3 The partnership between clinicians 
and managers is a sensible idea 
and should be fostered in the 
future. 
Quote 66: “[W]hat we find is that it is 
a partnership between clinical leaders 
and expert managers and it doesn’t 
work with one or the other on their 
own. It has to be that synergy” 
(Interviewee O).  
Quote 67: “And actually, because I 
don’t expect a clinician to be an 
accountant any more than a clinician 
would expect me to be a doctor, the 
best bit is the marrying up of those 
qualities and attributes [managerial 
and clinical] in an appropriate 
organisational form” (Interviewee P). 
Quote 68: “[A] long time ago … I 
went to a meeting where people talked 
about managerially competent 
clinicians and clinically competent 
managers and I think that actually 
works really well” (Interviewee S). 
Quote 69: “[A]s Chair of the board … 
I don’t do the, you wouldn’t do the 
operational budget setting but, 
actually, the high-level strategy is 
clearly, you know, something that I’d 
lead a team on, developing that … I 
mean, actually, one of the things that 
I’ve put in my personal development 
plan this year for my appraisal is to 
get greater insight into the accounting 
processes … Hm, you know, because 
I see that as a definite educational 
need in this role…” (Interviewee Q). 
Quote 70: “I read a paper in the BMJ 
[British Medical Journal], I think it 
might have been, a few years ago 
which was looking at risk tolerance 
and risk management behaviours in 
the different groups, I mean managers 
vs. doctors, and they do have a 
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The first contribution to policy/legislation in the above table consists of the following: the 
research data suggest that legislation should be very carefully crafted in the future since it is 
harder to undo legislation compared to policy. Six relevant quotes from the interviews are 
presented in Table 8 in support of this first contribution.   
 
Primary legislation consists of statutory laws, i.e. bills that have passed through Parliament, 
such as the HSCA 2012. Legislation may be primary (acts of Parliament which were 
proposed bills before becoming acts) or secondary (statutory instruments and regulations). 
According to Partington (2014, p. 42), secondary legislation, “is not subject to the full 
parliamentary scrutiny that a bill faces” and “[t]he process of amending legislation is usually 
done by passing a new Act that alters an Act already on the statute book. Thus amending 
different approach to risk 
management … So, doctors tend to be 
much more risk tolerant than 
managers. Managers tend to manage 
risk by, by planning, by consultation, 
by collective decision making, 
whereas doctors would manage it 
through autonomous decision making, 
you know, reference to their own 
knowledge, sometimes reference to 
external sources of knowledge, but by 
and large shoulder the decision 
making on an individual basis, 
whereas managers tend to do it on a 
group basis. And I think that 
characterises some of the difference in 
style. And that’s why this bit is such 
an important partnership between 
managers and doctors because 
sometimes the managers stop me from 
making rash decisions on an 
individual basis and sometimes I cut 
through some of their bureaucracy and 
obfuscation that group behaviour 
provides. So, it’s quite a good 
tension” (Interviewee O).  
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legislation must take its turn in finding a slot in the legislative programme” (p. 43).  
 
As illustrated in Table 8, using policy, rather than legislation, to institute change is preferable, 
according to many research subjects since legislation cannot be altered by simple policy 
change, but only by new legislation. Moreover, the creation of new legislation is a lengthy 
and expensive route to reform. In support of this first contribution to policy/legislation, 
Timmins (2013, pp. 37-38), a source recommended by Interviewee K, purports:  
“Crucially, this would all be laid down in legislation, and in a way that, 
without further legislation, would tie the hands of both the current health 
secretary and his successors … So it had all to be put into legislation to nail it 
down, to ensure that the next secretary of state could not just come along and 
change it without fresh legislation. “The evidence of the past was very clear,” 
Lansley says. “That because of the nature of the [existing] legislation, you 
change the secretary of state and you can change the policy on virtually 
everything in the NHS.””  
 
In support of this first contribution, Ham et al. (2015, p. 9), a publication by the King’s Fund, 
write the following regarding the recent top-down NHS reforms: “The implication of these 
decisions [the HSCA 2012] was that the NHS would be required to undertake major 
structural change even though the programme for government – and, indeed, Conservative 
politicians when in opposition [during the New Labour government] – had promised to avoid 
this.” This fundamental restructuring expressed in “root and branch changes” was done at a 
time when “funding pressures began to bite,” while it would have been more reasonable, the 
source states, if “existing arrangements” had been used instead (Ibid.).  
 
Thinking of Miller’s theoretical work mentioned earlier in this research, one may see CCG 
commissioning as indeed a ‘technology’ of government (Miller, 1990), i.e. a set of 
“calculations, procedures and mechanisms” (p. 317). Technologies are used by the state to 
make the programmatic aspect of government “operable in principle” (Ibid.). This 
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programmatic aspect is the “abstract aims” (Ibid.) that the state had in mind when it legislated 
the latest commissioning reforms – excellent health outcomes, patient-centred services, cost 
effectiveness, etc. By legislating the reforms, the government reinforced these abstract aims 
and made the reforms very hard to undo. Even though many interviewees perceived the large 
scale of the commissioning reform as not very necessary (Interviewees K, H, J, P, and N), 
CCG commissioning, a technology of government, was imposed on the NHS from the top 
down. The political logic shattered the arena of commissioning in a powerful, gargantuan 
way and moulded the governance logic, so that the medical/professional logic became more 
business-like.  
 
The second contribution to policy/legislation that this research puts forward is: simplicity, 
rather than complexity in policy/legislation design, seems to create better receptivity by 
organisations. In addition, CCG commissioning loses its strategic scope by overdoing the 
localism agenda and fragmentation (Table 8). Support for this second contribution comes not 
only from the interview data, but also from the practitioner literature. Partially in an effort to 
enhance the strategic scope of CCG commissioning, three CCGs were recently announced to 
be joining one another in the first CCG merger since CCGs became statutory bodies – the 
Gateshead, Newcastle North and East, and Newcastle West CCGs (West, 2014). Another 
example from the recent past of an effort not to overdo the localism agenda is the recently 
signed agreement on the Manchester devolution project (Williams, 2015). This article states:  
“A memorandum of understanding, which was leaked in draft form two days 
ago, has now been signed by 12 clinical commissioning groups, 15 NHS 
providers, 10 councils, NHS England, the chancellor George Osborne and 
health secretary Jeremy Hunt … The agreement covers the entire health and 
social care system in Greater Manchester, including primary care and social 
care, mental health, acute and community services, and public health.” 
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This agreement represents an effort toward the local integration of these services. The 
devolvement of financial responsibility to local level has always been about both financial 
freedom and constraints (Laughlin et al., 1994). Yet, as suggested by the research data, local 
freedom and constraints should not overshadow the national strategy for the NHS. Both local 
vision and national strategy are equally important, as Interviewee S shared. This second 
contribution may be seen as an aspiration towards more simplicity and complementarity in 
the interrelationship among institutional logics, be they the business, professional, 
governance or the political one.  
 
The third contribution to policy/legislation consists of the following: the partnership between 
clinicians and managers is a sensible idea and should be fostered in the future (Table 8). Even 
though Bååthe and Norbäck (2013) write about clinicians and managers as having different 
mindsets or identities (physicians ‘cure’ and managers ‘control’) the interview data seemed to 
suggest that a partnership between the two groups was essential. The above authors call this 
partnership ‘organisational development work.’ Fitzgerald et al. (2013) also note a link 
between distributed/dispersed leadership and service improvement outcomes, thanks to the 
collaboration of managers, clinical hybrids, and other actors.  
 
An online survey from January 2015, entitled Change Challenge
39
 and administered by the 
Health Service Journal, Nursing Times, and NHS Improving Quality, aimed to identify how 
the NHS could achieve change, while challenging top-down leadership. More than 1,500 
people from within and outside the NHS participated in the first stage of the survey and made 
more than 7,000 contributions, the source claims. Many of the contributions to the Change 
Challenge addressed the often times strained relationship between NHS physicians and 
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 Available at: <https://changechallenge.clevertogether.com/> [Accessed 1 March 2015].   
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managers. For instance, a clinician posted a comment that mangers, mostly at the senior level, 
should come to the hospital wards and see for themselves what it was like to work there. This 
clinician wrote that he/she would welcome his or her NHS trust’s Chief Executive to come on 
a shift with him or her. Maybe then, continued the clinician, this executive would truly 
understand the pressures on the frontline and maybe then things might progress better.   
 
Box-ticking and targets are commonly used tools for performance evaluation (Townley, 
1997), consultant appraisal for medical licence revalidation (McGivern and Ferlie, 2007), and 
hospital appraisal. Box-ticking tends to be a process that may alienate clinicians from the 
managers who performance-manage them perhaps against too unrealistic standards. 
Managers have often been accused of not knowing the real pressures on the frontline. Also, 
the negative effects of the sometimes “clumsy use of performance management systems” 
(Arnaboldi, Lapsley and Steccolini, 2015, p. 1) have been observed in the public sector. This 
clumsy use may cause additional tensions between clinicians and managers.  
 
The dual role of the commissioning GP hybrid is central to the working harmony between the 
two camps – clinicians and managers. Recently, some distinguished NHS leaders called for 
more respect for NHS managers in the upcoming at the time elections campaign via an open 
letter (HSJ News, 2014): 
“In our experience, NHS managers are as dedicated to the service as any other 
group of staff. We find it regrettable, therefore, that they are so often the 
subject of ill judged criticism and made scapegoats when concerns arise. This 
is both unfair and damaging to the interests of patients since successful joint 
working between managerial and clinical staff is an essential ingredient of 
good care.”  
 
The letter was signed by Dr. Mark Porter, Chair of Council (BMA), Dr. Maureen Baker, 
Chair (Royal College of GPs), Alan Milburn, former Secretary of State for Health, and 
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several other signatories. In line with the expectations of the neo-liberalist literature on de-
centralisation and governing ‘at a distance’ (Pollitt, 2005; Rubin and Kelly, 2005), clinicians, 
and not mangers, were the Coalition government’s chosen actors to entrust with 
commissioning duties. Perhaps, because managers in PCTs were perceived by the 
government as people who were doing a poor job with the NHS (consistent with the quote 
above), their commissioning duties were taken away and placed in the hands of GPs. This 
was probably done because of the overall culture of mistrust in NHS managers. Clinicians 
initially did not welcome the changes: Timmins (2013) writes that the Royal College of GPs 
and the Royal College of Nursing were both strongly opposed to the proposed at the time 
commissioning reforms. Later, coerced by the new law, GPs embraced their new roles as 
CCG commissioners – some directly as leaders, others indirectly as contributors.  
 
To nurture a good working relationship, it is a wise idea to start the relationship as early as 
possible and have an open communication. Ahmed-Little (2013) gives the following example 
of establishing a good working relationship between NHS clinicians and managers from the 
very start of their careers, a real-life example which may turn out fruitful in the future: 
“North Western deanery has adopted this [collaborative, my note] approach 
with its medical leadership programme. Junior doctors can now apply for 
formal leadership development alongside NHS management trainees. Eight 
junior doctors in a room of 230 management trainee graduates has [sic] 
influenced the group dynamic to everyone’s benefit. False preconceptions are 
challenged there and then, not years later when it is often too late to change a 
habit.” 
 
The complementarity and peaceful coexistence of the four logics this research has 
been talking about may be seen as the embodiment of this third contribution to policy 
or legislation (see Figure 6).   
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8.7. Contributions to practice 
 
In the recent literature on qualitative research in accounting and management (Humphrey, 
2014; Ter Bogt and Van Helden, 2012), the importance of academic rigour (theorisation) and 
the practice relevance behind qualitative research are both outlined as vital tools for the 
understanding of social reality. The interview data collected in the course of this research led 
incidentally to some ideas on how to improve the practices or activities that CCGs engage in. 
Thus, the data prompted several contributions to current CCG practice, two of which are 
examined in more detail below. Current CCG practices, i.e. meaningful and relatively well 
established and coherent activities, should be subject to constant improvement. The two 
contributions in Table 9 below are aimed to help improve current CCG practice.   
 
Table 9 
Contributions to practice 
 
      
Contribution to  Nature of the contribution  Relevant quotes from the data 
practice   to practice   
number     
 
    
           1 Living within the limits of a 
constrained budget incentivises 
clinicians to do things differently 
and, hopefully, better than in the 
past. Moreover, CCGs and other 
NHS entities should not be overly 
averse to taking risk and, 
occasionally, making mistakes.  
Quote 71: “When CCGs were 
formed, one of the key reasons for its 
formation was that NHS was running 
with cash starvation. And they had to 
find new ways to control the cost but 
at the same time make sure that the 
quality and services are well 
preserved and I think that giving it in 
the hands of clinicians addresses that 
focus and especially at our CCG 
level, the clinicians are in charge and 
they think more rationally, 
innovatively, to find the quality of 
care and to produce efficiency. So, 
when there is, like, a war, people are 
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at their best. So, when you have less 
money, to produce the same results, 
you have more innovation, and you 
think more differently to address 
those problems” (Interviewee G). 
Quote 72: “…whereas, previously 
there was a lot of inertia in the system 
because the GPs didn’t really have 
much financial responsibility and 
therefore were doing what was the 
easiest thing which is to send the 
patients to hospital. Now they’ve got 
financial incentivisation … because 
they have to live within a constrained 
budget, they might do something 
differently” (Interviewee A). 
Quote 73: “It’s about the 
bureaucracy, the kind of hoops that 
you need to do before you can really 
do practical things. They say, just like 
the police, they have to tick 200 boxes 
for a five-minute incident. So, they 
have the contact with the criminal for 
five minutes but they spend two hours 
writing about it. The same thing is 
happening with the doctors ... So, 
whatever you do, it takes a lot longer 
to implement it because of several 
layers of ... it’s called governance, too 
many layers of governance. So, there 
are people governing you from five, 
ten different organisations, so you still 
do not have the independence to 
actually … because they are afraid 
that you may make the wrong 
decision but you have to learn from 
making the wrong decision in the first 
place or you don’t make any decision 
at all … Then, how can you change 
anything? And if someone knew 
exactly that that’s the right decision, 
nobody knows if it is the right 
decision because they do not have the 
experience of doing it in the first 
place. You have not allowed people to 
do something new, then how can you 
have the information about it?”  
(Interviewee G).   
221 
 
 
 
             2 The NHS should further train the 
clinicians involved in CCGs in 
business, accounting, leadership, 
and other management skills, so 
that they may better understand 
large-scale business mechanisms, 
strategies, and processes.  
Quote 74: “It’s [A CCG is] a business 
[laughing]. Frankly, it comes down to 
it, doesn’t it? You know, if I were the 
GP, right, and somebody came to me; 
so, it all depends on how this business 
process works. So, I am a GP and I go 
to somebody and I say, ‘I would like, 
I’d like to offer an additional service. 
I am going to buy a piece of kit. I’m 
going to train myself up on it to an 
accredited standard and I’d like to 
offer you an additional service.’ And 
somebody says, ‘That’s marvelous 
and we’ll do that.’ OK? Now, that’s 
part of your investment decision to 
make that call and the issue is: to keep 
that running, you need to do it well. 
That’s a different set of business 
processes, so me as a commissioner 
saying, ‘GP, I’d like you to run this 
service.’ And then the GP then 
responds, ‘OK, I need to buy a 
machine. I’ve got to train myself up. I 
want a three-year contract. Because if 
I get a three year contract, that gives 
me more payback on my machine.’ 
It’s about understanding business 
process, you know. If you strip away 
the words ‘health,’ ‘clinicians,’ it’s a 
business transaction. You would not 
enter into a business transaction not 
having a clue about how you recover 
your investment or not understanding 
the market and your income stream … 
Well, it is complex, but I mean, the 
actual business processes aren’t that 
complex. We make them complex 
‘cause we throw a lot of words in it 
that people don’t mean and we don’t 
allow ourselves to recognise some of 
the more obvious economic 
disciplines” (Interviewee P). 
Quote 75: “No, they [GPs]’ve had no 
training whatsoever other than some 
kind of corporate development 
support, but it’s no way near enough” 
(Interviewee H).  
Quote 76: “Certainly, there has been 
some training available for people 
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The first contribution to practice from the above table consists of the following: living within 
the limits of a constrained budget incentivises clinicians to do things differently and, 
hopefully, better than in the past. Besides, CCGs and other NHS entities should not be overly 
averse to taking risk and, occasionally, making mistakes. This is so because mistakes are a 
normal part of risk taking. Without risk taking, no change will ever materialise. Even though 
healthcare is a sector with a high potential for harm to the end user, so are also many other 
industries which take charge of people’s lives and safety – the automobile industry, the 
airlines industry, the pharmaceutical industry, and many more. In today’s economic climate 
of scares resources, taking well-calculated risks should be something normal, even in 
healthcare, and should not be feared. Table 9 presents four relevant quotes in support of this 
first contribution to practice.  
 
An opinion that supports this contribution comes from an anonymous commentator from the 
online survey, the Change Challenge, mentioned in section 8.6: “[T]he end result of being 
over-risk averse, especially in a culture of fear, is that patient safety is compromised and 
[clinicians in CCGs] to look at NHS 
budgeting and whatever, if people 
wanted to take advantage of it” 
(Interviewee S). 
Quote 77: “I mean, actually, one of 
the things that I’ve put in my personal 
development plan this year for my 
appraisal is to get greater insight into 
the accounting processes … Hm, you 
know, because I see that as a definite 
educational need in this role … which 
would certainly allow me to perform 
this role a bit better” (Interviewee Q).  
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more mistakes are made.
40” Another anonymous commentator wrote a post entitled, ‘Fear of 
failure in a blame culture’ which says that this fear “is a key barrier to change within 
organisations. The front line is not empowered to make improvements.” This posting 
generated an impressive 37 ‘likes’ from other participants in the survey.  
 
Another supporting comment to the first contribution to practice comes from an article on the 
recent, very controversial discontinuation of the private company Circle’s franchise of the 
Hinchingbrooke Health Care Trust in Cambridgeshire (Welikala, 2015b). This was the first of 
its kind franchise by a private company of a NHS trust. Because costs exceeded an agreed-
upon limit (£5 million), Circle withdrew contractually from the agreement. Several 
commentators to Welikala’s online article commented that they also felt like withdrawing 
from their poorly performing NHS hospital contracts but they couldn’t – the public sector 
simply did not have similar withdrawal privileges to those of the private company Circle. A 
commentator then responded: 
“The NHS cannot continue to do what it has always done and expect things to 
improve by some automatic process. All sorts of approaches need to be 
developed and tried. Not all will be successful, in fact most won’t. But if we 
took the approach of “no guarantee so no attempt” we wouldn’t be using 
modern pharmaceutical products or surgical techniques. well [sic] done for the 
attempt, for recognising when it had failed and reverting to a different model. 
Whether others have a go at this model [franchising to a private company] or 
not is a matter for them. I hope someone tries something” (Anonymous, 9 
January 2015, 11:20 am, Ibid.).  
 
Common sense dictates that too much risk aversion is not conductive to discovering new, and 
perhaps better, ways of doing things. Some recent research has found that the new CCGs 
have a desire to do things differently than the previous commissioners (Coleman et al., 2015). 
Hopefully, this desire to experiment and innovate will ultimately improve CCG practices. 
Coming back to excessive risk aversion, Pope and Burnes (2013) call this aversion 
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 Available at: <https://changechallenge.clevertogether.com/> [Accessed 30 March 2015].  
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organisational ‘silence’ and ‘selective moral disengagement.’ These two phenomena, in the 
authors’ view, hinder the NHS from becoming a ‘wise’ organisation that listens and learns 
along the way.  
 
A healthy pressure from the business logic on the medical/professional logic is a good idea: 
living within limited resources brings out the best in people, as this contribution showed. The 
professional logic should accommodate calculated risk taking, to avoid creating a ‘culture of 
fear’ and to nurture innovation. Thus, flexibility in logics is desirable.   
 
The second contribution to practice proposed here (see Table 9) is the following: the NHS 
should further train the clinicians involved in CCGs in business, accounting, leadership, and 
management skills, so that they may better understand large-scale business mechanisms, 
strategies, and processes. According to the four quotes in support of this second contribution, 
such training would help clinicians become better CCG leaders. 
 
Among the first articles to address the topic of clinicians’ business training within CCGs 
were Currie et al. (2012) and Devlin (2010). The previous chapter showed that clinicians 
were not alone in commissioning, but were still the ones accountable and responsible for it. 
In the parlance of HSJ News, maybe, clinician-commissioners are a less ‘tainted’ type of 
manager than the pure NHS manager who performance manages the hard-working, 
understaffed, and overly-stressed NHS clinicians to whom was assigned the impossible task 
to meet ever-rising demand with ever-dwindling resources. In this spirit, HJS News (2014) 
states: 
“A popular suggestion [in the Change Challenge online survey] was that the 
words “manager” and “management” should be banned as they were 
“alienating” and had “tainted” connotations. Instead, managers could be 
replaced with “team leaders” who “lead from the front.””  
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The rationale for the symbiosis of family doctor and commissioner transpired from the white 
paper that first announced the CCG reforms: “The Government will devolve power and 
responsibility for commissioning services to the healthcare professionals closest to patients: 
GPs and their practice teams working in consortia [which later became known as CCGs]” 
(DH, 2010a, p. 4). As already mentioned, the Coalition government perceived PCT managers 
as expensive people who were doing a sub-standard job with the NHS and its finances. 
Therefore, ‘Who could be better than GPs in handling PCT mangers’ jobs than GPs?’ 
probably thought the government. After all, “90 per cent of patient contact with the NHS 
takes place in general practice.
41” Clearly, the proximity of GPs to patients, i.e. their situation 
within the field, or their frontline worker status, similarly to this of head teachers and school 
governors in education (Laughlin et al., 1994), is what earned GPs their status of 
commissioning hybrids. It is still relatively early to know how the commissioning practices of 
these hybrids would differ from these of PCT commissioners, as evoked by several 
interviewees. Yet, many differences are already widely evident – more engagement with the 
public is taking place, an enhanced dialogue with various external parties is being heard, and 
an increased clinical input in decision making is present. Additional management, 
accounting, and leadership training would doubtlessly help these new hybrids to better 
understand large-scale business issues.  
 
Training clinicians in the economic disciplines and their calculative practices is nothing but a 
spreading of the business logic into what used to be the realm of the professional/clinical 
logic (clinicians’ skills set). It looks like some clinicians (Quote 77) were keen to learn new 
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 Available at: <http://www.england.nhs.uk/london/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2013/11/Call-Action-
ACCESSIBLE.pdf> [Accessed 20 April 2015].  
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skills and thus become better CCG leaders. This way, the expanded boundaries of the 
business logic would improve governance and leadership (the governance logic).  
 
Figure 6 is a summary of this research and an extension of Figures 4 and 5.  
 
Figure 6 
Summary of this research  
  
 
 
Some interviewees even expressed the view that the latest NHS reforms were an orchestrated 
attempt by the government to give the impossible task of ‘fixing’ the NHS to the 
inexperienced in large-scale business processes GPs and thus put the whole blame for the 
immanent NHS failure on them. This is a perceived ulterior motive of the Coalition 
government. Thus, the only viable remaining solution would be to privatise the NHS. 
Interviewee F opined:  
                
I. Concept of 'calculative practices'
     &
     Contributions: II. Dynamics and interplay amongst
     institutional logics (business, professional,
Answers to RQs:      governance, and political)
1) Answer to RQ 1 1) professional vs. business and governance logics (conflicting and in harmony)
2) Answer to RQ 2 2) professional vs. business and governance logics (in harmony but sometimes in disbalance)
3) Answer to RQ 3 3) professional, business and governance logics (in harmony thanks to cooperation of agents)
4) Answer to RQ 4 4) professional, business, and governance logics (in flux and metamorphosis)
Incidental findings and contributions:
1) Contribution to policy 1 1) political logic moulds governance logic, to make the professional logic more business-like
2) Contribution to policy 2 2) all four logics (aspiration towards more simplicy and complementarity amongst logics)
3) Contribution to policy 3 3) all four logics (complementarity and peaceful coexistence)
4) Contribution to practice 1 4) professional, business, and governance logics (flexibility in logics is desirable)
5) Contribution to practice 2 5) professional, business, and governance logics (expanding logics' boundaries)
    Theoretical concepts used:
Objective: Towards a better understanding of GPs in CCGs
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“My cynical opinion is that the whole exercise [of CCG commissioning] is 
part of the government’s wider agenda to privatise primary care in England. 
After years of generating bad press and public hostility towards GPs in the 
press, commissioning initially seemed like a change of heart from the powers 
that be, but … the whole exercise is doomed to failure. The government itself 
could never get away with privatising primary care, but if they can say, ‘Well, 
we gave the responsibility to GPs and look what a mess they’ve made of it,’ 
then they may be able to bring in the private sector and potentially remove the 
independent contractor status of GPs and turn them into more manageable 
NHS employees (something I’m sure they’ve wanted to do for decades 
anyway)” (Quote 78).    
 
‘More manageable NHS employees’ resonates with a Miller-inspired concept – this of the 
‘calculative agent.’ The boundaries of who should be such a calculative agent have changed 
in order to help privatise the NHS, would claim this interviewee.  
 
When asked at the end of the interview what else he wanted to add, Interviewee A shared: 
“The other thing that I think would be quite interesting is there’s very clearly, 
I think (particularly with the new Minister) gonna be a drive to provide a 
bigger amount of health care from independent [i.e. private] providers and not 
the NHS. And it’s never a lot of examples of independent providers is more 
expensive. Not necessarily less value for money but more expensive. So, we 
got examples locally where the audiology service which is provided mostly 
from this hospital and could easily be provided in community settings is likely 
to increase the cost of providing audiology services because to attempt into the 
market, the independent providers, you have to make it look attractive and so 
we had the same experience in elective orthopaedics. Well, undoubtedly, there 
was a problem and the local NHS wasn’t delivering elective orthopaedic care 
in a timely or effective manner. And an independent provider was asked to 
provide it for five years and they did so but at a considerable extra cost … It 
actually, that particular example through a negotiated process that we’ve 
taken, the NHS has taken that service back and we are in our first year of 
providing that and if all goes according to plan, we’ll be able to do it at 
significantly less than the independent provider was proving it for” (Quote 
79). 
 
 
Interviewee A continued: 
“And so, there are areas where I think independence [i.e. privatisation] will 
add value – diagnostic services is probably one, where pathology services 
could potentially provide better value for money, imaging (X-Rays and 
ultrasound) … They are, it’s gonna become very blurred I think. So, money 
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will go to a non-NHS provider to look after NHS patients. And then it 
becomes a significant issue about – is it more expensive to start with and what 
happens to all the profit that normally gets reinvested? Because elective 
orthopaedics is highly profitable and if you leave the care of all the trauma 
patients within the NHS and the profit from the elective service goes to the 
independent provider, there’s a health economy problem … I am not sure it’s 
all bad … And I am certainly not against having independent providers. You 
can set a benchmark for what services should cost because it does make 
others, you know, if our Imaging Department for example are aware that there 
may be a moderate amount of competition from an independent provider, it 
does challenge them to make sure they are providing us with a cost-effective 
service within the NHS. I am not sure it’s all bad … I am not sure that it’s 
very transparent and it needs to be. But that’s quite difficult because 
independent providers wouldn’t release information about cost of services. 
They just hide behind confidentiality and other agreements. So, transparency 
in the market is quite difficult” (Quote 80).  
  
 
Interviewee H shared the following with respect to an eventual NHS privatisation: 
 “So, I think there will be parts of the NHS that will be opened up to the 
market and … we seem to be designing institutional failure into the system. 
And the lesson from the last 20 to 30 years is that the government uses 
institutional inefficiency and failure as a rationale for privatisation … Did you 
know, if you look at the rail industry, did you know that the private sector 
franchise holders receive four times more in taxpayer subsidy than British Rail 
did before privatisation and that fares for passengers are many times more 
expensive? … So, we’ve got the most expensive rail fare in Europe! So, where 
is the evidence that privatised public institutions are cheaper, more effective, 
and more efficient? So, again, the electricity industry simply loads risk onto 
the consumer, so the consumer pays more. That doesn’t sound like a very 
good model. I think we are still suffering from an ideological perspective that 
the Tory party have had since the days of Margaret Thatcher that because 
something is owned by the state and run by the state, that it is inherently bad 
value for money. There’s no evidence that I can think of to conclusively prove 
that to be the case … I think that’s [the privatisation of the NHS] inevitable. I 
can’t see that that wouldn’t happen but we are having that conversation with 
the people of this country on health. Hm, so I think it’s inevitable, given the 
increasing demands on the healthcare system that some kind of copayment 
system must be introduced at some point because the NHS is not affordable 
within the resources that have been allocated” (Interview 11, Quote 81).  
 
Interviewee M offered the following view: 
“The aim basically is to try and make healthcare less expensive. They [the 
government] know the answer to that – you could make it less expensive if 
you make patients pay for some of the services. And to do that, you’ve got to 
hive off some of the NHS to private companies … It will be less expensive for 
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the government. It will be more expensive for patients. Now, as you probably 
know, when the NHS was formed, it included dental services, included eye 
testing (ophthalmology) … So, within a few years, if you wanted false teeth, 
you had to pay for them. If you wanted glasses, you had to pay for them. 
Whereas in 1948 when it [the NHS] was started, you could get glasses, you 
could get false teeth, you could get virtually everything. You were getting 
your prescriptions free. Now they’ve already (in England) they’ve already 
started paying for prescriptions. In Scotland, they don’t pay for it. They’ve got 
a different financial arrangement and of course this will happen as time goes 
on. It is very easy to think, ‘What else can we make patients pay for?’ Well, 
maybe if you go to A&E. You can get them pay for that. So, if you go to 
A&E, you pay £20. Who knows where it’s going? But, it’s the thin end of the 
wedge. It’s the privatisation of what was a social service” (Quote 82). 
 
A supporting claim for the above views (Quotes 78-82) is one by a leader of Unite, the largest 
trade union in Britain, Len McCluskey, who was heard saying that, “no fewer than 230 
Conservative MPs (out of 303) … [had] some sort of link with private health companies” 
(White, 2015). With the benefit of hindsight, it is hard to say whether the private sector will 
always want to enter the NHS realm, given the fiasco of Circle with Hinchingbrooke. As 
Interviewee A said in Quote 80, there would be a “health economy problem” if only highly 
profitable services get privatised.   
 
8.8. Conclusion 
 
Chapter 8 provided a further discussion on the research findings from Chapter 7. This was 
done in light of the gaps identified in Chapter 1, the literature review, the theoretical 
framework in Figure 4, and the rationale for data analysis in Figure 5. This chapter provided 
some possible answers to the four research questions (see sections 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, and 8.5) and 
added five more contributions (three contributions to policy/legislation and two contributions 
to theory) that were incidental to this research. The empirical and theoretical findings from 
the whole research were summarised in Figure 6. Now, let us turn to the final chapter of this 
thesis, Chapter 9, which will briefly conclude this thesis.     
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
 
9.1. Summary of this research 
 
The objective of this research was to contribute to knowledge and understanding by exploring 
the professional identities of GPs in CCGs and their level of involvement in commissioning 
calculative practices. Four research questions were asked in Chapter 1 and answered in 
Chapter 8. These questions were: RQ 1, ‘How appropriate is it for clinicians to be involved in 
acute care commissioning?;’ RQ 2, ‘What motivates clinicians to assume leadership roles in 
CCGs?;’ RQ 3, ‘How involved are clinicians in CCG calculative practices?;’ and RQ 4, ‘To 
what extent do hybridity and calculative practices affect clinicians’ professional identities in 
CCGs?’  
 
The answers to these four research questions hopefully helped fill the eight research gaps 
identified in Chapter 1, at least partially. Gap 1 was the shortage of academic studies on the 
new CCG commissioning compared to such studies in the practitioner literature.  Gap 2 was 
the lack of studies on how the people directly involved in CCGs, such as GPs and other 
clinicians, personally felt about clinicians’ involvement in commissioning. Given that some 
commentators after CCG commissioning was first announced were very skeptical about GPs’ 
role in commissioning, this gap was particularly important to fill. Gap 3 was the lack of 
studies of CCGs from a calculative practices perspective. Gap 4 was the shortage of 
accounting studies on healthcare commissioning, compared to education commissioning 
studies in England. Gap 5 was the shortage of agency studies in CCG commissioning. Gap 6 
was the lack of studies on the motivational factors thanks to which clinicians undertake active 
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roles in CCGs. Gap 7 was the lack of studies on the level of involvement of clinicians in 
CCG calculative practices.  Finally, Gap 8 was the scarcity of studies on hybrid professional 
identities in CCG commissioning.   
 
This research also presented five additional, incidental contributions to current 
policy/legislation and practice. These contributions were followed by more research data that 
alluded to the, what some interviewees saw as, the immanent privatisation of the NHS. Figure 
6 summarised this whole research by giving the spotlight not just to the answers to the 
research questions and the incidental contributions, but also to a number of theoretical 
observations and findings (depicted in cells).   
 
An important foundation of CCG commissioning is the purchaser-provider split that was 
introduced in Chapter 3. Hybrid GP-commissioners and this whole research would not have 
existed in the absence of this split. “The division of the health service into purchasers and 
providers has been a cornerstone of governments’ health policies for three decades. However, 
recent months have seen its value called into question by high profile figures within the 
NHS” (Clover, 2013). According to this source, the Health Service Journal/Capsticks 
Hospital Chief Executives’ Barometer survey asked the leaders of English hospital trusts to 
rate how useful the purchaser-provider split was to their health economies. The survey was 
administered in the early days of CCG commissioning. The average rating of all 45 
respondents was 3.1, with 1 being ‘not at all useful’ and 10 being ‘very useful.’ No 
respondent gave more than an 8 rating. A chief executive of a FT wrote in this survey that 
while leaders of FTs and trusts wanted to focus on delivering the best services to their 
patients, they were often, “frustrated by the amount of time they … [had] to spend 
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negotiating contracts with commissioners and navigating the added complexity this brings” 
(Ibid.).   
 
In a 2013 interview with the Health Service Journal, Sir David Nicholson said that NHS 
England was already “thinking about the possibility of mutual [organisations and] social 
enterprises, and also about whether the straightforward commissioner-provider split … [was] 
the right thing for all communities” (West, 2013). He also called on the service to look more 
closely at the U.S. healthcare organisations, Geisinger and Kaiser Permanente which serve as 
both an insurer and provider for a defined membership. He added, “We need to be much 
more creative about those sorts of models of integration, which go beyond simple provider 
integration” (Ibid.).   
 
So, what is the future of CCG commissioning? If indeed the English NHS moves to an 
insurance-based system like the one in the U.S., the duties of CCG commissioners, whether 
these commissioners are clinicians or not, will most likely transfer to health insurance 
companies and/or providers. Perhaps, the early signs that the English NHS is moving toward 
a U.S.-inspired insurance-based model are already here? It is probably too early to speculate 
whether or when this will happen since the HSCA 2012 is a piece of law and, as we saw, 
legislation is hard to undo. Hard but not impossible.  
 
9.2. Implications for future research 
 
It is recognised that this research may be extended in the future, so that it may cover other 
important issues besides the professional identities and calculative practices of 
commissioning hybrids in acute care commissioning. The data already collected may be used 
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for future, in-depth studies on issues repeatedly brought up by the research interviewees: the 
localism agenda of NPM, the changing work identities and practices of non-clinicians 
involved in CCGs, the new duties of local authorities, the new Health and Wellbeing Boards, 
NHS England, and many more. Another area of future research may be to examine the 
contemporary state of commissioning in other public sector fields, not just in acute 
healthcare, such as social care and infrastructure, to list just a few. Besides, the issue of the 
eventual privatisation of the English NHS and how the purchaser-provider split might be 
implicated by it may also be addressed in the future.  
 
It is hoped that the reader enjoyed reading this thesis and that the topic of the socially 
important CCG commissioning will grab the attention of many more scholars to come.  
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Appendix A 
Commissioning Show 2013 programme 
 
 
PROGRAMME 
12 June, 2013 
Streams: CCG Business and Clinical Commissioning Support 
Stream Chairs: Dr. Amanda Doyle and Dr. Phil Moore, respectively 
 
9:00 – 9:15 Morning plenary sessions: Opening and welcome from Dr. Charles 
Alessi, Chairperson, NAPC and NHS Clinical Commissioners 
9:15 – 9:50 Keynote address: Rt. Hon. Norman Lamb, Minister for Care and 
Support 
9:50 – 10:00 NHS e-Referrals Launch: Beverly Bryant, Director of Strategic 
Systems and Technology, NHS England and Dr. Masood Nazir, GP 
Lead, CCIO, NHS England 
10:30 – 11:00 HSJ Debate: Who is responsible for the delivery of QIPP – NHS 
England, CCGs or CSUs? 
 Debate chair: Dave West, Chief Reporter, HSJ  
 Andrew Kenworthy, Director of the Commissioning Support Unit 
Transition Programme, NHS England 
 John Wilderspin, Managing Director, Central Southern CSU 
Dr. Sam Everington, Chair, Tower Hamlets CCG and NHS England 
Representative 
11:00 – 11:30  Commissioning an informed anticoagulation service for the patient 
Dr. Ameet Bakhai, Consultant cardiologist, R&D Lead, Barnet and 
Chase Farm NHS Trust 
Dr. Matthew Fay, GP, Westcliffe Medical Practice, Shipley 
11:30 – 12:00  Networking and exhibition visit 
12:00 – 12:30  How can CCGs achieve financial balance in their first year? 
   Paul Baumann, Chief Financial Officer, NHS England  
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12:30 – 13:00  How out of hospital care can help you meet the QIPP agenda? 
   Jacqui Lyttie, Commissioning adviser, JSL Consulting 
   Richard Jackson, Director of Operations, Bupa Care Services 
   Stephen Cook, Director of Pharmacy, Bupa Home Healthcare   
13:00 – 14:00 Procuring commissioning support services: A consultation on 
supporting CCGs and other buyers  
Bob Ricketts, Director of Commissioning Support Strategy & Market 
Development, NHS England 
14:00 – 14:30 Commissioning for long-term conditions: Do we know what 
commissioners actually do? 
Dr. Judith Smith, Director of Policy, Nuffield Trust 
14:30 – 15:00  A new primary care pathway for DVT treatment 
   Dr. David Russell, GP and Andy Reay, Pharmaceutical Adviser 
15:00 – 15:30 How to make a success of CCGs’ critical relationships with NHS 
England? 
 Dr. Johnny Marshall, NHS Clinical Commissioners 
 CCGs and member practices – a shared fate? 
 Dr. Minesh Patel, Clinical Chair, Horsham and mid-Sussex CCG 
15:30 – 16:00 CCGs post-Francis: How to avoid another Mid Staffs and make quality 
the priority in 2013? 
 Dr. David Paynton (MBE, FRCGP, DMS), National Clinical Lead, 
Centre for Commissioning, Royal College of General Practitioners 
16:00 – 16:30 The CQC’s new strategy for 2013-16 – its impact on CCGs 
 Dr. Paul Bate, CQC Director of Strategy and Intelligence and Former 
Health Advisor, No. 10 Policy Unit   
17:00 – 17:45 Keynote address on Labour’s vision for integrated health and social 
care: Rt. Hon. Andy Burnham, MP, Shadow Health Secretary. 
Followed by a live interview with Alastair McLellan, Editor, HSJ 
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PROGRAMME 
13 June, 2013 
Streams: CCG Business, Long-Term Conditions, and Clinical Commissioning Support 
Stream Chairs: Julie Wood, Dr. Rowan Hillson, MBE, and Dr. Charles Alessi, 
respectively 
 
9:00 – 9:15 Morning plenary sessions: Welcome by conference chair Dr. Mike 
Dixon, Chair, NHS Allianceand Interim President, NHS Clinical 
Commissioners 
9:15 – 10:00 Head-to-head debate: Can CCGs solve the urgent and emergency care 
crisis?  
Dr. James Kingsland, National Clinical Lead, NHS Clinical 
Commissioning Community and Prof. Tim Evans, Lead Fellow, 
Royal College of Physicians Future Hospital Commission, NHS 
10:00 – 10:30  Networking and exhibition visit 
10:30 – 11:00  No health without mental heath  
  Rebecca Cotton, Acting Deputy Director, Mental Health Network 
 Dr. Caroline Dollery, Mental Health Commissioners Steering Group, 
NHS Clinical Commissioners 
11:00 – 11:30  Practical examples of improving productivity and efficiency  
Dr. Umesh Kumar Roy, CCG Board Member, Innovation Lead and 
Chair for Improving Cardiovascular Outcomes – Leicester City  
11:30 – 12:00  Networking and exhibition visit 
12:00 – 12:30  The Big Conversation: What are the key priorities for CCGs post-
authorisation?  
 Dr. Stephen Richards, Chief Clinical Officer, Oxfordshire CCG, 
 Dr. Andrew Coward, Chair, NHS Birmingham South Central CCG 
and  
 Dr. Helen Tattersfield, Chair, Lewisham CCG 
12:30 – 1:00 Networking and exhibition visit 
1:00 – 1:30  Procuring Commissioning Support Services: A consultation on 
supporting CCGs and other buyers 
 Bob Ricketts, Director of Commissioning Support Strategy & Market 
Development, NHS England 
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14:00 – 14:30 Moving beyond authorisation – the legal and governance challenges 
CCGs must address in their first year 
 Giles Peel, Adviser, Clinical and Healthcare Risk, DAC Beachcroft, 
 Robert McGough, Partner, DAC Beachcroft  
14:30 – 15:00 Commissioning to prevent Atrial Fibrillation (AF) Related Stroke  
 Dr. Matthew Fay, GP, Westcliffe Medical Practice, Shipley 
15:00 – 15:30 Integrated responsibility: Patient centred commissioning  
 Dr. Steve Kell, Chair, Bassetlaw CCG and Co-Chair, NHS Clinical 
Commissioners Leadership Group 
15:30 – 16:15 Keynote Debate: What do CCGs need to do to avoid major re-
organisation in three years’ time?  
Chair: Dr. Mike Dixon 
Confirmed panel members: Rt. Hon. Stephen Dorrell, MP, Chair of 
the House of Commons Health Select Committee, Prof. David 
Haslam, CBE, Chair Designate, NICE and National Professional 
Adviser, CQC, Ben Page, Chief Executive, Ipsos MORI, Sir Robert 
Naylor, Chief Executive, University College London NHS Foundation 
Trust, Dr. David Bennett, Chair and Chief Executive, Monitor.  
 
Source: Commissioning Show 2013 programme. London ExCel Building, 12-13 June, 2013.  
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Appendix B 
Hospital Directions 2013 Conference programme  
 
PROGRAMME 
27 November, 2013 
Presentations attended in Theatres 1/2/3 
 
09:00 – 09:30  What will the hospital of the future look like? 
   Mike Farrar, Chief Executive, NHS Federation  
10:00 – 10:40 ‘Operation Onion – peeling back the layers’ for lasting change 
Samantha Jones, Chief Executive, West Hertfordshire Hospitals NHS 
Trust  
 Michael Van der Watt, Medical Director, West Hertfordshire 
Hospitals NHS Trust  
10:50 – 11:35 Kaiser Permanente’s hospitals’ journey: Achieving the triple aim 
 Gregory A. Adams, Executive Vice President, Group President and 
Regional President of Northern California, Kaiser Permanente 
 Alide Chase, Senior Vice President of Medicare Clinical Operations 
and Population Care, Kaiser Permanente 
11:55 – 12:40 Benefits of tele-health in secondary care 
Katy Lethbridge, Healthcare & Health Technology Sector Specialist, 
Medvivo 
13:30 – 14:10 New approaches to improving performance and creating a system of 
consequences 
 David Dalton, Chief Executive, Salford Royal NHS Foundation Trust 
14:35 – 15:10 Financial challenge – moving towards sustainability 
 Bob Alexander, Director of Finance, NHS Trust Development 
Authority 
15:45 – 16:30  The role of the private sector in the NHS 
 Michael Watson, Chief Operations Officer, Circle Partnership 
 Stephen Collier, Group CEO, BMI Healthcare 
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 John Myatt, Strategic Development Director, Serco Health 
16:50 – 17:30 Clinical engagement in hospital finance – the Brighton experience 
 Philip Thomas, Clinical Chief of Finance and Consultant Urologist, 
Brighton and Sussex University Hospital NHS Trust  
 
 
 
 
PROGRAMME 
28 November, 2013 
Presentations attended in Theatres 1/2/3 
 
09:30 – 10:00 Opportunities abroad – NHS expertise and Gulf States demand 
 Simon Shooter, Partner, Bird & Bird 
10:00 – 10:40 Delayed discharges are all down to social care … or are they? 
 Richard O’Driscoll, Discharge Transformation Manager, Cambridge 
University Hospital Foundation Trust 
11:05- 11:45 The worst of both worlds? Resource allocation compromises inequality 
 Prof. Sheena Asthana, Professor of Health Policy, University of 
Plymouth 
11:55 – 12:40 Linda Mussell, Child Protection Information System (CP-IS) Clinical 
Engagement Lead, Health and Social Care Information Centre 
 Dr. Emyr Wyn Jones, Clinical Lead – National Implementation 
Summary Care Records Service, Health and Social Care Information 
Centre, HSCIC – Information sharing between health care settings 
13:40 – 14:15 Progress towards sustainability in estates 
 Martyn Jeffery, Director of Estates, Royal Free London NHS 
Foundation Trust 
14:30 – 15:10 The importance of clinical leadership in the future of the NHS 
 Mark Newbold, Chief Executive, Heart of England NHS Foundation 
Trust 
 Karen Payne, Head of Operations, NHS Leadership Academy 
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15:45 – 16:20 QIPP – changing our business model in a changing world 
 Rob Forster, Director of Finance and IM&T, Wigan, Wrighton and 
Leigh NHS 
16:20 – 17:05 Health IT and the Francis Report – how IT systems can help address 
the key findings 
 Dr. Paul Shannon, Consultant Anaesthetist in the NHS and Medical 
Director at CSC 
 
Source: Hospital Directions 2013 Conference programme. London ExCel Building, 27-28 
November 2013 
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Appendix C 
Commissioning Show 2014 programme  
 
 
PROGRAMME 
25 June, 2014 
Stream: CCG Business 
Stream Chair: Dr. Steve Kell, Chair, NHS Bassetlaw CCG, 
Co-Chair, NHS Clinical Commissioners Leadership Group, and GP, Bassetlaw 
 
 
10:25 – 10:55 Key challenges and opportunities for CCGs in year two 
  Speaker(s): 
  Ros Roughton, National Director, Commissioning Development, NHSE  
Dr. Sam Everington, OBE, NHS Clinical Commissioners Leadership Group; 
GP and Chair, Tower Hamlets CCG 
11:00 – 11:30 CCG finance update and Q&A with expert panel 
  Speaker(s): 
Dean Westcott, Chief Financial Officer, West Essex CCG; member, NHSCC 
Leadership Group 
Dr. Tim Moorhead, Chair, Sheffield CCG; member, NHSCC 
11:30 – 12:00 Integrated care for commissioners 
  Speaker(s): 
  Matt Murphy, Managing Director, EMIS 
  Hasib Aftab, Head of Informatics and IT, Camden CCG 
12:00 – 12:30 CCGs’ role in co-commissioning primary care 
  Speaker(s): 
CCG Business Chair Dr. Steve Kell, GP and Chair, NHS Bassetlaw CCG; 
Co-Chair, NHS Clinical Commissioners Leadership Group; GP, Bassetlaw 
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12:35 – 13:05 Introducing point of care medicines optimisation support into NHS 
Lincolnshire East CCG 
 Speaker(s): 
 Dr. James Howarth, GP Chair, NHS Lincolnshire East CCG 
 Dr. Fermin Blanco-Mayo, GP 
13:05 – 14:00 Networking & exhibition visit 
14:00 – 14:35 Commissioning for value-based outcomes – how to actually do it 
 Speaker(s): 
 Dr. Neil Bacon, CEO & Founder, iWantGreatCare, Ltd. 
 Dr. Nikki Kanani, GP, Vice Chair CCG, Quality Lead FMLM, Exec NAPC 
 Dr. Ombarish Banerjee, Clinical Lead for MSK, Bexley CCG 
 Dr. Rupert Dunbar-Rees, Founder and Director, Outcomes Based Healthcare 
14:35 – 15:05 Workforce challenges, opportunities, issues and anxieties 
 Speaker(s): 
 Dean Royes, Chief Executive, NHS Employers 
15:05 – 15:35 Networking & exhibition visit 
15:35 – 16:10 Alcohol in safer hands: A joint working project opportunity for CCGs 
 Speaker(s): 
 Dr. Joe McGilligan, Chair, East Surrey CCG & Co-Chair, Surrey Health and 
Wellbeing Board 
 16:10 – 16:40 Tackling the A&E crisis – two high-impact solutions commissioned by CCGs 
 Speaker(s): 
 Clare Lyons-Collins, Out of Hospital Mental Health Lead, Hammersmith and 
Fulham CCG 
 Mike Pinkerton, Chief Executive, Doncaster and Bassetlaw Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust 
 Dr. Steve Reid, Clinical Director for Psychological Medicine, Central and 
North West London NHS Foundation Trust 
16:40 – 17:10 Networking & exhibition visit 
17:10 – 17:45 Keynote debate: What whole-system innovations are most likely to help end 
the A&E crisis within five years? 
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 Chair: Dr. Charles Alessi, Chair, National Association of Primary Care, NHS 
Confederation and Lead for Preventable Dementia, Public Health England 
 Speaker(s): 
 Dr. Anita Donley, Clinical Vice President, RCP 
 Sir Bruce Keogh, National Medical Director for NHS England 
 Clifford Mann, President, The College of Emergency Medicine 
 Göran Henriks, Chief Executive of Learning and Innovation, Jönköping 
County Council, Sweden 
 
 
 
 
PROGRAMME 
26 June, 2014 
Stream: CCG Business 
Stream Chair: Dr. Phil Moore, GP, Central Surgery Surbiton, Deputy Chair, Kingston 
CCG and Member of leadership Group of NHSCC 
 
 
09:00 – 09:15 Keynote address by the Rt. Hon. Andy Burnham, Shadow Secretary 
of State for Health 
09:15 – 09:55  Keynote debate: Is whole person care another NHS reorganisation? 
  Chair: Alistair McLellan, Editor, Health Service Journal  
  Speaker(s): 
  Andy Burnham, Shadow Secretary of State for Health  
 Dr. Charles Alessi, National Association of Primary Care, NHS 
Confederation and Lead for Preventable Dementia, Public Health 
England  
 The Rt. Hon. Stephen Dorrell, Former Chair of the House of 
Commons Health Select Committee 
 Cllr. Steve Bedser, Cabinet Member for Health and Wellbeing, 
Birmingham City Council 
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09:55 – 10:25   Networking & exhibition visit 
10:25 – 10:55 Integrating services for the frail elderly in Kingston – a blueprint for 
the Better Care Fund 
 Speaker(s): 
 Dr. Phil Moore, GP Central Surger Surbiton, Deputy Chair, Kingston 
CCG and Member of Leadership Group of NHSCC 
11:00 – 11:30 Collaborative commissioning – getting it right 
 Speaker(s): 
 Giles Peel, Head of Governance Advisory Practice, DAC Beachcroft 
11:30 – 12:00 Networking & exhibition visit 
12:00 – 12:35 Tackling common tensions in the CCG/NHS England Area Team 
relationship 
 Speaker(s): 
 John Wicks, Interim Chief Officer, Warrington CCG  
Moira Dumma, Area Team Director, Cheshire, Warrington & Wirral 
Area Team, NHS England 
12:35 – 13:05  Tips for procuring excellent commissioning support 
   Speaker(s): 
   Dr. Shane Gordon, Chief Officer, NHS North East Essex CCG 
13:05 – 14:35  Networking & exhibition visit 
14:35 – 15:15  Commissioning for value based outcomes: Is the NHS capable or not? 
   Speaker(s): 
Prof. Paul Corrigan, Former Advisor to Prime Minister Tony Blair 
and Commentator on Health Policy  
Saffron Cordery, Director of Policy and Strategy, Foundation Trust 
Network 
Dr. Steve Laitner, GP, Freelance Health Consultant 
15:05 – 15:40  Networking & exhibition visit 
15:40 – 16:15 Preventing another ‘Bournemouth and Poole’ – lessons from 
experience 
   Speaker(s): 
Catherine Davies, Executive Director of Cooperation and 
Competition, Monitor 
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Gerard Hanratty, Partner, Capsticks 
Sharon Lamb, Partner, Capsticks 
    
Available at: 
<http://www.healthpluscare.co.uk/page.cfm/action=search/searchid=42/filterShowCatID_10=
,108/filterentryDateRange=,26%20Jun%202014> [Accessed 22 August 2014] 
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Appendix D  
List of interviews (anonymised) conducted in the course of this Ph.D. but not used in 
this research 
 
 
Interview 
number 
Entity 
(type) 
Interviewee  Job title Date of 
interview 
22 s 
(provider) 
 
U Estates Services 
Manager 
21 Aug. 2012 
23 t 
(private provider) 
 
V Sector Director of 
Healthcare 
 
5 Sept. 2012 
24 u 
(provider) 
W Project Manager 
(Construction) 
 
11 Sept. 2012 
25 v 
(provider) 
 
X Private Finance 
Initiative Contract 
Manager 
12 Sept. 2012 
(phone 
interview) 
26 w 
(provider) 
Y Director of Planning 27 Sept. 2012 
(phone 
interview) 
27 x 
(provider) 
Z Director of Estates and 
Facilities 
27 Sept. 2012 
(phone 
interview) 
28 y 
(provider) 
 
AA Contracts Manager 27 Sept. 2012 
28 y 
(provider) 
 
BB Estates General 
Manager 
27 Sept. 2012 
29 Z 
(private provider) 
 
CC Commercial Director 2 Oct. 2012 
30 aa 
(provider) 
 
DD Estates Strategic 
Development Manager 
9 Oct. 2012 
31 bb 
(provider) 
 
EE Deputy Director of 
Finance 
10 Oct. 2012 
32 cc 
(provider) 
 
FF Director of Estates and 
Facilities 
17 Oct. 2012 
33 dd 
(consultancy) 
GG Partner, Corporate 
Finance 
18 Oct. 2012 
 
